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Abstract 
Singapore became an independent state on 9 August 1965, six months after 
United States forces landed in Vietnam in March 1965. As part of an effort to contain 
the influence of the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China in Southeast Asia, 
Washington deployed a strategy that encompassed political, economic and defence 
engagements with non-communist countries in the region. Because of its strategic 
location and significant population of overseas Chinese, Singapore became a key 
country in Washington’s policy towards Southeast Asia. 
Between 1965 and 1975, Washington aimed to maintain its access to 
Singapore’s naval dockyards and to keep the island state’s economy viable, so as to 
limit the risk of communist subversion in Singapore. The Singapore government’s 
objectives were to preserve its legitimacy to govern by developing Singapore’s 
economy and boosting its security during the Cold War. In order to gain international 
recognition of its independence after separation from Malaysia, the Singapore 
government decided to join the Non-aligned Movement and maintained an image of 
neutralism in the bipolar conflict between the US and the USSR. After a rocky start in 
the US-Singapore relationship in late 1965, America’s relations with Singapore 
improved in 1966. Nevertheless, the Singapore government seemed to distance itself 
from the US while drawing nearer to the Soviet Union between the late 1960s and the 
early 1970s. 
Drawing from archival documents from the United States, Britain and Australia, 
this dissertation presents a history of US-Singapore foreign relations during the period 
of the Vietnam War, and argues that relations between the two countries were 
determined by the interplay of America’s policy of containment and Singapore’s 
attempt at projecting a non-aligned foreign policy stance. Although the first decade of 
Singapore’s independence established the United States as an indispensable contributor 
to Singapore’s economic growth and security during the Cold War, the process was not 
always smooth because the leaders in both countries recognised that their interests were 
best met when Singapore and the US maintained political distance from each other. 
This study adds to a current trend in Cold War historiography in Southeast Asia 
by demonstrating how American strategy was influenced by smaller states such as 
Singapore. The Singapore government attempted to sway US strategy in the region and 
was able to achieve its goals when it played the Soviet card. Non-communist Southeast 
 v 
Asian leaders, including Lee Kuan Yew, exerted pressure on the US government to 
maintain troops in Vietnam and prolonged the Vietnam war. This study establishes a 
link between a prosperous Southeast Asia and a Vietnam that became a war zone and 
proposes that Singapore was able to prosper not only due to good governance, but also 
because of America’s interest in keeping Singapore economically viable. 
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Introduction 
 
“Recent developments suggest that the GOS may to some degree be in the 
process of changing its attitude toward US military presence in Singapore and security 
relationships with the U.S.,” wrote Theodore Heavner, Country Director of Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore Affairs at the United States Department of State in a 
memorandum in 1973. “While nothing dramatic has surfaced, the former GOS policy, 
i.e. holding us at arm’s length and even flirting with the possibility of increased Soviet 
presence, now seems to be undergoing gradual change.”1 At first glance, Ted Heavner 
was giving a positive report on Singapore’s improving attitude towards the United 
States. Yet far from hitting a celebratory note, Heavner’s statements were really a 
preamble to a warning. In his memo, he went on to caution that America’s policy 
towards Singapore should be kept unchanged despite positive signs that the Singapore 
government would now welcome an American military presence in Singapore. The 
foreign policy strategy of the Richard Nixon administration had been to carry out the 
devolution of American military presence in Asia, while establishing détente with the 
Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China.2 Heavner feared that an overly warm 
reception of the Singapore government’s overture towards the United States, though 
welcomed, could cause the US government drift away from the tenets of the Nixon 
Doctrine, or to create such an impression among the Singapore leadership.3 
In the course of ten years, from 1965 to 1975, Washington and Singapore 
struggled to reciprocate friendly gestures from each other. When Washington was 
willing to deepen US-Singapore ties during the Lyndon Johnson administration (1963-
1969), the Singapore government met US offers with suspicions. When the Singapore 
                                                
1 Theodore J.C. Heavner, “US Military Involvement with Singapore and Some Suggested Policy 
Guidelines”, 20 February 1973, in DEF 19 Military Assistance - Army 1973, Box 11, Subject Files of the 
Office of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore Affairs, 1965-74, RG 59, NACP. 
2 Warren I. Cohen, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations Volume 4: America in the Age 
of Soviet Power, 1945-1991 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 184. 
3 Heavner, “US Military Involvement with Singapore”, 20 February 1973. 
 2 
government invited closer collaboration with the United States, policymakers in the US 
government no longer regarded intimate American-Singapore ties to be of vital interest. 
In August 1965, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, during a televised interview, 
categorically dispelled all likelihood that Singapore would welcome the US military. “If 
the British withdraw,” Lee hypothesised then, “I am prepared to go on with the 
Australians and the New Zealanders. But, I am not prepared to go on with Americans.”4 
When Britain announced plans to withdraw from east of Suez in 1967, Lee visited US 
President Lyndon Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to invite the US 
Seventh Fleet to utilise the naval dockyards left behind by the British military, and 
perhaps provide an American military presence in Singapore to ward off likely 
aggressors. Washington agreed to repair US warships in Singapore but flatly rejected 
further forms of US military commitment towards Singapore. In the early 1970s, when 
Richard Nixon was President of the United States (1969-1974), the tables turned. Back 
then, the American ambassador to Singapore, Charles Cross, failed to get a favourable 
response from Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew when he probed Lee on the 
possibility of US Navy vessels being permanently stationed in Sembawang Naval Base 
in the north of Singapore.5 But by then, Lee was no longer worried about external 
threats to Singapore and hinted that an American naval presence in Singapore would not 
benefit both countries. During the Gerald Ford presidency, from 1974 to 1976, US-
Singapore relations were stable, built on solid economic and strategic cooperation. 
Thus, to describe the United States-Singapore foreign relations between 1965 and 1975 
as volatile would be to state the case too mildly.  
During the 1960s and 1970s, the governments of both countries saw common 
interests between Singapore and the United States in Southeast Asia. Yet, domestic 
conditions and external factors kept both countries mostly “at arm’s length”. 6 
Decolonisation and the Cold War dynamics complicated the relations between 
Singapore and the US. In August 1965, Singapore emerged from close to two years of 
                                                
4 “Transcript of an interview by foreign correspondents with the Prime Minister of Singapore Mr. Lee 
Kuan Yew, held at TV Singapura at 1130 hrs on 30.8.65”, 30 August 1965, in Lee Kuan Yew (2 of 2), 
Box 2, Subject Files of the Office of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore Affairs, 1965-74, RG 59, NACP. 
5  Charles T. Cross, “Memorandum of Conversation: US Naval and Aircraft Repair Program in 
Singapore”, 24 July 1971, in DEF 15 U.S. Use of Military Facilities (Singapore 1971), Box 8, Subject 
Files of the Office of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore Affairs, 1965-74, RG 59, NACP. For a map of 
Sembawang, see p. xiii of this thesis. 
6 Heavner, “US Military Involvement with Singapore”, 20 February 1973. 
 3 
unhappy union with the Federation of Malaysia. Containing communism, although not 
irrelevant to the newly independent Singapore, did not loom large in the minds of the 
political elites; social stability and economic development, often referred to as 
“survival”, preoccupied the Lee Kuan Yew government. 7  American military 
involvement in the Vietnam War escalated in early 1965 and ended with the Paris Peace 
Accord of 1973, followed by the fall of Saigon in April 1975.8 As a result of 
Washington’s policy of containing communist influence in Asia during the Cold War, 
American military and political involvement in Southeast Asian affairs was 
unprecedented from 1965 to 1975. Because of America’s increasing stake in the 
Vietnam War, even developments in Singapore, a seemingly insignificant Southeast 
Asian country, became a concern for the US government.  
Although the US State Department was attentive to developments in Singapore 
during the Cold War, Washington still viewed Singapore mainly as a former British 
colony, and hence, a Commonwealth responsibility. As a matter of policy during the 
Lyndon Johnson presidency, the United States government should avoid commitment to 
Singapore’s defence. Nevertheless, from 1965 to the middle of the 1970s, bilateral 
relations between the US and Singapore deepened, reflecting an interplay between 
America’s containment strategy in Asia and Singapore’s foreign policy of neutralism.9 
                                                
7 ‘Survival’ is a recurring theme in the memoirs and biographies of Singapore’s early leaders. See Lee 
Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965-2000 (New York: HarperCollins, 
2000; Lee Kuan Yew, “The Fundamentals of Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Then & Now” (paper presented 
at the S Rajaratnam Lecture 2009, Shangri-la Hotel, Singapore, 9 April 2009); S.R. Nathan, “My Foreign 
Ministry Years”, in The Little Red Dot: Reflections by Singapore’s Diplomats, ed. Koh and Chang,  
(Singapore: World Scientific, 2005). Scholars writing Singapore’s history have also acknowledged that 
the theme of ‘survival’ is an appropriate description of Singapore’s circumstances during its separation 
from Malaysia in August 1965. See Chan Heng Chee, Singapore: The Politics of Survival 1965-1967 
(Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 2; Amitav Acharya, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: The 
Search for Regional Order (Singapore: World Scientific, 2008), p. 1; Chua Beng Huat, Communitarian 
Ideology and Democracy in Singapore (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 4-5 & 18-19; Kawin Wilarat, 
Singapore’s Foreign Policy: The First Decade (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1975), 
pp. 29-73. Tim Huxley, Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore (NSW: Allen & 
Unwin, 2000), p. xix. 
8 Ang Cheng Guan marks the beginning of American involvement in the Second Indochina War to be 8 
March 1965 with “the landing of the first combat troops - two marine battalions consisting of 3,500 men 
landing on the beach of Danang”. See Ang Cheng Guan, Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2010), p. 24. Paul Kelemen’s account of the escalation of US military involvement begins in 
February 1965, “marked by regular bombings of the North…and the sending in July of 100,000 American 
troops to South Vietnam”. See Paul Kelemen, “Soviet Strategy in Southeast Asia”, Asian Survey, 24, no. 
3 (1984): p. 337. 
9 The terms “neutrality” and “neutralism” used in a political context during the Cold War were 
problematic because of the different shades in the meaning of “neutrality” in history. Peter Lyon points 
out that the concept of “neutralism”, more often used than “neutrality” during the Cold War, branches out 
to “proximate equivalents” such as “non-alignment”, “peaceful and active co-existence”, “active formal 
neutralism”, “positive neutralism” and “isolationism”. “Neutrality”, on the other hand, has an older 
 4 
Before Heavner’s 1973 memorandum, Singapore’s policy of non-alignment with major 
power blocs kept the United States at a distance, not unlike Singapore’s treatment of the 
Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Only Singapore’s 
Commonwealth partners, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (ANZUK) 
possessed special relations with the newly independent Singapore. 
Yet the Singapore government, while keeping the Americans at arm’s length, 
was regarded by the United States government as an important partner. Since 1966, US-
Singapore relations had played a decisive role in Singapore’s viability after Singapore 
was expelled from Malaysia. ANZUK-Singapore relations faded in importance, whereas 
the US-Singapore relationship emerged as the key to Singapore’s economic viability. 
To be sure, the United States-Singapore relationship was asymmetric from the start. 
Although the US was the greater partner in the US-Singapore relationship, the impact of 
the smaller player in the nexus should not be ignored. Tuong Vu, in his work on the 
Cold War in Asia, cautions that “the new Cold War scholarship should not assume that 
power and influence flowed only one way from the big to the small, even in highly 
asymmetric relationships that characterized many Cold War alliances”. 10  Vu’s 
argument, shared by Robert Litwak, is best illustrated by the US State Department when 
it hesitated to reject the Singapore defence ministry’s request for sophisticated military 
equipment, for fear that the Singapore government would turn to the Soviet Union to 
supply similar technology.11 
                                                                                                                                          
tradition tracing back to the Roman Empire, the Middle Ages, and more recently, the French 
Revolutionary-Napoleonic wars, and the First and Second World Wars. More important, “neutrality” 
carries a narrower definition than “neutralism”. Lyon argues that “neutrality means keeping aloof from 
shooting wars whereas neutralism means dissociation from the cold war, while perhaps, involving efforts 
to remove or, at least, mitigate some of the harshness of the cold war struggle”. See Peter Lyon, 
“Neutrality and the Emergence of the Concept of Neutralism”, Review of Politics, 22, no. 2 (April 1960): 
pp. 266-67. This current study agrees with Lyon’s position on the meanings of “neutrality” and 
“neutralism”, and uses “neutralism” and “non-alignment” to mean the foreign policy stance of the Afro-
Asian countries that did not align themselves with the major power blocs during the Cold War. The US 
Department of State documents consulted for this current study and some scholars writing on the Non-
aligned Movement within the Cold War context do not make a distinction between “neutrality” and 
“neutralism”. Hence, unless otherwise stated, sources that mention “neutral”, “neutrality”, or 
“neutralisation” will be understood to carry the broader definition of “neutralism” and “non-alignment 
with major power bloc”. 
10 Tuong Vu, “Cold War Studies and the Cultural Cold War in Asia”, in Dynamics of the Cold War in 
Asia, ed. Vu and Wongsurawat,  (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 9. 
11 Robert S. Litwak, Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of 
Stability, 1969-1976 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 92; “Singapore: Bilateral Issues 
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The importance of the United States to Singapore’s viability outweighed the 
importance of Singapore to the United States; it was apparent that Singapore needed the 
US partnership more. Yet Singapore chose to be non-aligned when it gained 
independent statehood.12 In fact, both governments recognised that a formal alliance or 
any overt political alignment during the period from 1965 to 1975 would not further 
their respective interests, and even be detrimental to their foreign policy and political 
objectives. Washington aimed to contain the rising influence of the PRC in Asia. On the 
other hand, the Singapore government needed to build a nation from a population of 
migrants, which mostly comprised ethnic Chinese. The Singapore government, although 
anti-communist, aligned Singapore with the neutralist bloc while promoting a 
Singaporean identity. Finding common ground in the midst of superpower competition 
during the Cold War had been a central theme in the history of United States-Singapore 
relations between 1965 and 1975. At times, Singapore’s interests were best served by 
drawing closer to the United States. On other occasions, the Singapore government 
preferred to emphasise Singapore’s foreign policy of neutralism and kept America at a 
distance. 
Writing the history of Southeast Asia during the Cold War based on an interplay 
between America’s containment policy and decolonisation in Southeast Asia has 
become a growing trend both in the historiography of American foreign relations and 
Southeast Asian history. Since 2005, scholars of American diplomatic history during 
the Cold War have given much attention to the writing of “new Cold War history”.13 A 
“new Cold War history”, as argued in Christopher Goscha and Christian Ostermann’s 
Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945-1962 
(2009), will shift “the old debate centered on the question of who was to blame for the 
rise of the Cold War to rethinking some of the fundamental dynamics of the 
international history of the second half of the twentieth century”.14 This new genre 
                                                
12 The Singapore government’s decision to be non-aligned was motivated by the fear that Singapore’s 
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emphasises “the role of ideas and ideology and the importance of ‘smaller powers’”, 
brings to bear findings in newly declassified documents in communist countries, and 
sets American foreign policy in the context of decolonisation and Asian nationalism.15 
The editors of Connecting Histories noted that “it is also worth recalling how the 
intersection of the Cold War and decolonization prolonged or hastened decolonization 
on the diplomatic front”.16 In the case of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew was able to ride on 
American containment strategy to promote US investments in Singapore, giving the 
newly decolonised country a boost in its economic development. 
Tuong Vu takes the analysis further by asserting that “Asian actors — while 
possessing limited military and economic capabilities — were neither victims nor 
puppets of the superpowers as conventionally believed”.17 He outlines the importance of 
juxtaposing three central concepts in his assessment of Cold War historiography, 
“namely, ‘Asia’ as a geographical location, the ‘Cold War’ as a historical event, and 
‘culture’ as a sphere of social activity”.18 In applying the three concepts, he argues that 
the spread of the Cold War “should be reconceptualized as an intercontinental 
synchronization of hostilities in which Asian actors shared equal responsibilities with 
the superpowers in the spread of the conflict”.19 He challenges “the notion of an Asian 
vacuum waiting for the superpowers to fill in the late 1940s,” and stresses that 
[i]t is more accurate to say that the Cold War would not have extended into Asia 
had some Asian actors not desired it and worked hard to get what they wanted. 
The Cold War did not spread to and engulf Asia as the standard narratives tell it. 
Asia was already engulfed in conflicts. These local conflicts in Asia intensified 
and lasted longer due to the Cold War. But the Cold War also intensified and 
lasted longer because of these local conflicts.20 
Michael Szonyi and Hong Liu concur with Vu’s challenge to the “standard narratives” 
of the Cold War in Asia by arguing that “while the history of Asia in the late twentieth 
century cannot simply be subsumed within a Cold War narrative, the global geo-
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18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
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political struggle profoundly shaped the context in which regional and national change 
unfolded”.21 Immanuel Wallerstein challenges the “dominant historical narratives” of 
the US or the USSR initiating “anything important that happened” during the Cold War 
period, calling it “largely a fantasy”.22 The case of Singapore-US relations from 1965 to 
1975 supports the argument that the superpower rivalry indeed had limited impact on 
Southeast Asian conflicts. The US, the PRC, and the USSR to a lesser extent, 
influenced the changes occurring within Singapore during this period, but neither could 
be regarded as having dictated or solely directed key events surrounding Singapore’s 
development of nationhood.  
Second, under Vu’s concept of “Cold War”, he argues that “indigenous political 
processes in Asia (i.e., nation-state building and socioeconomic development) had 
critical reverse impact on the Cold War”.23 The Asian nationalists were able to play one 
superpower over the other to break away from colonial rule and “to secure American or 
Soviet aid for their nation-building programs”.24  Szonyi and Liu assert that “the 
superpower perception of the conflict in bipolar, zero-sum terms implied, for the 
superpowers, certain logics — ways of apprehending the world and formulating 
policy”.25 Asian governments that comprehended the Cold War logic of Washington, 
Moscow and Beijing “could make use of those logics to force the superpowers to act in 
service of local interests”.26 The Singapore government certainly took into account the 
logic of American Cold War perceptions to its diplomacy with the United States. At 
times, according to Szonyi and Liu, “tails could wag dogs”.27  
Third, Vu argues that “Asian actors’ visions and political loyalties during the 
Cold War” were not limited to the nation-state, but encompassed the nation’s peoples, 
their ideology and their cultures.28 In sum, Cold War scholarship must neither fall into 
the trap of completely ignoring the interaction between local and international histories 
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26 Ibid. 
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nor disregard the influence of the superpowers during the Cold War.29 “To use an 
analogy of theater,” he explains, “ the plays on Asian stages embedded both Cold War 
and local plots…. The job of Cold War analysts is to disentangle these plots.”30 This 
account of US-Singapore relations from 1965 to 1975 reveals the existence of differing 
priorities in the midst of common interests between the US and Singapore governments 
such as the containment of communism in Southeast Asia. Whereas the American 
government treated nation-building as a strategy for containment in Asia, Singapore 
government regarded nation-building and socioeconomic development in Singapore as a 
critical endeavour in its own right. 
The history of United States-Singapore foreign relations seldom attracts book-
length studies. The most comprehensive study on US-Singapore relations so far is Joey 
Long’s Safe for Decolonization: the Eisenhower administration, Britain, and Singapore 
(2011).31 In his study, Long argues that the Eisenhower administration understood that 
the People’s Action Party (PAP) government, which came to power after the 1959 
elections in Singapore, was “communist infiltrated” and “adverse to US and free world 
interests”.32 Long provides historical background on US-Singapore relations during the 
Eisenhower administration from the perspectives of the American, British and local 
actors.33 Relations between “principal actors” from Singapore, the UK and the US, 
Long argues, went through “many twists and turns”, with Americans and British 
disagreeing over the “decolonization process” in the midst of conflicting local attitudes 
towards the western powers.34 In his study, Long places emphasis on President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower’s development of a robust Cold War strategy that deployed instruments 
of statecraft to make Singapore “safe for decolonization”, thereby challenging the 
notion that Eisenhower did not exercise leadership as executive, but gave his Secretary 
of State, John Foster Dulles, full control over foreign policy.35 Juxtaposing the “Cold 
War and local plots” effectively,36 Long’s work offers an important backdrop for this 
current study by elucidating the significance of Singapore to American administrations 
                                                
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
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(Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2011). 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Vu, “Cold War Studies and the Cultural Cold War in Asia”, p. 12. 
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even before Singapore’s independence.37 In attempting to build bridges with Singapore 
through a myriad of strategies, the Eisenhower administration achieved mixed results 
but was most successful in projecting a favourable image of the United States among 
Singaporeans through injecting American cultural products into the island.38 If the 
Eisenhower years laid the foundation for subsequent US administrations to build 
friendly US-Singapore relations,39 Long’s work too serves as a natural starting point for 
this study on relations between the two countries after the Eisenhower administration.  
Shorter studies focussing on United States-Singapore relations between 1965 
and 1975 have also provided insights on several aspects of foreign relations between the 
two countries. Ang Cheng Guan’s study of US-Singapore relations during the Vietnam 
War (2009) and the Southeast Asian perspective of the Vietnam conflict (2010) 
examines US relations with Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and the 
Philippines during the Vietnam War, from 1965 to 1973.40 For his research, Ang uses 
sources from the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and Southeast Asian countries that are 
available in edited series and internet databases. Sections on Lee Kuan Yew’s 
conversations with US government officials during the period offer opportunities to 
cross-examine the sources used in this current study. Ang’s survey on the impact of the 
Vietnam War on the five Southeast Asian countries has been acclaimed for being an 
invaluable contribution to a deeper understanding of US-Southeast Asian relations 
during the Vietnam War.41 In his other works, Ang accentuates the prominence of Lee 
Kuan Yew in Singapore’s foreign policy planning through an examination of Lee’s 
strategic thoughts.42 Ang asserts that Lee was “Asia’s leading strategic thinker” with the 
ability to help other world leaders “find direction in a complicated world”.43 Drawing 
upon Lee’s speeches and public statements, Ang makes the claim that Lee’s statements 
and speeches are “valuable but underrated source[s]” useful for understanding his 
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thoughts on international politics.44 Writing predominantly on Lee’s views regarding 
the Vietnam War, however, Ang alludes to Lee’s anti-American comments made in 
1965 but inadvertently treats the anti-American thrust of Lee’s statements with a light 
touch.45 
Albert Lau’s edited volume on the impact and legacy of the Cold War in 
Southeast Asia incorporated one chapter on “Decolonization and the Cold War in 
Singapore, 1955-9,” authored by himself.46 Like Joey Long, Lau’s study focuses on 
Singapore’s struggle for independence from British colonial rule during the Cold War. 
Drawing mainly from British sources, Lau argues that the British government had 
underestimated the desire of Singapore to break away from colonial control during the 
Cold War years.47 Lau and Long arrived at the same conclusion, that London and 
Washington had managed relations with Singapore with predominantly Cold War 
thinking and minimal appreciation for rising nationalism in Singapore. This current 
study agrees with their assertions and further argues that American Cold War policy of 
containment in Asia did not take into consideration Singapore’s circumstances as a 
newly independent state. Even when the US embassy in Singapore occasionally 
recommended a deeper engagement with the Singapore government, Washington was 
often slow to act. The US State Department was most successful in its relations with 
Singapore when its policies aligned with Singapore’s need for socioeconomic 
development — a pillar of Singapore’s nation-building project. 
Although studies focussing on the United States’ engagement with Singapore 
are relatively scant, research conducted on US relations with Southeast Asian countries 
often reveals insights into how Washington conducted diplomacy with non-aligned 
countries during the Cold War. Pamela Sodhy, in her book The US-Malaysian Nexus, 
argues that the United States engaged Malaysia through a “triangular relationship”, 
which had to involve the British.48 Sodhy proposes that US perception of Malaysia 
before its independence in 1957 was marked by three “prisms”: Malaya was part of a 
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vital area of interest – the Far East, relations with Malaya took account of British 
involvement, and Malaya was an “important bulwark in containing communism in 
Southeast Asia”.49 The US government’s criticism of Britain’s conduct of the Malayan 
Emergency (1948-1960) motivated the US to be more involved in Malaya, and caused 
the Malayan leadership to gradually see America as a possible alternative to the 
British.50 Major events such as the Indonesian Confrontation, the Vietnam War and 
Britain’s announcement to withdraw from East of Suez resulted in the drifting apart of 
Malaysia from the British, and strengthening of US-Malaysian ties.51 Richard Mason 
observed that “[f]or many of these newly emerged [Southeast Asian] states, neutralism 
in the Cold War was a domestic political imperative. At the same time, non-alignment 
allowed them to acquire assistance from both sides in the Cold War”.52 Using Indonesia 
as an example, Mason goes on to point out that “[d]espite this profession of neutralism, 
…the international orientation of Indonesia…was in fact considerably closer to the 
Western bloc than to the Sino-Soviet bloc”.53 Mason’s conclusions for Indonesia are apt 
when applied to Singapore between 1965 and 1975, since Singapore also “leaned 
discernibly toward the United States”.54 Nevertheless, the similarities between United 
States objectives for Singapore and Indonesia during the early years of independent 
statehood end there. Whereas Washington aimed to bring Indonesia “into a full 
alignment with the Western powers” in 1950,55 this current study asserts that the US 
government was content to let Singapore remain non-aligned in the 1960s.  
Based mainly on declassified documents from the National Archives and 
Records Administration at the Maryland, USA, this current research provides a 
historical account of US-Singapore foreign relations from 1965 to 1975. Whenever 
necessary, records from the National Archives at Kew, London, and the National 
Archives of Australia at Canberra are consulted to supplement the American 
documents. As pointed out accurately by Ang Cheng Guan and historians writing on 
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Singapore, and Southeast Asia in general, the perspectives of Southeast Asian 
governments during the Cold War will remain missing as long as government 
documents are not opened for research.56 To make up for the lack of official documents, 
this current study utilises speeches, memoirs and biographies of Singapore political 
leaders to gain a Singapore perspective. 
The interpretation of the documentary sources collected for this research 
benefits from the scholarship of international history and international relations. 
Beginning from the 1980s, historians John Lewis Gaddis and Melvyn Leffler urged 
diplomatic historians to consider the impact of US foreign policy within an international 
context instead of single-mindedly criticising US diplomacy based on its effects on 
America’s domestic environment. The focus on the global impact of US foreign 
relations created a generation of international historians who refrained from making the 
US the centre of the Cold War narrative and gave a voice to other countries involved 
during the Cold War.57 Often referred to as postrevisionist historians of the Cold War, 
Gaddis and Leffler aim to preserve two key strands of the realist school of international 
relations theory: maintaining the primary focus on state-to-state interaction, and 
avoiding synthesis of diplomatic history with other disciplines. Leffler advocates that 
diplomatic history should focus on “policymaking elites, on state-to-state relations, and 
on national power”.58 Michael Hogan nonetheless argues that focussing on states “is 
essentially an analysis of perceptions, not some objective and knowable reality”.59 In 
response, Leffler cautions diplomatic historians against synthesising the discipline with 
branches of social and cultural studies, stressing that 
[t]he pursuit of synthesis will not lead to consensus; quite the opposite. 
Controversy over the relative weight we should assign a multiplicity of variables 
will open new interpretive vistas. To be persuasive we will need to be more 
rigorous, more complex, more creative.… But the postmodernist emphasis on 
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culture, language, and rhetoric often diverts attention from questions of 
causation and agency.60 
When examining the documents gathered from the six archives and presidential 
libraries, this research focuses on state-to-state relations between the US and Singapore, 
and posits a new Cold War history by giving heed to the interaction between America’s 
diplomacy and Singapore’s decolonisation.  
Situated within the field of international history, this study employs methods 
that are common to historical research, particularly in the application of international 
relations theory in US-Singapore relations. Gaddis posits that historians tend to keep an 
“open mind” in the analysis of their sources and see theory as “more often than not 
closing minds”.61 Gaddis explains that  
theorists seek to build universally applicable generalizations about necessarily 
simple matters; but if these matters were any more complicated their theories 
wouldn’t be universally applicable. From our [historians’] perspective, then, 
when theories are right they generally confirm the obvious. When they move 
beyond the obvious they’re usually wrong.62 
To be sure, Gaddis acknowledges that theory plays a role in the writing of history. 
When historians attempt to simulate past events, they practise what Gaddis calls 
“particular generalization” by embedding theory within the narrative. 63  Political 
scientists, on the other hand, practise “general particularization” where narrative is 
subordinate to the principal objective of testing a theoretical framework.64 To illustrate 
the process of particular generalization, Gaddis recounts that his writing of Cold War 
history involves the use of neorealism to explain a particular historical outcome without 
attempting to “encompass the entire Cold War within a neorealist framework”.65 
Following Gaddis’ process of particular generalization, this research develops a 
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historical narrative that traces the development of US-Singapore relations and embeds 
concepts such as balance of power and zero-sum calculus that belong to the realist 
school of international relations theory. 
Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman assert that “the differences between 
international historians and political scientists who study international relations through 
qualitative methods are not as stark as believed”.66 Historians and international relations 
theorists share the view that “the past can be studied to provide perspectives on the 
present and to help solve current policy problems”.67 Robert Jervis argues that the work 
of political scientists and diplomatic historians involve general theories and particular 
historical cases but they “go about the task characteristically differently”.68 A common 
challenge for both historians and political scientists that Jervis points out is the level of 
consistency in human behaviour.69 Jervis contends that psychologists have found that 
scholars put too much emphasis on “personal dispositions” and underestimate “the 
power of the situation” in analysing the decision and the decision-maker.70 By so doing, 
there is a tendency to assume a general consistency in human behaviour, resulting in 
inaccurate projection of future actions of individuals. In fact, Deborah Welch Larson 
questions the notion that policymakers “consciously direct their actions to achieve 
larger goals” and proposes that they make “snap judgments” based on the information 
they have and rationalise their decisions later on.71 Hence, Larson cautions both 
historians and international relations theorists not to assume that decision-makers 
anticipated the outcomes of their actions. Bearing in mind the complexity of analysing 
the archival records used in this research, there is conscious attempt to avoid 
overrationalising or speculating on the particular situations when there are gaps in the 
sources. 
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The principal argument put forth in this current study is that diplomatic relations 
between Singapore and the United States between 1965 and 1975 were determined by 
the interplay between the American policy of containment and Singapore’s image of 
non-alignment. The period covered in this study was critical to Southeast Asia’s 
security, beginning with the entry of US ground troops into Vietnam in March 1965, 
and Singapore’s separation from the Federation of Malaysia in August of the same year. 
The withdrawal of British troops from Malaysia and Singapore from 1967 to 1971 
ended Britain’s military influence in the sub-region, and led to Singapore’s turn towards 
the United States as a balancing power against the People’s Republic of China. After the 
United States withdrew from Vietnam in 1973, North and South Vietnam unified under 
a communist government in 1975. In that year, the Lon Nol government in Cambodia 
was ousted by the Khmer Rouge, setting the stage for the Vietnam-Cambodia crisis, 
which marked a new period of conflict, and becomes a suitable point to end this 
dissertation. The first part of this study analyses the underlying premises of both the 
Singapore government and the American government in their foreign policy approaches 
towards each other — the former declared a non-aligned posture, whereas the latter was 
waging a global Cold War with the aim of containing communism in Asia. Although 
attempts were made by both governments to deepen US-Singapore relations, the 
relationship could be described as ‘intimacy at arm’s length’. The first chapter accounts 
for the nation-building imperative taken by the Singapore government when Singapore 
became independent in 1965. The need to build a nation, which centred on a Singapore 
identity and enjoyed a basic standard of living directed the Singapore government’s 
domestic and foreign policies. Undergirding governmental policies was the objective of 
economic development and regime preservation of the PAP government. Maintaining 
the focal point at Singapore’s foreign policy, this chapter demonstrates the 
incompatibility of Singapore’s non-aligned approach to diplomacy with the American 
policy of containment in Asia. 
In 1965, Washington’s chief objective in Singapore was to keep the island-state 
out of the communist orbit. The Singapore government, however, was focussed on 
political and economic viability more than global containment of communism. With the 
objective of boosting Singapore’s non-aligned credentials, Lee Kuan Yew made a series 
of public speeches and interviews expressing anti-American views. Chapter 2 gives an 
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account of Lee’s anti-American press campaign beginning in August 1965. State 
Department documents reveal Lee’s personal motivations and political objectives for 
making vitriolic remarks against the American administration in public. Along with 
Lee’s anti-American speeches, steps were taken by the Singapore government to project 
a strong non-aligned foreign policy to gain membership into the United Nations. The 
souring of relations between the American and the Singapore governments caused 
anxiety to US officials in Washington and the Consul-General in Singapore. Governed 
by a zero-sum mentality, American officials feared that Singapore’s distancing of itself 
from the US implied a close relationship with the Sino-Soviet bloc. State Department 
records reveal that US officials tended to overstate Singapore’s propensity to align itself 
with the communist bloc and argued for active engagement with the newly independent 
Singapore, leading to the visit of senior American officials to Singapore.72  
Part One concludes with the United States-Singapore relations moving in a 
positive trajectory for the first time since August 1965. William Bundy, US Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, met Lee Kuan Yew in March 
1966. The meeting, outlined and examined in Chapter 3, was the turning point for the 
erstwhile difficult US-Singapore relationship. Despite the personal friendship that had 
developed between Bundy and Lee after the meeting, both governments acknowledged 
that a sudden change in their public positions towards each other would not serve their 
best interests. Recognising that an economically viable Singapore would not easily fall 
under the influence of Moscow and Beijing, Washington’s containment policy in 
Singapore took the form of strong economic cooperation. Hence, without publicity, US 
economic activities in Singapore began to increase. 
The second part of the study accounts for the accelerated improvement of the 
United States-Singapore strategic relationship after the British government, under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Harold Wilson, announced plans to withdraw British 
troops from Malaysia and Singapore. Chapter 4 evaluates the impact of Britain’s 
military withdrawal, which was predicted to affect Singapore’s security, as well as 
political and economic stability. During his visit to Washington in October 1967, Lee 
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invited the United States Navy to maintain an American military presence in the naval 
bases in Singapore. The Johnson administration had already committed significant 
resources in Vietnam but recognised that it was in America’s interest to maintain USN 
access to Singapore naval dockyards after Britain’s withdrawal. Hence, a commercial 
deal was struck to repair US ships and aircraft at Singapore’s naval dockyards and air 
bases. Although the US government avoided direct involvement in Singapore defence, 
Washington kept a close watch over the negotiations of the Five Power Defence 
Arrangements, occasionally intervening behind the scenes by urging Australia to take 
on the leadership of the FPDA. The US government also supplied Singapore with 
military equipment, ranging from light weapons to heavy artillery vehicles and fighter 
jets. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, increased American economic assistance to 
Singapore buttressed the island’s defence and preserved political stability. From 1966 
onwards, there were more American private investments in Singapore, increased trade 
between Singapore and the US military procurement office in Vietnam, and grants for 
regional projects initiated by Singapore. Washington and Singapore recognised that 
burgeoning economic ties between Singapore and the US were compatible with 
containment and non-alignment. 
Although economic cooperation had greatly strengthened US-Singapore 
relations by the early 1970s, the Vietnam War influenced the development of bilateral 
ties throughout the period from 1965 to 1975. Part Three of this study analyses the 
practical difficulties experienced by the US government and the Singapore government 
in meshing containment and non-alignment. As demonstrated in Chapter 6, the United 
States’ desire to pull out of South Vietnam motivated the Singapore government to 
increase engagements with the Soviet Union. After President Lyndon Johnson’s 
announcement not to run for a second term, the Singapore government became sceptical 
that the American military presence in South Vietnam would last long. Fearing that a 
US withdrawal from South Vietnam might lead to a communist takeover in Southeast 
Asia, the Singapore government urged Washington to maintain American troops in 
Vietnam during the early months of the Richard Nixon’s administration. The Nixon 
Doctrine, aimed at minimising direct US involvement in overseas conflicts, nonetheless 
signalled a reduced American commitment to fight communism in Southeast Asia. 
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In addition to the communist threat from Vietnam, the Singapore government 
was also concerned that the People’s Republic of China might exert its influence over 
the Chinese population in Singapore. The victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 
1949 after a long civil war had stirred up ethnic pride in a large section of the Chinese 
population in Singapore, strengthening their affiliation with China.73 In 1949, Beijing 
created the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC) to engage the overseas 
Chinese in Southeast Asia through Chinese organisations, schools and newspapers. 
During the late 1940s and 1950s, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) established an 
Open United Front, which carried on communist struggle in Singapore through trade 
and student unions.74 Trade unions such as the Singapore Federation of Trade Unions 
(SFTU) “made little secret of their Communist affiliation”.75 The Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce became openly critical of the colonial government when the Chinese 
language was not recognised as an official language in the Rendel commission,76 
followed by changes in the education system that disadvantaged Chinese-medium 
schools.77 Resentment towards the policies that affected the Chinese in Singapore 
sparked labour and student protests, most notably the Hock Lee Bus strike in 1955, and 
student protests in 1954 and 1961.78 The Secretary General of the MCP, Chin Peng, 
revealed in a dialogue with scholars that there were teachers in Singapore Chinese 
schools who were members of the CCP.79 The MCP had also established a Foreign 
Bureau in Beijing around 1954 and sought advice from the CCP.80 After Singapore was 
separated from Malaysia in 1965, the Singapore government continued to regard 
communist subversion as a credible threat. 
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If the US could not contain the PRC, the Singapore government would engage 
the USSR to balance Beijing’s influence in the region. Furthermore, Singapore’s 
relations with Malaysia and Indonesia would be adversely affected if the Singapore 
government was seen to be close to the PRC.81 Between 1968 and 1969, the Singapore 
government began to regard Moscow as an alternative to the US for the containment of 
Beijing’s threat to Singapore, should the US military withdraw from Vietnam 
precipitously.82 Singapore established diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union in June 
1968 and began allowing Soviet warships into Singapore’s naval dockyards. Under 
pressure from the ANZUK and the US, however, the Singapore government restricted 
access to Soviet warships but continued ship repair contracts for Soviet merchant 
vessels in Singapore. The Singapore government played the ‘Soviet card’ from 1968 to 
1972 in order to keep America engaged in Southeast Asia. 
Chapter 7 highlights the changes in attitude between Washington and the 
Singapore government after the US withdrew from Vietnam. Although President 
Nixon’s foreign policy strategy of superpower détente and devolution of American 
forces in Asia was met with suspicion by the Singapore government, America’s exit 
from the Vietnam War in January 1973 marked a period of improved US-Singapore 
ties. As part of the US government’s plans to withdraw from Vietnam, the US 
Department of Defense utilised Singapore as a staging area for its withdrawal. The use 
of Singapore’s ship and aircraft repair facilities by the US Army and Navy carried on 
despite the end of the Vietnam War. During the Ford administration, the Singapore 
government continued to be an ardent supporter of American presence in Southeast 
Asia. By the end of 1975, close relations between the United States and Singapore had 
been firmly established. 
As part of a new genre of Cold War history, this study analyses the interplay 
between America’s policy of containment in Asia and Singapore’s non-aligned foreign 
policy. This study argues that the two governments found misalignments in their 
objectives and disagreed on political issues. Nevertheless, economic cooperation 
became a strong link between Singapore and the United States from 1966 onwards, and 
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gave the Singapore government’s neutralism a strong American bias. Along with other 
Southeast Asian leaders, Lee’s warnings that an American withdrawal would result in a 
loss of credibility and confidence in the United States prolonged the Vietnam War. Lee 
argues that the United States, by holding the line in Vietnam, was buying time for the 
rest of Southeast Asia. 83  American military involvement in Vietnam maintained 
political stability of the non-communist regimes in Southeast Asia and provided the 
years necessary to build their economies. By examining the intersection of Euro-centric 
perspectives of the Cold War with Asian decolonisation, both the “Cold War and the 
local plots” interact to reveal the complicity of smaller actors in the region in the 
protracted warfare in Vietnam.84 
                                                
83 Ang, Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War, p. 29. 
84 Vu, “Cold War Studies and the Cultural Cold War in Asia”, p. 12. 
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Avoiding Proximity 
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Chapter 1 
American Containment and Singapore Survival 
Finding Common Ground 
 
In the development of bilateral ties between the United States government and 
the People’s Action Party government in Singapore, several factors intertwined to direct 
the course of US-Singapore relations.1 Most significant among these factors were the 
Singapore government’s foreign policy of non-alignment with major powers and the US 
government’s policy of containing Sino-Soviet expansionism in Asia from 1965 to 
1975. The American policy of containment was the effect of America’s ideological and 
hegemonic contest with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, which spread into Asia 
through armed conflicts on the Korean Peninsula in the 1950s and in Indochina from the 
1960s to 1970s. A diplomatic history of the United States’ relations with Singapore is 
both a discourse on US containment policy in Southeast Asia, and Singapore’s decision 
to adopt a non-aligned foreign policy during the Cold War. The PAP government’s 
foreign policy decisions were made with consideration of Singapore’s domestic 
conditions, and aimed towards achieving political, social and economic objectives. To 
appreciate the extent and impact of the interplay between containment and non-
alignment, it is essential to consider the basis of the policy approaches of both the 
Singapore and the United States governments and to survey how containment and non-
alignment were compatible in some instances, and became incompatible in other 
circumstances between 1965 and 1975. 
Foreign policy was an important instrument utilised by the PAP government to 
achieve domestic objectives of nation-building and economic development in Singapore 
after the island was separated from Malaysia on 9 August 1965. Lee Kuan Yew 
                                                
1 Singapore became an independent state on 9 August 1965 after secession from the Federation of 
Malaysia, which it was a part of from September 1963. Government-to-government diplomatic relations 
only began when Singapore became a sovereign country but the United States government had 
established a consulate-general in Singapore in 1836. 
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expressed the notion that Singapore’s trade and industrial development was linked with 
its defence and security. Hence, a key objective of Singapore’s foreign and defence 
policy was the promotion of trade.2 In 1969, during the commemoration of Singapore’s 
150th anniversary as a British colony, Singapore’s Minster for Foreign Affairs S. 
Rajaratnam asserted that, “Singapore’s foreign policy is…domestic policy conducted by 
other means”.3 In the speech, Rajaratnam made the connection between Singapore’s 
internal and external policies by describing two “hard facts” about Singapore’s role and 
influence in world affairs.4 First, he asserted that equality between small and big nations 
was often breached by big powers. He then argued that a small country like Singapore 
must possess “internal political stability, a vigorous economy and a sense of purposeful 
unity” in order to “survive the storms of international life”.5 Rajaratnam’s metaphor of 
surviving storms was a common theme in speeches made by Singapore leaders during 
the first years of independence. 
Survival had been the overarching theme for Singapore’s nation-building since 
1965.6 The notion that Singapore was constantly fighting for economic survival, or even 
recognition as an independent political entity in 1965, was built on the perception that 
Singapore was highly susceptible to internal shocks and external threats. “In a nutshell,” 
declared Rajaratnam in a speech made in 1966, “our problem is how to make sure that a 
small island with a teeming population and no natural resources to speak of, can 
maintain, even increase, its living standards and also enjoy peace and security in a 
region marked by mutual jealousies, internal violence, economic disintegration and 
great power conflicts.”7 One of the key founding leaders of Singapore, Goh Keng Swee, 
asserts that Singapore merged with Malaysia in order to “break away from the 
Communist Party” that had controlled the PAP.8 Merger would also provide Singapore 
with a hinterland after the establishment of a common market with Malaysia. After the 
Alliance and the PAP governments failed to find a viable political arrangement between 
                                                
2 Ang, Lee Kuan Yew’s Strategic Thought, p. 18. 
3 S. Rajaratnam, “Speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs & Labour, Mr. S. Rajaratnam, at the 
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Singapore and Malaysia, Goh met Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Razak, and 
Foreign Minister, Tun Dr. Ismail, on 20 July 1965 and “persuaded [them] that the only 
way out was for Singapore to secede, completely”.9 In fact, both Malaysian leaders had 
already “come to the conclusion that Singapore must get out”, and what was left to 
discuss was how separation could be accomplished without British awareness.10 
After separation from Malaysia in 1965, the PAP government developed 
Singapore’s nation-building imperative around the immediate need for Singapore’s 
economic model to respond to the stalled common market project after the separation.11 
In his memoir, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew recounts several problems 
between the federal government in Kuala Lumpur and the PAP government in 
Singapore. Lee quotes a letter from a cabinet colleague, Finance Minister Hon Sui Sen, 
who commented to Lee that the Malaysian government continued to “believe that 
Singapore cannot survive without Malaysia and that [Singapore’s] prosperity is 
completely dependent upon them” even after Singapore had seceded from the 
Federation of Malaysia.12 Regardless of the differing perspectives from Malaysia and 
Singapore, separation from Malaysia had now left Singapore without a hinterland. 
Moreover, the lack of significant manufacturing and agricultural industries meant that 
Singapore did not produce enough goods to be exported. Hence, reducing Singapore’s 
economic dependence on Malaysia became an urgent task for the PAP government after 
separation.  
Beyond economic problems, the Singapore government also needed to develop a 
national identity for Singapore. A large portion of Singapore’s population was made up 
of ethnic Chinese — about 75% of the total population. Approximately 15% of 
Singapore’s population was Malay, less than 10% was Indian, and the rest of the 
population comprised Eurasians and other minorities. The majority of Singapore’s 
immigrant population had come to the island in hope of better economic conditions, but 
remained emotionally and culturally attached to their home countries. The overseas 
Chinese in Singapore retained strong cultural roots with mainland China, and some 
continued to remit their savings back to their home villages in China. Concerns over the 
links that the Chinese in Singapore had with mainland China played a major role in 
bilateral relations between the Singapore government and the United States government 
                                                
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid; Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Times Edition, 
1998), pp. 628-31. 
11 Chua, Communitarian Ideology and Democracy in Singapore, pp. 4-5. 
12 Lee, From Third World to First, p. 237. 
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during the Cold War and requires separate treatment in a later part of the chapter. It is 
sufficient to note at this point that the PAP saw an urgent need to direct the immigrant 
population’s loyalties towards Singapore and away from their home countries. In order 
to create a national identity and a common destiny for Singaporeans, the PAP 
government preached a shared vulnerability that could unify the multi-racial, immigrant 
population in Singapore. 
Beginning from 1965, the notion of vulnerability formed the basis of the PAP 
government’s policies related to Singapore’s nation-building, diplomacy, defence and 
economy. The PAP government attributed Singapore’s vulnerability to geographical, 
economic and political factors, which contributed to internal and external threats to 
Singapore’s security and economic viability.13 PAP leaders used the term “survival” as 
a shorthand to refer to Singapore’s ability to overcome its vulnerabilities to build a 
viable nation-state in 1965. 
Since the early years of independence, the PAP has attributed Singapore’s 
economic vulnerability to the notion of Singapore’s geographical deficiency. 14 
Singapore has a land area of a mere 620 square kilometres, immensely smaller than its 
neighbours, Malaysia and Indonesia. 15  Indeed, Singapore’s small size created 
constraints such as a lack of space, a weak domestic market as a result of a small 
population, and relatively inferior political position in a region with larger and more 
populated neighbours. The constraint of space, coupled with a lack of natural resources, 
also imposed limitations on the use of land for the production of commodities for trade. 
In 1963, the PAP government admonished that only a political merger with the 
Federation of Malaysia could resolve the economic problems caused by Singapore’s 
lack of hinterland and sizeable domestic market.16 The failed merger with Malaysia 
added a strong sense of crisis and urgency to the notion of vulnerability conveyed by the 
PAP government. On the other hand, Singapore’s disadvantage in size was somewhat 
mitigated by its geographical position. Singapore was located off the southern tip of the 
Malay Peninsula and at the intersection of trade routes between major ports in the Far 
East, and seaports in key Middle Eastern cities and Europe. In addition, Singapore had 
deep harbours and was sheltered from storms by larger islands surrounding it. 
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Therefore, at the beginning of British colonial rule in 1824, Singapore was regarded by 
the British as an ideal port along the trade route to China.17  
Whereas Singapore’s location at the crossroads of the Indo-Pacific Ocean made 
it an ideal trading hub, its strategic location also made the island a target for external 
powers competing for a foothold in the region.18 During the Cold War period, where the 
US and the Soviet Union fought each other through proxies, Singapore became a 
strategic target for both the free world and the communist camp.19 Both the United 
States and the Sino-Soviet bloc recognised the significance of Southeast Asia because 
control over the region by the opposing camp would result in considerable strategic and 
political disadvantage during the conflict.20 The United States and the Commonwealth 
nations calculated that a communist stronghold in Singapore would be a significant 
advantage to the Sino-Soviet bloc in Southeast Asia by encircling the Malay Peninsula 
and Thailand with communist regimes, especially if a communist-led Singapore could 
assist the communist party in Indonesia, the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), in their 
political struggle against the Indonesian Army. Parties in Indonesia that opposed the 
PKI thus voiced grave concerns that Singapore could be used as an outpost for Beijing 
to operate subversive communist operations in Southeast Asia.21 
Apart from the problems arising from Singapore’s geopolitical setting, violent 
labour and communal riots threatened its internal security and social stability during the 
1950s.22 After the defeat of the Labour Front government at the 1959 elections, the PAP 
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came to power. Intertwined in Singapore’s struggle for independence was the political 
battle between a caucus led by Lim Chin Siong and another led by Lee Kuan Yew. The 
PAP split in 1961 when Lim and his supporters formed their own party, the Barisan 
Sosialis. Lee and the PAP labelled the Barisan Sosialis ‘pro-communist’, and asserted 
that Barisan could become a likely vehicle for a potential communist takeover of 
Singapore. Months before the 1963 elections in Singapore, the PAP launched a raid 
codenamed ‘Operation Coldstore’ and detained individuals suspected to be communists, 
including Lim and prominent leaders from the Barisan Sosialis.23 With the most 
influential opposition politicians put in detention, the PAP won the majority of the seats 
in the elections. In protest against the results of the 1963 elections, the Secretary-
General of the Barisan Sosialis, Lee Siew Choh, called for a boycott of parliament by 
elected Members of Parliament under the Barisan Sosialis that lasted for a year.24 From 
1963 to 1965, Barisan Sosialis MPs resigned one after another and created opportunities 
for PAP victories in the resultant by-elections.25 The resignation of Barisan Sosialis 
MPs led to an enduring one-party government in Singapore with no opposition 
representation in parliament. The political battle came to something of a close when the 
PAP government achieved full independence for Singapore through a merger with 
Malaysia and secured all seats in parliament.  
Even though the Barisan Sosialis was politically impotent by the late 1960s, the 
PAP government continued to claim that Barisan remained capable of carrying out 
subversive operations by inciting communal conflicts in Singapore.26 Evoking images 
of the racial riots in Singapore during the 1950s and 1964, the PAP warned that 
Singapore would not “survive” another bout of communal riots, and should, therefore, 
strive to build a cohesive multi-racial society. Foreign Minister Rajaratnam’s “two facts 
of life” speech in 1969 encapsulated the importance of building a purposefully unified 
society that would assure Singapore’s ability to “survive the storms of international 
life”.27  
The occasion chosen by Rajaratnam to make these statements on Singapore’s 
foreign policy imperatives was as significant as the statements he made. Singapore’s 
sesquicentennial was a celebration of 150 years of British imperialism that had shaped 
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“modern Singapore”. 28  Yet 1969 also marked the fourth year of Singapore’s 
independence, a result of a protracted anti-colonial struggle against British rule after the 
end of the Second World War. Rajaratnam noted that his audience “might find baffling 
that the people of Singapore should at one and the same time be celebrating the 
founding of a colonial outpost and its final liquidation”.29 The foreign minister used the 
occasion and the speech to illustrate that Singapore’s long association with the British 
had become history. Independent Singapore should not align itself with the major 
powers if it hoped to achieve economic and social stability during the Cold War. 
Rajaratnam made similar points when Singapore was admitted into the United Nations 
General Assembly in September 1965. To the UN General Assembly, Rajaratnam said 
Singapore has chosen the path of non-alignment. It simply means that we do not 
wish to be drawn into alliances dedicated to imposing our own way of life on 
other countries. Friendship between two countries should not be conditional on 
the acceptance of common ideologies, common friends and common foes.30 
Although Rajaratnam’s statements suggested the Singapore government’s resolve to be 
non-aligned, Singapore’s non-alignment was questionable since the British bases were 
still on the island until 1971, and the Singapore government supported US involvement 
in the Vietnam War from 1968 to 1973. Whereas contradictions between actions and 
rhetoric were common in politics and diplomacy, sporadic episodes of tension did arise 
between the Singapore government and the US government, which was guided by a 
containment policy of communist powers in the region.  
Underpinning Washington’s approach towards Singapore was the containment 
of Sino-Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. The foundation of America’s containment 
policy was set soon after the Second World War ended. George Kennan, a US diplomat 
stationed in Moscow, wrote a long telegram to US Secretary of State James Byrnes in 
1946, outlining the ideological differences between the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) and the capitalist world led by the United States of America and 
Britain.31 Kennan’s telegram, known as the ‘Long Telegram’, was followed by an 
article, which called for the containment of the Soviet Union.32 John Foster Dulles, 
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Secretary of State during the Eisenhower administration, advocated a more aggressive 
strategy of rolling back Soviet influence.33 Although the US and the USSR were equally 
in conflict with each other, notions about the nature of the Cold War conflict were not 
completely similar in Washington and the Kremlin; the United States government 
defined the Cold War as a conflict between a free world and a totalitarian world, 
whereas the Soviet Union described the Cold War conflict as a struggle between a 
capitalist world and a socialist world.34 Although Washington and Moscow were 
fighting for somewhat dissimilar objectives during the early period of the conflict, both 
posited that “there was an irreconcilable ideological gulf between the two camps, and 
that it was incumbent on everyone to choose sides.”35 To the West, a rejection of the 
containment of the USSR was equivalent to an endorsement of totalitarianism. Hence, 
“neutralism was immoral,” as Dulles was reported to have said.36 
In Asia, the United States government aimed to contain the influence of 
communist China after Beijing and Moscow reached a “strategic ‘division of labor’ 
agreement” in 1949 that placed the Soviet Union chiefly responsible for promoting 
revolutions in the West, whereas the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would stir up 
revolutions in the East.37 Chen Jian notes that during the 1950s CCP leaders vigorously 
promoted the PRC’s successful revolution as a model for achieving “national 
independence and people’s democracy” in Asia.38 Beijing achieved some success 
through its participation in the 1954 Geneva Conference and the Bandung Conference 
in 1955.39 Led by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, the PRC delegation to the Bandung 
Conference projected a reconciliatory image of Beijing and expressed willingness to 
work with the United States to reduce “tensions in the Far East”.40 Prior to the Bandung 
conference, in June 1954, Zhou, together with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru 
and Burmese Prime Minister U Nu, introduced the “Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence”, which included 
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(1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, (2) nonaggression, (3) 
noninterference in other countries’ internal affairs, (4) equal and mutual benefit, 
and (5) peaceful coexistence.41 
Chen Jian, in his analysis of the PRC’s foreign policy during the early Cold War period, 
argues that “the emergence of the Bandung discourse” was Beijing’s attempt to 
establish “China’s centrality in international affairs and expand China’s influence in the 
non-Western world”.42 Washington’s opposition to the Non-aligned Movement was a 
result of Beijing’s successful engagement with non-aligned countries during the 
Bandung Conference. State Department officials during the Eisenhower administration 
“uncritically assumed” that ethnic Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, especially 
Singapore which had a majority Chinese population, were particularly responsive to 
Beijing’s overtures.43 
Beijing’s engagement with the Afro-Asian countries was a manifestation of the 
PRC’s diplomacy towards an Asia that was decolonising during the Cold War period. 
Beijing’s attempt to connect “decolonization and revolution” in Asia was demonstrated 
by the PRC’s support of the revolutions in Korea and Indochina, where Beijing backed 
the communist regimes of Kim Il-Sung in Pyongyang, and Ho Chi Minh in Hanoi.44 
Although Beijing’s participation in the Korean War led to a high number of casualties 
within the People’s Liberation Army, the war experience in Korea and Indochina 
bolstered the CCP’s ability to mobilise Chinese domestic masses through nationwide 
campaigns, which promoted revolutionary nationalism.45 Beijing’s rhetoric during the 
Bandung Conference, however, was not matched by deeds. Despite the Chinese 
leadership’s advocacy of peaceful coexistence in the Five Principles, the aggressive 
actions of the PRC in Korea, Indochina and the Taiwan Strait clearly contradicted the 
tenets of non-aggression and non-interference. By shelling the Nationalist-controlled 
Jinmen islands in 1958, Beijing abandoned a foreign policy of moderation and 
embraced an overtly aggressive approach in resolving international disputes.46 In his 
evaluation of Mao Zedong’s speeches in the 1950s, Chen argues that Beijing had all 
along held “a deep and consistent belief…that revolution would never emerge in 
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peaceful settings”.47 Beijing’s ostensible espousal of the Five Principles was a strategy 
to turn countries in Asia and Africa “into allies in anti-imperialism and anticolonialism 
struggles, and that ‘in the end the United States will certainly be isolated’”.48 Whereas 
Beijing attempted to isolate the US from the East, Washington strived to contain the 
PRC’s influence in Asia. 
The American strategy of containment was delineated in a joint State-Defense 
long-range China study conducted by the US State and Defense Departments in late 
1965. The document outlined five possible strategies that the US government could take 
against the growing influence of the PRC in Asia. Washington could seek an “early 
showdown” with the PRC, adopt “close-in containment and forward defense” by 
maintaining US military presence in Northeast and Southeast Asia, develop an off-shore 
island chain to contain the PRC, develop “remote containment and mid-Pacific defense 
behind buffer zones”, and disengage with the region but maintain “mid-Pacific 
defense”.49 The most extreme strategies — showdown and disengagement — were 
excluded after preliminary consideration because they were deemed less advantageous 
than the other strategies. Hence, containment manifested in three forms — close-in, 
remote, or from an island chain — became the basis for US deployment of political, 
military, economic and psychological instruments of diplomacy.50 
Until the early 1960s, the United States was committed to a strategy of close 
containment and forward defence in Northeast and Southeast Asia. The State 
Department considered the strategy to be costly, strategically inflexible and 
“unavoidably leads to frictions with the host governments and peoples”. 51  State 
Department planners therefore preferred the island chain containment strategy in the 
interim period, from 1965 to 1975, and eventually remote containment from a buffer 
zone in the mid-Pacific region as a long-term policy.52 But neither strategies were 
practicable under current circumstances in Northeast and Southeast Asia as 
“abandonment of close containment is out of the question while we [the US] are locked 
in a struggle to preserve the freedom of South Vietnam and to demonstrate our will and 
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ability to repel indirect, as well as direct, Communist aggression”.53 “Swift, complete 
withdrawal,” the study concluded, “might be misinterpreted by both our friends and our 
enemies and undermine our continuing efforts to deter renewed Communist insurgency 
and bolster the internal stability of South Vietnam….”54 Hence, the US government 
maintained a close-in containment strategy despite its high cost. 
The State Department designed different forms of close-in containment strategy 
in Northeast and Southeast Asia that could be implemented to handle three types of 
regimes in Asia.55 Towards established communist regimes in Asia, the United States 
government should deter or defeat overt attacks and counter “Communist subversion, 
psychological warfare and disruptive diplomacy”.56 With respect to non-communist 
states, the US government should strengthen their economic, political and social 
stability and assist in their aspirations for modernisation. Furthermore, Washington 
should induce Asian communist leaders to “moderate, and eventually abandon, their 
expansionist policies”.57 In the face of greater recognition of Beijing in the UN and the 
PRC’s growing nuclear capabilities, the study concluded that “[s]trengthening the free 
nations around Communist China is in fact essential to the success of a strategy of 
remote containment in South Asia and to any hope of moving back from close-in 
containment in East and Southeast Asia”.58 In order to strengthen non-communist 
countries in Southeast Asia, the study recommended a slew of diplomatic instruments 
ranging from economic and military aid, providing support for education, offering a 
nuclear deterrence, and promoting regional cooperation. Significantly, the US 
government must strengthen ties with non-communist Southeast Asian nations by 
acquiring a better understanding of the systems and people of these countries. 
Nevertheless, Beijing’s overtures towards the non-aligned countries during the 1950s 
had coloured American perception of the Non-aligned Movement. Singapore, which 
declared its affiliation with the non-aligned camp after gaining independence, was also 
perceived to be pro-Beijing. Governed by a dichotomous Cold War logic, London and 
Washington therefore perceived that Beijing could potentially mobilise Singapore’s 
Chinese population to promote communist revolution in Southeast Asia. 
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During the early Cold War period, the US Department of State identified the 
overseas Chinese in Asia as an avenue along which Beijing could exert economic and 
political influence. In 1946, the Truman administration held the view that “[i]f these 
[overseas] Chinese were turned into a fifth column to advocate local communist 
revolutions, or convinced to use their economic power to support the communist 
machine, then the entire region would fall, endangering US security and foreign policy 
interests, not to mention weakening US allies in the region like the ROC [Republic of 
China on Taiwan], Japan and South Korea.”59 After the declaration of the People’s 
Republic of China in October 1949, the US government paid specific attention towards 
overseas Chinese and formulated “an overseas Chinese policy, which sought to deny the 
overseas Chinese to the Chinese communists; encourage the diaspora to identify their 
interests with those of their countries of residence; and ensure that they look to the ROC 
on Taiwan for leadership and sources of cultural or ethnic pride”.60  
During the 1950s, Washington regarded Singapore’s majority Chinese 
population as “especially vulnerable to communist subversion”,61 a perception that 
informed the way Washington conducted its diplomacy towards Singapore during the 
Eisenhower administration. The PRC encouraged overseas Chinese to send their 
children for education in China and help to rebuild the motherland. In reaction to 
Beijing’s overtures, the colonial authorities in Singapore prohibited the Chinese from 
returning to Singapore after visiting China.62 The Chinese Chamber of Commerce 
resented the harsh treatment of the British authorities against what the Chinese regarded 
as acts of patriotism towards their homeland. The Chamber became openly critical of 
the colonial government when the Chinese language was not recognised as an official 
language in the Rendel commission.63 In addition, funding for English-medium schools 
were disproportionally higher than Chinese-medium schools, drawing students away 
from poorly staffed and funded Chinese schools, and widened the rift between the 
Chinese community and the colonial government.64  Chinese schools thus became 
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“particularly vulnerable to Communist propaganda”.65 The National Service Ordinance 
announced in 1954 sparked violent clashes between students of Chinese middle schools 
and the police, although reports vary on whether the Malayan Communist Party 
instigated the protests. 66  In 1961, Chinese middle school students boycotted 
examinations to protest against changes in the education system, this time with 
allegations by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew that left-wing opposition political parties 
fuelled the protests.67 It was more likely that Chinese students protested because of 
dissatisfaction about policies rather than with the intention of subverting the 
government. Nevertheless, the communists took advantage of the student movements to 
create unrest and gather supporters.68 Many young Chinese students were drawn to the 
communist party and developed an admiration for Marxism, of which Beijing became a 
source of inspiration.69 
Joey Long asserts that the loyalty of Singapore’s Chinese towards mainland 
China was more a matter of “ethnic pride” than ideological alignment.70 Lim Chin 
Siong also admitted to Douglas Hyde, who interviewed Lim in the mid-1960s, that his 
supporters were “pro-Chinese rather than pro-Communist”.71 Regardless of the nature 
of overseas Chinese affiliation towards the PRC, however, a competition for the loyalty 
of the overseas Chinese ensued during the early 1950s. At least three parties vied for the 
support of the overseas Chinese: the United States, the People’s Republic of China, and 
the Republic of China on Taiwan. A fourth group competing for the loyalties of the 
Chinese immigrants was the host country that the overseas Chinese resided in. During 
the Cold War period, the host governments that were not aligned with major power 
blocs frequently “added their voices in opposition to both communist and containment 
themes”.72 The PAP government in Singapore was no different and was determined to 
gain the allegiance of the Chinese population towards Singapore. 
The Chinese Communist Party government’s ultimate goal was to limit the 
political and economic support from the overseas Chinese towards Nationalist China. 
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Beijing’s policy towards overseas Chinese was articulated in five points by the OCAC. 
Meredith Oyen translates and summarises the five points: 
unifying the patriotic overseas Chinese; exposing attacks on the overseas 
Chinese by Chiang Kai-shek’s government; protecting the rights of the Chinese 
living abroad (including their ability to send remittances, but also protecting 
them against local discriminations and violence and opening immigration 
opportunities); promoting cultural and language education abroad; and 
improving relations between the overseas Chinese and the local societies in 
which they lived.73 
Although the OCAC mentioned that it would improve relations between overseas 
Chinese and the local societies that they lived in, the OCAC’s major policy objectives 
pointed towards the chief aim of unifying the overseas Chinese behind Beijing and 
maintaining cultural and language links between overseas Chinese and the PRC. 
In the psychological battle among the US, the PRC and the ROC, Beijing 
enjoyed the greatest success in Singapore during the 1950s because of its more palatable 
propaganda messages. Pro-communist Hong Kong newspapers, such as Ta Kung Pao 
and Wen Wei Po, focussed on shared love for the Chinese mainland and tactfully 
avoided reports about internal campaigns so that the Chinese in Singapore would not 
form negative perceptions of mainland China after reading about political developments 
in the PRC.74 Since many overseas Chinese were engaged in private enterprise in 
Singapore, the PRC newspapers avoided negative commentary on capitalist thought. 
Beijing’s priority was not to “get the entire diaspora behind every domestic policy” but 
rather to promote general opposition to the ROC and support for the PRC.75 The United 
States Information Service (USIS) counteracted PRC propaganda by providing articles 
that were sympathetic to free world ideologies for Southeast Asian Chinese newspapers, 
which were often in need of well-written Chinese articles. But the success of USIS was 
heavily dependent on indigenous circumstances.76  Whereas the USIS managed to 
distribute 90% of its articles through Hong Kong newspapers, its articles were not as 
well-circulated through Singapore’s Chinese newspapers because the press in Singapore 
was able to produce its own material rather than use “pieces offered by USIS”.77 
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Although the USIS and the PRC propaganda machinery were both unable to tap into 
Singapore’s newspapers, the PRC gained an edge by producing textbooks that were 
used in Chinese schools in Singapore. 
As mentioned earlier, Beijing’s policy towards the overseas Chinese was a 
factor in both Singapore and Washington’s policies. As a consequence, US-Singapore 
relations during the early Cold War were indirectly influenced by the policies of the 
CCP towards the overseas Chinese in Singapore. In tandem with its relatively 
successful propaganda campaign towards overseas Chinese, Beijing modified its 
citizenship policy towards the overseas Chinese in the middle of the 1950s in order to 
improve its relations with African and Asian governments that had emerged from 
decolonisation and independence movements. During the Qing dynasty, ethnic Chinese 
born in China or abroad were recognised as Chinese nationals or citizens even though 
they might also be recognised as citizens of another state.78 After the end of the Qing 
dynasty, the Kuomintang (KMT) government, intending to make overseas Chinese 
“culturally loyal to China”, retained the dual nationality policy when it came to power.79 
With the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the loyalty of overseas Chinese in Southeast 
Asia towards mainland China became a source of problems for Beijing’s relations with 
newly independent governments in the region.80 Overseas Chinese residing in Southeast 
Asia were perceived to be more loyal to mainland China and seen as an extension of 
Beijing’s influence in the region. During the Bandung Conference of 1955, the PRC 
delegation led by Zhou Enlai indicated that Beijing was willing to abandon its policy of 
dual nationality. 81  With the abandonment of the dual nationality policy, Chinese 
overseas could either choose to remain as Chinese citizens and give up political rights in 
their host countries, or give up Chinese citizenship to assimilate better into their host 
societies.82  
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The PRC’s decision was largely welcomed by Southeast Asian governments at 
that time and Beijing gained considerable goodwill among the non-aligned countries 
during the conference in Bandung.83 The British feared that the PRC’s intention was to 
allow the Chinese in Malaysia and Singapore “to naturalize so that they could better 
promote communism from within the country as citizens, rather than as aliens”.84 
Washington, too, was doubtful that Beijing would be any less influential to the overseas 
Chinese after the elimination of dual nationality. The Anglo-American fear was not 
entirely unfounded. Wang Gungwu argues that when China was invaded during the 
Second World War, patriotic sentiments of overseas Chinese living in Southeast Asia 
towards China grew.85 After the war ended, Chinese residing overseas, regardless of 
birthplace, developed strong anti-colonial and anti-western values and participated in 
the nationalist movements against European powers.86 Wang asserts that these patriotic 
feelings became so strong that “all the colonial powers as well as native rulers began to 
develop genuine fears, deep-seated fears, about the ambitions of China and its Overseas 
Chinese”.87 Regardless of Beijing’s motivation for changing its citizenship policy, what 
was clear is that the manoeuvre was certainly calibrated to gain friends among the Afro-
Asian countries. By precipitating the assimilation of the overseas Chinese into their 
local societies, Beijing had put into motion the erosion of supporters of the KMT 
government in the ROC, which had depended on support from the overseas Chinese as 
a counterweight against the PRC. Beijing’s policy eventually forced the KMT’s hand 
and persuaded it to follow the PRC lead by conceding that it was better for overseas 
Chinese to become citizens of their host countries.88  
In addition to the PRC’s diplomatic triumph over the ROC, Beijing also 
benefited when Southeast Asian governments hosting the overseas Chinese 
implemented “abrupt and drastic” policies to hasten the assimilation of these new 
citizens from China.89 The initial tactlessness of host governments resulted in stiffened 
resistance against integration and pent-up resentments, which Beijing could exploit.90 
According to the CIA report on overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, governments such 
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as Indonesia, Thailand, South Vietnam, and the Philippines imposed economic 
restrictions on their own Chinese citizens and simultaneously forced the Chinese to 
assimilate faster by assuming greater responsibility towards the host government.91 The 
CIA report concluded that in “all the host countries [in Southeast Asia] the Chinese 
have resisted assimilation”.92 Assimilation of the Chinese population was a non-starter 
in Singapore since the majority of Singapore’s population was Chinese. Yet the Chinese 
population in Singapore was responsible for much of the social unrest on the island 
during the 1950s. 
During the period of self-governance in Singapore, the Labour Front 
government in Singapore was openly hostile towards communist slogans in Singapore 
and displayed intolerance towards communist-incited activities by quelling riots and 
protests involving Chinese workers and high school students during the mid-1950s. The 
Singapore government showed toughness in containing leftist influence in Singapore 
but the US government, though recognising the resolve of the Labour Front 
government, foresaw that if Singapore became independent from British rule, it could 
quickly become drawn into Beijing’s orbit. “Given the earnest concern about stemming 
the communist tide,” argues Joey Long, “a consensus on the Eisenhower 
administration’s Singapore policy had emerged within top policymaking circles in 
Washington: whether in concert with the British or unilaterally, the United States would 
have to intervene more forcefully to preserve American interests.”93 Putting together a 
repertoire of diplomatic, cultural and covert tactics, the Eisenhower administration 
cajoled local politicians, disseminated USIS material in local libraries established with 
US resources, and deployed CIA agents to gather intelligence by bribing Singapore 
Special Branch officers.94 
By the late 1950s and well into the 1960s, the PRC seemed to reduce its 
emphasis towards the overseas Chinese when the Chinese Communist Party disbanded 
the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission.95 Washington began to change its position 
towards the overseas Chinese as well. The United States government became more 
active in integrating Chinese Americans into American society, and revised its foreign 
policy to reflect the lesser threat it now attributed to the overseas Chinese. In particular, 
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the US State Department moved Washington’s overseas Chinese policy “out of the 
realm of China policy and into the realm of US-Southeast Asian relations”.96 Overseas 
Chinese affairs became regarded as part of the domestic affairs of host governments, 
and fundamentally detached from developments in the PRC. Unlike during the 1950s, 
Washington eventually began to recognise that a significant number of overseas 
Chinese in Southeast Asia were in fact “more pro-China than pro-Communist”.97 
In 1965, driven to some extent by the fear that Singapore could still fall under 
Beijing’s political influence, the US government directed policies to build “reasonably 
good relations” with Singapore.98 Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs William Bundy’s views on Singapore in late 1965 were that 
[a] hostile Singapore could develop into a difficult strategic problem for us in 
Southeast Asia, particularly if the UK goes ahead with certain military phase-
downs in the area which it has intimated strongly on several recent occasions. 
The temptation to a hostile government of an overwhelmingly Chinese state to 
act in concert with Peking’s objectives, even if it maintained its anti-communist 
personality, would be substantial. While we may not be able to prevent this 
eventuality, I believe we have a definite obligation to take constructive actions 
to lessen its attractiveness to those in and out of the Singapore government who 
are willing to consider constructing reasonable good relations with us as a 
desirable policy option.99 
“For the sake of our future relations with this small, but key country,” argued Bundy, “I 
believe we must demonstrate in a concrete way our genuine desire to do what is 
politically possible to ensure its continued economic viability.”100  
Months before his first official visit to Washington in 1967, Lee Kuan Yew 
stated that he wanted to change Washington’s perception that Singapore was pro-
Beijing. In an interview conducted in Chinese, before his October trip, a question was 
raised: “We know the Americans generally have some misconceptions about the 
overseas Chinese, and believe that they have strong ties with China and are acting as 
agents for China…. Why should the Americans hold such an attitude towards the 
overseas Chinese?” Without challenging the premise that Washington indeed held 
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misconceptions about overseas Chinese, Lee told his questioner that there might be 
several factors and wished to “take the opportunity of [his] coming visit to clarify this 
matter”.101 Lee wanted to make clear to the US administration that Singapore was not a 
malleable instrument at the disposal of the PRC. In October 1967, Lee visited 
Washington and met with President Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary 
of Defense Robert McNamara and other senior US officials. The press statements Lee 
gave during his visit were supportive of American involvement in the Vietnam War and 
contrasted with the anti-American speeches he made in late 1965.102 Lee’s meeting with 
the Johnson administration was fruitful in two ways: Lee had somewhat convinced the 
president and senior officials in Washington that the Singapore government was more 
pro-American than pro-Beijing, and had also become convinced that the US 
government no longer held the view that Singapore was pro-communist. The US 
Department of State discovered in the 1970s that Singapore was far more fearful of 
intimacy with Beijing than Washington had initially perceived. 
After the Nixon administration’s rapprochement with Beijing in 1972, the 
Singapore government, unlike other Southeast Asian countries, was reluctant to follow 
America’s lead in engaging the PRC. The US State Department reported in 1973 that 
Lee and his government were confident that the Chinese people of Singapore would 
“eventually break their emotional ties with the mainland and develop a Singaporean 
identity” but the process had not been completed.103 Formal diplomatic ties between the 
Singapore government and Beijing during this period might lead to close affiliation 
between Singapore’s Chinese population and the PRC. Strong links with mainland 
China could weaken the nascent sense of a Singaporean identity that the PAP had been 
promoting among Chinese Singaporeans. Hence, the Singapore government “would like 
another generation of isolation from the mainland”.104 Lee feared that other countries in 
the region, particularly Malaysia, would develop close ties with Beijing “too 
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quickly”.105 Malaysia was the first ASEAN country to establish formal ties with the 
PRC.106 The Singapore government calculated that Kuala Lumpur was engaging the 
PRC so that Beijing would reduce support for the Communist Party of Malaya, which 
was still active in the Thai-Malaysia border.107 It is not clear whether the Malaysian 
government did benefit from formal ties with Beijing but recognition of the Chinese 
Communist Party regime in Beijing could motivate the leftist political factions that had 
been at the fringes of Malaysia and Singapore politics. The Singapore government was 
perhaps more cautious than Kuala Lumpur about the prospects of a rejuvenated left-
wing in Singapore politics. Hence, Lee expressed concern that official diplomatic 
presence of the PRC in Kuala Lumpur “would put great pressure” on the Singapore 
government to establish diplomatic ties with Beijing.108  
In 1974, Deputy Chief of Mission at the American embassy in Singapore, 
William B. Grant, reported to the State Department regarding the concerns related to 
Singapore’s recognition of the PRC after a conversation with his British counterpart, 
Deputy High Commissioner John Watts. According to Watts, British High 
Commissioner Peter Tripp had met with Lee earlier to discuss the possible 
consequences of Singapore’s recognition of the PRC.109 “Lee told High Commissioner 
Tripp,” reported Grant, “that he could only count on about 10% of the population of 
Singapore being totally loyal to Singapore and its government. Another 15% were out 
and out Chinese chauvinists who looked to Peking for inspiration and direction.”110 Lee 
described the remaining 75% as “rather pathetic and could be easily swayed one way or 
another by events and personalities”.111 Lee seemed to be telling the British High 
Commissioner that more Chinese in Singapore were loyal towards the PRC than 
towards Singapore, which was a perspective Lee claimed he wanted to change when he 
visited Washington in October 1967. 
The likelihood of Beijing’s disruptive influence on Singapore’s nation-building 
project was somewhat echoed by the Soviet Counsellor to Singapore, Valentin 
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Pasentchuk. The Soviet diplomat, who was in Beijing during the Cultural Revolution, 
noted that “the school books used by Chinese children clearly showed parts of 
Southeast Asia including Malaysia and Singapore as belonging to ‘Greater China’”.112 
Regardless of the accuracy of Pasentchuk’s views, the Soviet diplomat would have seen 
some benefits in sharing his opinion with the Singapore leaders. If Pasentchuk’s report 
was reliable and the PRC did view Singapore as a part of its territory, then the 
Singapore government would indeed want to delay establishing diplomatic ties with 
Beijing for as long as possible. Furthermore, an entente between Beijing and the 
Singapore government would jeopardise Singapore’s relations with its close neighbour, 
Indonesia, who had suspended diplomatic relations with the PRC. 113  Pasentchuk 
mentioned to William Grant in a conversation that “Singapore had made it clear it 
would be the last ASEAN Government to establish relations with the PRC”.114 Indeed, 
preoccupation with the risks arising from communist China was a common thread that 
bound the US and Singapore governments closely. 
Another factor that determined US-Singapore relations during the Cold War was 
the way Washington viewed Singapore’s non-aligned foreign policy. Along with the 
change of American attitude towards the Chinese in Singapore during the early 1960s, 
America’s foreign policy towards non-aligned countries also shifted decisively. 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who served under Presidents John F. Kennedy and 
Lyndon B. Johnson, publicly stated that Washington no longer held a hostile position 
towards the Non-aligned Movement (NAM). In 1962, Rusk indicated the shift of the 
Kennedy administration’s approach towards the NAM. During a press conference, Rusk 
explained that the Kennedy administration did not “regard neutrals as enemies, or allies 
as satellites”,115 a departure from the views of the Eisenhower administration which 
regarded non-aligned states as being closer to the communist bloc than the US. In fact, 
Rusk “deplore[d] the earlier American misunderstanding of the Neutrals”.116  
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Although the Department of State had adopted a new approach towards non-
aligned countries, sections of American officials and politicians remained hostile and 
suspicious towards the NAM. That the United States was a popular target for anti-
imperialist propaganda by some non-aligned countries contributed to remnants of 
mutual distrust between the NAM and the US. In 1963, the USIA reported that the 
Indonesian government was using the Afro-Asian Journalists’ Conference held in 
Jakarta as a platform to garner support from non-aligned countries against the proposed 
Federation of Malaysia. The Conference launched “poorly camouflaged anti-Western, 
anti-American denunciations”, accusing the US of “imperialist intervention in Cuba, 
Laos, Korea and South Viet-Nam”.117 The Acting Director of USIA, Donald M. Wilson, 
called for retaliatory measures, which included lodging formal protests to the 
Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs, launching propaganda campaigns through 
American press and radio, and circulating “materials refuting specific charges levied 
against the U.S. and its allies and exposing Chinese communist tactics in their attempts 
to capture the Afro-Asian movement”.118 The US State Department was nonetheless 
reluctant to take such a confrontational approach and instructed the USIA to focus its 
propaganda campaign on specific issues of contention “without bringing Indonesia into 
the picture in any denigrating fashion”.119  
Discussions among State Department officials revealed that the US 
administration had begun to interpret the internal and international affairs affecting non-
aligned countries based on local perspectives rather than through bifurcated Cold War 
logic. State Department official, Robert L. Kinney, advised that the United States 
must assume for the present that the Indonesians, whatever their peculiarly 
Javanese motives, are going to be playing the communist and particularly the 
Chicom [the People’s Republic of China] game: the cards in Djakarta are simply 
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stacked that way (Sukarno’s pet propaganda lines, weak Cabinet Ministers and a 
rampant internal network of communist fronts allied with the Chicoms).120 
The US State Department might advocate putting up with anti-American propaganda 
from Jakarta. But what really troubled the US government was Indonesia’s dependence 
on the Soviet Union for military equipment. Even after power shifted from Sukarno to 
Suharto, the Indonesian Air Force and Navy were still 70-80% equipped with Soviet 
weaponry in 1968, and “must rely on the USSR for spare parts”.121 The US government 
was prepared to offer generous military assistance and grants for Indonesia to acquire 
US defence equipment in order to reduce Jakarta’s military reliance on Moscow.  
To be sure, Washington did not view Singapore’s non-aligned position to be a 
hindrance to close US-Singapore relations in the 1960s.122 The Singapore government 
had, on several occasions, proclaimed that Singapore’s non-alignment did not preclude 
its preference towards the US.123 Furthermore, officials from the US government had 
developed personal relations with Singapore’s political leaders and government officials 
even before Singapore was separated from Malaysia. Lee Kuan Yew was a firm 
believer in the domino theory,124 which suggested that the communist influence would 
eventually spread to other countries in Southeast Asia if Vietnam became unified under 
a communist regime. Throughout the first years of independence, the Singapore 
government kept to a foreign policy position that retained a public image of non-
alignment with major power blocs, while leaning towards the free world. During the 
Nixon administration, US foreign policy in Asia was undergirded by a dual strategy of 
superpower détente and devolution of direct American military involvement in the 
region. The most significant foreign policy pronouncement of the Nixon administration 
was the Nixon Doctrine, also known as Guam Doctrine, outlined by President Nixon on 
25 July 1969 at the US military base in Guam.  
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Speaking at a press conference in Guam, President Nixon declared his 
administration’s foreign policy approach:  
One, that we [the US government] will keep our treaty commitments…; two, 
that as far as the problems of internal security are concerned , as far as problems 
of military defense, except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear 
weapons, that the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect 
that this problem will be increasingly handled by, and the responsibility for it 
taken by, the Asian nations themselves.125 
In November 1969, President Nixon reiterated the Guam Doctrine in a speech to the 
“silent majority” to plead for support. He outlined the key principles of his 
administration’s foreign policy doctrine, this time adding a third point: 
[I]n cases involving other types of aggression [i.e., not involving nuclear 
weapons], we [the US government] shall furnish military and economic 
assistance….126 
Initially suspicious of the intentions of the Nixon Doctrine, the Singapore government 
came to realise that the approach was complementary to Singapore’s non-aligned 
foreign policy. 
According to the Nixon administration, “[n]eutralization in principal [sic] 
meshes with the Nixon Doctrine concepts, and in the long run could provide a 
framework for stability in SEA requiring a minimum of U.S. security resource 
inputs”.127 The US State Department described Singapore as “a good Nixon Doctrine 
country”, praising Singapore for its contribution towards Southeast Asian stability, and 
probably for being a supporter of American involvement in the Vietnam War.128 In 
1972, the US State Department commented on Singapore’s balance of power approach 
in Southeast Asia: 
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GOS theory (Rajaratnam and Lee) is that multi-polarity is an established and on 
balance favorable situation. The belief is that the great powers have agreed on 
no direct confrontation, and that small countries must at all costs avoid 
becoming too closely dependent on one great power or they run the danger of 
becoming the field for indirect big power competition.… It would be more 
accurate…to say that what the GOS really desperately wants is for someone to 
counter the potential threat of Communist China.… They [GOS] do not really 
consider the US as a threat to their security, however, and they do so consider 
both the PRC and the USSR. Thus, they would much prefer that the US remain 
as the principal counter to China and would like the USSR to play this role only 
if we will not.… Neutralization in the GOS view is a non-starter.… [T]hey do 
not even really believe that.129 
The State Department, in 1973, described Singapore’s non-aligned foreign policy as 
“non-alignment with a Western bias”. 130  Despite the “distinctly Western bias”, 
Washington acknowledged that the Singapore government guarded its “public posture 
of non-alignment” and would “avoid actions or statements which would appear to line 
[Singapore] up politically on the side of any major power or bloc”.131 
The United States-Singapore bilateral relations from 1965 to 1975 were 
established under Cold War circumstances where the US government aimed to keep 
Singapore out of the communist bloc. The Singapore government, on the other hand, 
was less caught up with the Cold War and more preoccupied with maintaining 
Singapore’s social, political and economic stability through adopting a non-aligned 
approach towards great power rivalries. Although Washington and Singapore shared a 
common objective of limiting the PRC’s influence in Singapore and Southeast Asia, the 
Lee Kuan Yew government regarded the Soviet Union as a partner who could contain 
Beijing’s influence in the region. Unsurprisingly, Singapore’s diplomatic ties with the 
Soviet Union became a source of friction in US-Singapore relations. Whereas 
Washington valued cordial bilateral ties with Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, the 
US-Singapore relationship was considered the least critical to American interests among 
the three Southeast Asian countries.132 Since Washington would not risk alienating the 
                                                
129 “Chiefs of Mission Briefing Paper: Multi-polarity and Neutralization”, 19 June 1972. 
130 “Policy of Non-Alignment”, 3 February 1973, in Background (Singapore 1973), Box 11, Subject Files 
of the Office of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore Affairs, 1965-74, RG 59, NACP. 
131 Ibid. See also Huxley, Defending the Lion City, p. 34. 
132 Theodore J.C. Heavner, “Memorandum: Theodore J.C. Heavner to Cmdr. Robert A. Shaid: Comments 
on JCS Questions and Proposed Answers”, 17 August 1971, in DEF 15 U.S. Use of Military Facilities 
 47 
Malaysians and Indonesians by appearing overly sympathetic towards Singapore, the 
US government preferred to keep Singapore at arm’s length. 
Similarly, the Singapore government preferred to maintain a distance, at least 
politically, between Washington and Singapore. Although the Singapore government 
sought American economic assistance, close political alignment with the United States 
would draw criticisms from Singapore’s Chinese media and potentially damage the 
credibility of the PAP government. To balance out the notion that Singapore was 
relying too much on American economic engagement, the Singapore government also 
established some economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and the PRC. 
Nevertheless, Singapore’s economic nexus with the US far outweighed that with 
Moscow and Beijing. To Lee and the PAP government, if Singapore was seen as an 
American stooge, dissent among the Chinese population might in the most extreme 
circumstances result in a political comeback of the Barisan Sosialis, which had strong 
support from Chinese voters in Singapore before the mid-1960s. It would not come as a 
surprise then that United States-Singapore relations had a somewhat acrimonious 
beginning in August 1965. 
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Chapter 2  
“Never the Americans” 
Behind Lee Kuan Yew's Anti-American Press Campaign 
 
Shortly after Singapore’s separation from Malaysia in August 1965, Lee Kuan 
Yew made strong anti-American statements during media interviews over several 
months. 1965 marks the beginning of American military escalation in the war in 
Vietnam with the deployment of the first US combat troops, consisting of 3,500 men in 
Danang,1 as well as diminishing British military superiority in Southeast Asia. It would 
not have been surprising for the Singapore government, which claimed to be 
economically and socially vulnerable, to close ranks with a major power like the United 
States. Yet barely one month after the Separation Agreement between Malaysia and 
Singapore was signed, Lee launched a public relations campaign that was highly critical 
of the United States government. Lee Kuan Yew’s 1965 anti-American press campaign 
reflected both political calculation and an underlying hostile attitude towards the 
Americans. This chapter further asserts that Lee’s fundamental distrust towards the 
American administration was the most important factor driving his negative press 
campaign towards the US. 
Lee Kuan Yew’s leadership had a profound impact on the development of 
Singapore. Some academics and world leaders, therefore, describe Lee as the “official 
mascot” of Singapore.2 In 1969, the US Secretary of State, William P. Rogers, went as 
far as to remark that “Lee is Singapore”.3 Even Lee himself seemed to perceive 
Singapore as an extension of his political persona when he entitled his personal memoir 
as The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew. The Singapore government’s 
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oligarchic decision-making process and its rudimentary foreign affairs ministry in 1965 
meant that key foreign policy decisions were often made by the prime minister and 
senior members of the Singapore cabinet. When Singapore became independent, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not yet a “sophisticated bureaucratic apparatus”, but 
more an inexperienced outfit of novice diplomats.4 As explained by a senior official in 
Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the 1960s and 1970s and former 
President of Singapore, S.R. Nathan, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, with advice from 
the foreign minister, S. Rajaratnam, set the foreign policy direction for Singapore.5 Lee 
was the main decision-maker in Singapore’s foreign relations, especially during the first 
few years of Singapore’s independence. “I soon realised,” recounts Nathan, “that the 
Foreign Minister did not make ‘foreign policy’. It was the Prime Minister who made it 
with inputs from the Foreign Minister and his other Cabinet colleagues.”6 Even when 
the Singapore Foreign Ministry had evolved into a professional foreign service in the 
early 1970s, Lee remained “an articulate spokesman of Singapore’s international 
concerns and policies”.7 
In a study on Lee Kuan Yew’s strategic thinking, Ang Cheng Guan argues that 
“Lee is generally acknowledged as Asia’s leading strategic thinker, one who does not 
flatter but ‘who is known, from time to time, to speak bluntly’, and someone who helps 
‘us find direction in a complicated world’”.8 Drawing upon Lee’s speeches and public 
statements in his recent publication, Ang asserts that Lee’s statements and speeches can 
be regarded as “valuable but underrated source[s]” useful for understanding his thoughts 
on international politics.9 In a study written during the first years of Singapore’s 
independence, Chan Heng Chee mentions Lee’s “seemingly senseless outburst” towards 
the Americans during the 30 August 1965 interview.10 With sources from newspapers 
and speeches of Lee and other contemporaneous observers, Chan argues that the factors 
leading to Lee’s anti-American press campaign from August 1965 to early 1966 were 
twofold: to bolster Singapore’s non-aligned credentials, and to prevent a precipitous 
withdrawal of the British forces from Singapore.11 This current research amplifies 
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Chan’s largely accurate analysis and adds a dimension of Lee’s motives behind his anti-
American press campaign during the first months of Singapore’s independence. 
Lee Kuan Yew’s verbal attacks on the American administration in August 1965 
were not easily explained in Washington mainly because Lee was not known in United 
States’ policy-making circle to be anti-American prior to August 1965. In fact, a 
memorandum of conversation, dated 19 January 1965, between Lee, US Ambassador to 
Malaysia James Bell, and US Consul General to Singapore, John Lacey, revealed close 
and cordial ties between Lee and the American diplomats.12 Furthermore, the US 
Department of State briefly considered inviting Lee to Washington in July 1965 but 
eventually held back the invitation for fear that the US would become projected into 
Malaysia’s political controversy between the Alliance government in Kuala Lumpur 
and the People’s Action Party government in Singapore.13 For Lee to display such a 
hostile attitude towards the American administration was, therefore, puzzling to the 
Americans. But for Lee and the PAP government, being openly critical of American 
policies in Southeast Asia accentuated Singapore’s non-aligned foreign policy and 
yielded benefits for Singapore’s domestic environment and international relations. Lee’s 
vitriol against the US administration was later explained by the Singapore government 
as Lee’s attempt to gain the acceptance of the non-aligned Afro-Asian camp, and also 
calibrated to serve notice to listeners in Whitehall that the Americans would not be an 
acceptable alternative to the British should the British government decide to withdraw 
from the Singapore bases. 
In a televised interview conducted on 30 August 1965, Lee began to articulate 
anti-American sentiments for the first time since Singapore was expelled from the 
Federation of Malaysia on 9 August 1965. The interview began with discussions on 
Singapore’s internal security and the British military bases in Singapore, and cumulated 
in Lee criticising the American administration. Lee said: “[I]f the British withdraw I am 
prepared to go on with the Australians and the New Zealanders. But, I am not prepared 
to go on with Americans.” 14  Lee supported his low opinion of the American 
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government by recounting three incidents which led to his conclusion that the US 
government lacked “depth and judgment or wisdom which comes out of an 
accumulation of knowledge”.15 The first incident Lee cited was an attempt by US 
Central Intelligence Agency officers to suborn a Singapore Special Branch officer in 
1961. The second involved Lee and Goh Keng Swee missing a flight from Hawaii to 
Washington. The third incident involved Lee’s unsuccessful attempt to bring an 
American doctor to treat his wife’s illness in Singapore. Since Lee expounded more on 
the first and third incidents, this article will focus on the incidents involving the CIA 
covert operations in Singapore and Lee’s attempt to enlist the help of the US 
government to bring in a doctor to treat his wife’s illness. The two incidents are 
significant also because Lee continued to refer to the two incidents during media 
interviews until late 1965.16 
During the interview, Lee Kuan Yew described the American government as 
inferior to the British. He further claimed that the US administration’s inferiority to the 
British was “crucial to the whole of [his] thinking” towards the Americans.17 Lee 
narrated a 1961 incident involving the CIA to demonstrate American inferiority to the 
British in carrying out crucial intelligence operations: 
[W]e caught an American C.I.A. agent trying to subvert our Intelligence Special 
Branch Officer, bribe him, so that the Special Branch Officer will feed the 
C.I.A. because the C.I.A. wants to know what is happening. Subverting a 
Singapore officer! … I am proud the officer, offered a large sum of money and 
continuing sums of money…refused and reported the matter to his chief who 
reported it to me.… I told my officers, “Lay a trap: microphones, everything.[”] 
The man was caught, [and] arrested, [with] enough evidence to send him to gaol 
for anything up to twelve years. We had him by the throat. The American 
Consul-General, shaking at his knees, knew nothing about it.… Do you get 
confidence in an outfit like that?18 
When the CIA incident occurred in 1961, Lee asked the American government for $100 
million economic assistance in exchange for a quiet release of the two arrested CIA 
agents.19 The American government turned down Lee’s request and counter-offered Lee 
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and his political party $10 million instead. Lee called the US offer an “insult” and 
rejected it.20 Eventually, at the repeated urgings of the British High Commissioner, Lord 
Selkirk, the Singapore government released the CIA agent a month later.21 After Lee 
revealed the incident during the 30 August 1965 interview, the US State Department 
denied Lee’s allegations in a routine press conference. The next day, Lee backed his 
claim by releasing a letter from US Secretary of State Dean Rusk written in 1961. In the 
letter, Rusk expressed regret that the incident had occurred and assured the Singapore 
prime minister that the Kennedy administration would carry out disciplinary actions. 
The letter did not mention the attempted bribe.22 Embarrassed, the US State Department 
was later compelled to acknowledge the authenticity of Lee’s claims that the Secretary 
of State had written the letter to the Singapore government but refused to confirm that 
any bribe had been offered for the release of the CIA agent.23 US Ambassador to 
Malaysia James Bell, who was Director of the Office for Southwest Pacific Affairs 
when the CIA incident happened, also denied Lee’s allegation that Washington offered 
Lee a bribe to cover up the failed CIA operation.24 Joey Long’s detailed account of the 
1961 CIA incident points to the authenticity of Lee’s claims regarding the bribes, and 
blames the debacle on the lack of consultation between the CIA and the US consulate 
general in Singapore.25 By exposing the incident on national television, Lee was 
attacking American prestige by showing that the US government resorted to covert 
means to gain intelligence in Singapore and failed miserably. 
To further support his argument that the United States government was inferior 
to the British, Lee revealed another encounter he had with the US government. During 
the interview, Lee told his interviewer that “somebody very dear” to him “was in need 
of specialist treatment” and their doctor in Singapore recommended an American 
specialist who was described as the best person to treat the illness.26 Later, in September 
1965, Lee disclosed that his wife, Kwa Geok Choo, was the person he had mentioned in 
the 30 August interview, and she was suspected of suffering from a terminal illness 
after preliminary diagnosis by her doctor, Benjamin Sheares. Dr. Sheares had 
recommended an American specialist, Dr. Howard Taylor of Columbia University, as 
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the “best man on Mrs. Lee’s problem”.27 Lee sought the help of Ambassador Bell, and 
Consul General Richard Donald to invite the American doctor to see Mrs. Lee in 
Singapore. Samuel Berger, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Far East at the US State 
Department, approached Dr. Taylor with Lee’s request, stressing that “the State 
Department regarded this [request] as a matter of national importance” and urged 
Taylor to fly to Singapore.28 Lee told his interviewer in 30 August 1965 
Do you know what was the answer [from the American doctor]? The Professor 
was busy. He recommends Professor XYZ, but he does not know whether 
Professor XYZ will come or not.… And if the patient was prepared to fly to 
Geneva, the Professor would look at him or her.… You know, the impudence 
and the impertinence of it!29 
It turned out that Dr. Taylor had scheduled a professional trip to Geneva for 
commitments “which he could not break” and refused to go to Singapore.30 When 
Donald asked Lee Kuan Yew if Mrs. Lee could go to the US for treatment instead, Lee 
[r]epeatedly and forcefully said he would not permit his wife to go to US 
irregardless [sic] of consequences to her: It would ‘blow my [Lee’s] chances’ 
with Afro-Asian group.… [Lee] believes two or three weeks, possibly a month, 
margin [was] available [for treatment]. ‘Unless it is cancer, where every day 
counts’.… [Lee] said he [was] under intolerable pressure from his wife who is 
quarreling with him (I [Donald] assume [she was] wanting to fly to US).31 
After US State officials’ repeated pleas with Dr. Taylor, the doctor finally agreed to fly 
to Singapore to treat Mrs. Lee’s illness. Nevertheless, many days had elapsed and Lee 
finally told Donald that Mrs. Lee was “no longer interested in seeing [a] doctor who had 
no interest in seeing [his] patient.… She would seek out a British doctor”.32 In his 
memoir, Lee recalled that the failure of the United States government to arrange for Dr. 
Taylor to treat his wife’s ailment in Singapore drove him to “[fire] a broadside at the 
Americans” during the August 1965 interview.33 Lee commented that he was “angry 
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and under stress” due to his wife’s critical condition,34 and was “venting [his] anger on 
the Americans for being unhelpful”.35 
The events that transpired after the August interview led Lee to conclude that the 
Americans had not acted in good faith from the start. Dr. Taylor was worried that Lee’s 
mention of the case in his August interview would tarnish his professional reputation 
and created the impression that the US State Department had conveyed Lee’s request to 
him inaccurately. In a letter to Dr. Sheares explaining his initial refusal to go to 
Singapore, Dr. Taylor claimed inaccurately that US State officials had not told him the 
identity of the patient and the nature of the sickness when they first approached him.36 
On 15 September 1965, in an interview with New York Times correspondent Jerry King, 
Lee  
produced [a] letter from Dr Taylor…in which Taylor said that State Dept had 
not informed him who [the] patient was or [the] nature of [the] problem and that 
if he [Taylor] had known his initial response to Dept[’]s request might have been 
different.37 
Lee apparently bought into Taylor’s side of the story and accused Washington of 
insidiously forcing him to send his wife to the US for treatment. 
Lee said this proved his point that USG [United States Government] wanted to 
get Mrs Lee into US while he, Lee, was struggling to develop a neutralist policy 
in Singapore. [Jerry] King tried to argue with Lee that this was nonsense but got 
nowhere.… Lee was highly emotional on [the] subject….38 
Lee Kuan Yew’s attack on the US administration then shifted from his personal 
encounters with American officials to Washington’s conduct of foreign policy in 
Southeast Asia. During the interview on 30 August 1965, Lee mocked the US 
government’s unsuccessful, and unpopular, intervention in Vietnam: 
But, the Americans, they lack depth. And, they don’t understand the overseas 
Chinese. They don’t understand the Vietnamese. That is why it is such a mess… 
— they (the Americans) would have had somebody more brutal than Lim Yew 
Hock (ex PM of Singapore), like Ngo Dinh Diem. And, when finally they 
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decided that their own creation was an embarrassment. They closed their eyes, 
looked the other way, and he [Diem] got bumped off. I thought, well, they must 
have a plan, you know. Ngo Dinh Diem, bumped off. “A” takes over. Then Plan 
Alpha moves into operation. But, my god, they had no plans. There have been 
no less than 15 to 20 governments since Ngo Dinh Diem.39 
To be sure, Lee was not the first Southeast Asian leader to criticise the US for its 
unpopular war in Vietnam. His comments, however, reflected his attempt to echo the 
views of non-aligned African and Asian governments, who were often critical of 
America’s foreign interventions.  
Lee’s anti-American press campaign continued into September 1965. In an 
interview with the Chinese press in Singapore, Lee told reporters on 13 September 1965 
that 
America has a comparatively short history [compared with Britain] of only a 
few hundred years…. They may never understand us, that we would rather die 
than be politically bludgeoned in this way.… They are used to all sorts of 
preposterous transactions. For example, they buy and sell political leaders in 
South Korea and South Vietnam.… They think that Singapore is a small country 
and that her people can be bought and sold.40  
On 11 December 1965, Lee spoke with a group of foreign correspondents at the studios 
of Television Singapore, distinguishing his personal sentiments against the Americans 
from the policy of the Singapore government towards the US. A reporter from the Daily 
Mail of London, Arthur Cook, referred to the 30 August 1965 interview with Lee, when 
Lee displayed “great personal bitterness towards the Americans”.41 Lee interrupted 
Cook in mid-sentence, asserting that: 
My personal bitterness is irrelevant in matters of national policy.… One does 
not conduct national affairs on the basis of personal likes and dislikes. If you do 
that, then you perish.42 
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During the same interview, Lee was less strident against the US, saying that he now felt 
“the Americans are intelligent people and when they find they have got to buy goods 
instead of buying people, as they do in some other parts of Asia, it may be cheaper in 
the long run for them”.43 Perhaps one good point to mark the end of Lee’s anti-
American speech would be in the middle of 1966. On 15 June 1966, Lee delivered a 
speech titled “Big and Small Fishes in Asian Waters”.44 In response to questions after 
the speech, Lee gave a sympathetic analysis on US involvement in Vietnam: 
You know, American presidents have the unfortunate disability of having to face 
election every four years. In 1968, there will be any number of Robert Kennedys 
around to put all kinds of highly attractive formulae for resolving all the 
discomfort of by then probably three-quarters of a million Americans [affected 
by the Vietnam War]…. Hundreds of Vietnamese are dying every day, for what? 
For Vietnam? No! To decide that Vietnam shall not be repeated…. But whilst 
we buy time, if we just sit down and believe people are going to buy time 
forever after for us, then we deserve to perish.45 
At an address given at the Political Study Centre on 13 July 1966, Lee no longer 
attributed the lack of leadership in South Vietnam to poor US foresight and planning, 
but portrayed the developments in Vietnam as unpredictable:  
Nobody really knows because so many factors are involved [in] just what this 
[presumably the course of the Vietnam War] is going to lead to. Not even the 
Russians, not even the best of the whiz bids in Washington – they really do not 
know. If you ask them, ‘Look, what is going to happen in Vietnam? You tell me 
now, spell out step by step where you think this will end,’ and I do not think 
they can really spell it out to you and say, ‘Well, in the year X which is three 
years or five years from now, we shall have accomplished this and so many 
years from thence, we will have accomplished that’…. They are playing on the 
basis that certain factors are in a process of flux and change. Whatever happens, 
they cannot withdraw.46 
                                                
43 Ibid. 
44 Lee, The Papers of Lee Kuan Yew, Vol. 3, pp. 384-98. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
 57 
In both instances, Lee aimed to encourage US involvement in the Vietnam War, and 
that non-communist states in Southeast Asia had to make good use of the time that 
America was buying. 
Whether Lee’s criticisms of the United States was for publicity or a reflection of 
official doctrine towards the US, the Singapore government did try to use Singapore’s 
non-aligned and anti-American position to gain some leverage over the United States. It 
became more apparent when an American request to raise the US consulate general to 
an embassy in late 1965 was rejected by the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs. By 
November 1965, the Johnson administration felt some urgency to raise the Consulate 
General to an embassy because “if we [the US government] wait too long Lee may 
accuse us of lack of confidence or other shortcoming in our relations with him”.47 
Rajaratnam, Singapore’s foreign minister, took the opportunity to request a more open 
American market for Singapore textiles and other forms of economic assistance from 
the US.48 When Washington refused to tie the US embassy proposal to American 
economic assistance, Washington’s proposal to establish an American embassy in 
Singapore was shelved for months.49  
Lee’s August 1965 interview and Rajaratnam’s refusal to elevate the US 
consulate general to an American embassy suggested that the Singapore government 
approach intended to keep the Americans at a distance. Yet, in both instances there were 
hints that the PAP government actually sought to invite US economic assistance — 
most apparent in the CIA bribe incident and Rajaratnam’s conditions for the 
establishment of an American embassy in Singapore. After Singapore’s independence 
was recognised and it had become a member of the United Nations on 21 September 
1965, Lee’s criticism of the US had also begun to fade from his public statements. 
It seemed apparent, therefore, that the chief aim of Lee’s anti-American 
speeches was to gain recognition from the non-aligned Afro-Asian countries for 
Singapore’s sovereignty after separation from Malaysia in 1965. Since the 
establishment of the Non-aligned Movement in 1961, the group had almost doubled, 
                                                
47 George Ball, “Outgoing Telegram: Department of State to Amconsul Singapore”, 17 November 1965, 
in Cables - Singapore (Vol. 1) 8/65-7/67, Box 281, National Security File. Country File. Asia and the 
Pacific, LBJL. 
48 Robert J. Morris and Albert D. Moscotti, “Briefing Paper: Singapore”, 17 February 1966, in POL 1 
Gen. Policy Background (Singapore 1966), Box 1, Subject Files of the Office of Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore Affairs, 1965-74, RG 59, NACP. 
49 Samuel D. Berger, “Letter of Credence for Charge in Singapore”, 11 April 1966, in POL 17 Diplomatic 
and Consular Repr. (Singapore 1966), Box 1, Subject Files of the Office of Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore Affairs, 1965-74, RG 59, NACP. 
 58 
from the 25 founding members to 47 full members in 1964. Based on a 1965 estimate 
by the Director of the League of Arab States Information Center for the Southwestern 
United States, Khalid I. Babaa, out of the 112 member nations in the United Nations, 
there were 54 member states that claimed to belong to the NAM, “although the shades 
and degrees of belonging to that group vary”.50 Babaa, and other researchers studying 
the influence of the NAM within the UN such as Richard Jackson and John Wear 
Burton, also noted that the NAM did not distinctly vote as a bloc, largely due to the 
principle of non-alignment with major power blocs and their ideologies.51 The UN 
voting records nonetheless showed that non-aligned members in the UN consistently 
voted along anti-colonial and anti-imperialist lines.52 To gain the recognition of the 
NAM, Singapore needed to establish an anti-colonial and anti-imperialist position. 
Furthermore, extra effort had to be made to emphasise Singapore’s non-aligned stance 
because Singapore’s ties with its Commonwealth defence partners had inadvertently 
placed Singapore within the pro-West camp.  
The Singapore delegation to the United Nations in September 1965 also feared 
that “the Soviet Union might veto [Singapore’s] membership of the UN”. 53  In 
September 1964, a draft resolution submitted by the Norwegian delegate called for 
peaceful negotiations to end the Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation.54 A Soviet veto 
successfully blocked the Norwegian resolution. The Russian delegate, P.D. Morose, 
explained the Soviet decision to veto the resolution in anti-colonial, and essentially anti-
British terms. Morozov’s speech highlighted that the Soviet Union disagreed with the 
resolution because it did not mention the root of the problem, which it felt was the 
British presence in Southeast Asia: 
We [the USSR] consider it necessary to stress once again that the situation in 
South-East Asia is essentially a struggle against the remnants of the rotten 
colonial system to which the colonialists are still obstinately trying to cling.… It 
is in fact the aim of the United Kingdom and the other colonial Powers to 
preserve their colonial domination and to continue to suppress the national 
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liberation movement of the peoples of South-East Asia.… The colonialists must 
finally leave their former colonies in peace.55 
Since the British military presence in Malaysia and Singapore had not been 
reduced since the Russian veto, it was a cause for anxiety within the Singapore 
government that the USSR would veto Singapore’s application for UN membership. In 
fact, Malaysia’s well-intended sponsorship for Singapore’s entry into the UN in 
September 1965 might actually increase the chances of a Russian veto. Furthermore, the 
Singapore government could not take UN admission to be automatic because territories 
such as Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, South West 
Africa and British Guiana were still denied independence and recognition in the UN.56 
Hence, Singapore actively sought the support of powerful non-aligned countries such as 
India and Egypt to “mobilise support” for Singapore’s recognition by the UN.57 Chan 
Heng Chee, observing the developments during the episode, argued that Lee’s 
“seemingly senseless outburst” against the American government was prompted by the 
“slow response” from African governments to recognise Singapore’s independence. 
Almost a month after Singapore’s independence, most of the Afro-Asian nations had 
not recognised Singapore. 58  “Thus on the eve of Singapore’s application for 
membership in the UN,” Chan concludes, “Lee probably felt expedient to assert 
strongly his country’s genuine non-alignment.”59 Eventually, Singapore was admitted 
into the UN with unanimous accord by the Security Council without the need to call for 
a vote.60 But Singapore’s entry into the United Nations did not immediately reduce the 
frequency of Lee’s anti-American comments. The US State Department reported that 
Lee “repeatedly returned in public and on background basis to correspondents to [the] 
themes in his August 30 diatribe against U.S.”.61  
Senior cabinet ministers tried to play down Lee’s anti-Americanism during 
media conferences. During an interview before attending the UN General Assembly in 
September 1965, Singapore Foreign Minister Rajaratnam was asked if Lee’s anti-
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Americanism was intended to gain support from non-aligned countries. Rajaratnam 
alluded to the possibility that some Afro-Asian nations might interpret Lee’s anti-
American comments as “a badge of acceptance” by the Afro-Asian group, but defended 
Lee’s anti-American statements as criticisms that legitimately focussed on US policies 
that the Singapore government disagreed with.62 
In September 1965, US State Department officials observed that Lee wanted 
Singapore-US relations to be “correct but distant”, offering two likely intentions behind 
Lee’s acrid remarks about America and its people: 
Prime Minister Lee has been attacking the U.S. publicly in an effort to (a) 
establish his neutralist credentials with the Afro-Asians and gain admission to 
the Algiers Conference, and (b) serve notice on the Malaysians and UK that the 
U.S. cannot be regarded as an alternative to the British and Commonwealth as 
the primary guarantors of Malaysian-Singapore security.63 
Lee’s desire to court the Afro-Asian nations was not new. Even before 
Singapore was separated from Malaysia, Lee had posited that Singapore and Malaysia 
must win the friendship of the non-aligned group of countries. In 1964, Lee warned the 
Malaysian parliament that 
[i]solation from the growing body of Afro-Asian opinion and identification with 
imperialist and colonialist nations must in the end mean death. For us life must 
mean a growing identification with the hopes and aspirations of the political 
attitudes of Asian countries.64 
Despite Lee’s admonitions, the Malaysian government was unenthusiastic about 
engaging the Afro-Asian nations in the Algiers Conference.  
In 1964, Lee sought the domestic advantage that non-alignment would give the 
PAP. The Algiers Conference, or the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organisation 
Conference, was well attended by political parties, labour unions and other 
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organisations representing “radical elements and liberation movements in Asia and 
Africa”.65 Entry to the Algiers Conference was vital to the PAP’s political position in 
Singapore because Singapore’s strongest opposition party, the Barisan Sosialis, had 
earlier gained support from the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) and the PRC in 1964. 
S.R. Nathan explained the importance of Singapore’s membership in the AAPSO in his 
memoir: 
Victory [in the form of international recognition] at the AAPSO would have 
given them [the Barisan Sosialis] a wider range of international supporters. Such 
a development threatened to undermine the NTUC’s [National Trade Union 
Congress in Singapore] and potentially PAP’s efforts to win wider domestic 
support in the ongoing struggle against pro-communist elements in Singapore. 
Acceptance by this movement of the NTUC-led Singapore committee, rather 
than the Barisan Sosialis, was considered critical for the NTUC and indirectly 
for the PAP.66 
If acceptance by non-aligned Afro-Asian countries was critical to the PAP’s political 
survival in Singapore before independence, then being recognised by the Afro-Asian 
countries became even more crucial for Singapore after its separation from Malaysia. 
Chan argues that Lee’s tart remarks against the US from the August 1965 interview 
were instrumental in increasing Afro-Asian votes for Singapore’s entry into the UN.67 
Despite the intensity of Lee’s anti-American statements, the Singapore 
government, and even Lee himself, did not intend these comments to damage US-
Singapore relationship. In a daily staff report to President Johnson, White House staff 
members, Chester Cooper and McGeorge Bundy, informed Johnson that Lee was 
keeping to his “anti-American press campaign”.68 Nevertheless, the staff report added 
that Consul General Donald had received “private statements from Lee confirming that 
his intent in all this [anti-American press campaign] is to discourage the UK from 
serious consideration of a military withdrawal”.69 Concurring with the White House 
staff report, State Department also observed that the Singapore government  
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[c]ontinued normal close and friendly relations between ConGen [Consulate 
General] and GOS and PAP officials, (with one middle grade PAP official [on] 
Sept 16 explicitly seeking out ConGen officer and telling him that no 
instructions had been passed by Prime Minister [Lee] to be cool to 
Americans).… [The] September 16 assurances to ConGen officers…by 
permanent Secretary [of] Ministry [of] Defense that ‘all that (Lee’s anti-
American statements) [were] for public consumption only.’70 
The US State Department seemed to accept that Lee’s anti-American remarks 
made during the 30 August 1965 interview was Lee’s attempt to ensure the continued 
military presence of the Commonwealth powers in Singapore.71 When Singapore was a 
British colony, it was under the protection of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve 
based in the subregion. Hence, even after Singapore obtained self-governance and 
independence, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (ANZUK) continued to 
underwrite Singapore’s security. Furthermore, Commonwealth military bases in 
Singapore benefited Singapore’s economy through employment and consumption of 
goods, and provided Singapore with the stability to strengthen investors’ confidence. A 
reduction of military commitment by the British-led Commonwealth forces could, thus, 
trigger security and economic crises in Singapore.  
By publicly dismissing the possibility that the UK could transfer its security 
commitments in the subregion to the US, Lee was giving the British a strong indication 
that the Singapore government needed the Commonwealth military forces to remain 
committed in Singapore.72 Lee argued for British superiority over the Americans, when 
he used the botched CIA operation to illustrate American incompetence. In addition, he 
insinuated that the US Department of State acted in bad faith when he asked for their 
assistance in getting the American specialist to treat his wife’s illness. Lee’s diatribe 
against the US, a close British ally, was a questionable strategy for forestalling a British 
withdrawal. In fact, rushing to acquire some form of assurance from the US government 
to take over Singapore’s defence would appear to be a more viable strategy if the 
Singapore government indeed sensed that a British withdrawal was imminent. 
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Like the Singapore government, the US State Department also wanted the 
ANZUK powers to remain committed to Singapore’s defence for as long as possible. 
The US Department of State outlined America’s position on Singapore’s strategic 
importance and Washington’s desire to keep the British committed to its bases in 
Singapore in 1965: 
We [the US government] regard continued maintenance of the UK military 
presence, and specifically the Singapore base, as vital to the Western position in 
Southeast Asia. Alternative base sites in Australia or elsewhere would not meet 
either strategic or political requirements.73 
Since both Washington and the Singapore government shared a common aim of keeping 
the British in Singapore bases, it seemed counterintuitive that Lee should publicly 
criticise the American administration instead of working in tandem with the US 
government to persuade the British to stay in Singapore. 
Indeed, with the Indonesian Confrontation against the Malaysian Federation still 
unresolved, the British government did not harbour any intention to announce a 
reduction of forces in Singapore and Malaysia, even though the Harold Wilson 
government was planning for a reduction of Britain’s defence commitments overseas. In 
light of Singapore’s separation from Malaysia, the Defence and Overseas Policy 
Committee reported on the impact of Singapore’s secession on Britain’s long-term 
interests in August 1965. The committee stressed that Britain must “ensure that this 
important area [Singapore-Malaysia subregion] does not fall under Chinese Communist 
domination”.74 In this respect, Washington, London and Singapore shared the common 
goal of containing the influence of the People’s Republic of China. Additionally, the 
committee advised the British cabinet that British forces should remain in the Singapore 
bases to maintain “some influence on United States policies in the Far East”.75 Hence, 
with such vital strategic and political factors within Whitehall’s considerations, it was 
unlikely that Whitehall would hastily announce a military withdrawal from Singapore in 
1965. It was also doubtful that Lee’s criticisms of the US administration in August 1965 
would significantly change any decisions made in Whitehall to reduce Britain’s military 
commitments to Singapore. It appeared, therefore, more probable that Lee was trying to 
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repair the damage done to the US-Singapore relationship when he told Donald that his 
anti-American speeches were intended for public consumption and especially for the 
Labour Party government in Whitehall. 
Gaining acceptance by the Afro-Asian nations and keeping the British forces in 
Singapore bases were perceptible objectives behind Lee Kuan Yew’s anti-American 
comments in late 1965 and early 1966. American archival sources, however, point to 
more fundamental causes driving Lee’s decision to project an anti-American image. 
Lee’s decision to disparage the American government was greatly motivated by his 
perception of the American position towards Singapore, based on the Malaysian 
government’s engagement with the United States during the Indonesian Confrontation.  
Lee keenly observed the dismal consequences of Kuala Lumpur’s bungled 
attempt to attain military aid and credit from Washington during the Indonesian 
Confrontation in 1963. When the United States government offered to sell Malaysia 
military equipment amounting to US$7 million on credit, at interest of less than 5% 
over five years, the Malaysian government and news media responded angrily to the 
offer.76 Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman felt that Malaysia deserved far 
more favourable credit terms, since the Americans had previously given Indonesia 
outright grants. Malaysian reactions surprised Ambassador Bell and State officials as 
they thought that “[m]ilitary credits would increase Malaysia’s confidence in the U.S. 
and should strengthen relations between the two countries”. 77  In fact, the State 
Department felt that the military credit sales offer was already given at the “best credit 
terms available” at that time.78 Still, the US administration’s offer to Malaysia backfired 
completely. Robert Barnett, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern 
Economic Affairs, spoke with Malaysian Ambassador to the US, Ong Yoke Lin, to 
mitigate the diplomatic fallout but made no progress when the US was not willing to 
offer more favourable terms unless the Malaysian government moved swiftly to quell 
“over-excited public opinion” in Malaysia.79 The Malaysian government finally turned 
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down the military credit sales offer from the US but received financial aid from Canada, 
which, it turned out, had given Malaysia the grant after consultations with London and 
Washington. 80  Praises for Malaysia’s “courageous Canadian brothers” of the 
Commonwealth were sung, while at the same time disparaging caricatures were levelled 
at the Americans.81 By the time the storm involving military credit sales blew over, 
State Department officials had learnt a lesson about the sensitivities of Malaysia’s 
government and its people.  
Lee Kuan Yew, too, had gained a lesson at Malaysia’s expense by witnessing 
reluctance on the part of the United States to provide Commonwealth countries like 
Malaysia and Singapore any substantial aid. But since Singapore separation had not 
occurred until the later part of 1965, Lee’s attention was mainly towards US-Malaysian 
relations. When asked for his opinion on the military sales credit fiasco, Lee lamented 
to Ambassador Bell in January 1965 that “this kind of ultra-nationalism only serves to 
weaken the fabric of the country”.82 Lee commented that the main factor contributing to 
the government of Malaysia’s reactions over the military credit offer was “the GOM’s 
feeling of frustration with respect to the British, Australian and New Zealanders who 
are constantly telling the GOM what not to do.”83 Even before 1965, the Tunku had 
shown apparent “annoyance at unsolicited advice” from the British.84 The Malaysian 
government was annoyed that the British had advised the Tunku to negotiate for a 
settlement with Jakarta;85 and the Malaysian government complained that the British 
were not enforcing the ceasefire agreements strictly enough and not willing to pursue 
Indonesian guerrilla forces into Indonesian borders.86  
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That the Malaysian government was leaning closer to the Americans was 
already well-known to the American ambassador. Ambassador Bell explained that 
Malaysian government disapproved the manner with which the British military forces 
fought in the Confrontation against Indonesia. In his letter, Ambassador Bell told the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Roger Hilsman, that 
[h]aving moved away from political ties with the U.K. and having developed a 
reluctance to accept British political advice, the Malaysians may, over the next 
few months, seek a closer relationship with the United States. In this connection, 
the Tunku mentioned to the Attorney General [Robert Kennedy] his desire to 
have Malaysian military officers trained by the United States.87 
At the onset of the Confrontation, US enthusiasm for deeper engagement with Kuala 
Lumpur fizzled out for fear of being drawn into a conflict with Indonesia. Lee 
understood, then, that Malaysia ranked below Indonesia in Washington’s list of 
important Southeast Asian countries because of its relatively insignificant geopolitical 
impact on the region’s security; and Singapore surely ranked even lower. 
More crucially, Lee told Ambassador Bell that the Tunku and his lieutenants 
“had been allowed to believe that the United States, in support of anti-communism, 
always stood ready to help other free nations, if requested to do so…. [T]hese men came 
to think that they could call on the Seventh Fleet and on the United States material aid 
so that…they could bequeath a fortune to their children”.88 According to Lee, the 
Eisenhower administration bore some responsibility in encouraging the Malaysian 
government to shift its reliance from the United Kingdom to the United States in the 
1950s. When Malaya became independent in 1957, the Tunku was confident that the 
anti-communist position of the US would compel the American government to deploy 
the Seventh Fleet to the aid of Malaysia should communist-inspired Chinese in the 
Malay Peninsula attempt to take over Kuala Lumpur. In effect, the Tunku believed that 
the US also underwrote Malay dominance as the political elites in Malaysia after 
federation in 1963. Lee did not appear to doubt the Tunku’s confidence in America’s 
support after the Tunku admonished Lee to give up the idea that Chinese Malaysians in 
Singapore could attain a greater political influence within the Federation of Malaysia in 
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July 1964.89 Bell heard Lee’s views with great interest in January 1965, but it was 
difficult to determine whether Lee’s second-hand account of Tunku’s attitude was Lee’s 
attempt to mislead the American ambassador, or the Tunku’s attempt to mislead Lee. 
More than a year later, Lee met with the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
Affairs, William Bundy, and reiterated his views.  
The first prime minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, set for the fledging state a 
non-aligned foreign policy, and amplified Singapore’s non-alignment by making harsh 
anti-American comments in the media from late 1965 to early 1966. Lee’s vitriol 
against the US administration was interpreted as an attempt to gain the acceptance of 
the non-aligned Afro-Asian camp, and also as calibrated to cause Whitehall to think 
twice before planning a military withdrawal from British bases in Singapore. But 
beyond these two apparent reasons, often cited by commentators, Lee’s understanding 
— from Tunku Abdul Rahman — that US President Johnson had pledged to support 
Malays against Chinese in the event of a communal conflict in Malaysia and Singapore 
drove Lee to project a hostile attitude towards the US in August 1965. US-Singapore 
relations did not remain strained for long, however, as the political elites in Singapore 
maintained a fairly pliable foreign policy and gradually drifted from their erstwhile 
image of staunch non-alignment to deeper engagement with the United States. A few 
events precipitated the shift; the event that set in motion intimate US-Singapore 
relations was Lee Kuan Yew’s meeting with William Bundy in March 1966. 
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Chapter 3 
United States-Singapore Entente 
Removing Doubts and Building Trust 
 
Singapore’s relations with the United States ameliorated in March 1966 after 
more than six months of strain caused by a series of anti-American statements made by 
Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. With his anti-American press campaign, the 
Singapore leader aimed to bolster Singapore’s non-aligned credentials and also warn the 
British government that the Americans would not be welcomed in Singapore if 
Whitehall intended to reduce British forces in Singapore in the near future. Lee also 
signalled his willingness to allow the Soviet Union Pacific Fleet to have some presence 
in Singapore’s naval dockyards.1 But underlying political and strategic objectives, Lee’s 
anti-American comments were also the results of Lee’s distrust towards the US 
government that grew out of his political experience when Singapore was a member 
state of the Federation of Malaysia. When Singapore was still a part of Malaysia in 
1964, Lee formed a perception of the Americans based on his cognizance of an 
unverified US-Malaysian pact. Lee was under the impression that US President Lyndon 
Baines Johnson had promised Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman that 
Washington would assist the Tunku in suppressing the Chinese if communal riots in 
Malaysia got out of hand. Lee interpreted Johnson’s promise to the Tunku as a sign that 
Washington would preserve Malay political dominance in Malaysia in order to contain 
communist Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, Lee’s misperception of 
the Johnson administration’s position towards Malaysia and Singapore changed after a 
meeting with US officials in 1966. Lee’s first official visit to Washington in October 
1967 further enhanced US-Singapore relations. 
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On 8 March 1966, William Bundy met Lee Kuan Yew in Lee’s office and 
discussed what had transpired between US President Johnson and the Malaysian prime 
minister during the Tunku’s visit to Washington in July 1964. Both Bundy and Lee had 
some knowledge of what was discussed during the Tunku’s visit to Washington but had 
different impressions about the outcome of the Johnson-Tunku meetings. When Bundy, 
together with US Consul General Richard Donald, called on Lee on 8 March 1966, Lee 
spent a large part of the meeting probing Bundy on US policy towards overseas 
Chinese, especially the Chinese living in Singapore and Malaysia. He wanted to know if 
the Americans “believed that every Chinese was a potential communist and therefore 
the best way to handle the problem was by ‘containing’ Malaysia and Singapore”.2 
Bundy claimed to have “never heard of ‘containment’ of Singapore and Malaysia” and 
pointed out that Washington had maintained its support and friendship towards 
Malaysia. 3  Lee then described the problems between the Malay and Chinese 
communities in Malaysia and asserted that American interference in Malaysia’s racial 
problems had eliminated “the possibility of an accommodation” between the Malays 
and the Chinese in Malaysia.4 
In his rejoinder to Lee’s accusations of American interference, Bundy alluded to 
the Tunku’s visit to Washington in 1964 when President Johnson “expressed ‘U.S. 
support for a free and independent Malaysia’”.5 Bundy had been “very close to the 
scene” during that visit and “could categorically tell Mr. Lee that nothing else had been 
added”.6 He promptly assured Lee that equal support would be given to Singapore by 
the American president. Lee expressed relief upon hearing Bundy’s assurance of US 
support, but pressed further by asking if “the United States would support Singapore if 
it were attacked by the Malays?”7 Seeing that his American visitors were puzzled by the 
question, Lee explained that he had an “obsession” over America’s policy towards the 
Malay-Chinese conflict in Malaysia and Singapore.8  According to records of the 
meeting, 
[Lee] stated that in 1964 soon after the Tunku’s return from Washington he had 
joined the Tunku in the mountains where the Tunku was trying to decide 
whether to accept Lee into the Alliance Party [the ruling party of Malaysia]. At 
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that time, the Tunku had brushed aside Lee’s suggestions for ways of dealing 
with the Chinese problem and had said that the way to handle any Chinese who 
presented a problem was to shoot them. Lee had objected that this was not a 
practical matter, and if by so doing the Tunku drove more and more of the 
Chinese into opposition where would the Tunku get the strength to shoot so 
many Chinese? The Tunku had replied with calm confidence that he would do 
so from the United States.9 
There was no record of Lee’s elaboration on what could have led to the Tunku’s 
confidence that help for the Malays would come from the United States. But what was 
sure was that the Tunku had become confident of American support after visiting 
Washington in July 1964. The Tunku’s confidence that the Malays, with American 
help, would prevail against the Chinese had eliminated any prospects of compromise 
between Malay-Chinese differences during Singapore’s membership in the Federation 
of Malaysia. As part of the Chinese ‘problem’ in Malaysia during 1964, Lee and 
Singapore would have been the targets of joint Malaysian-American attack should the 
US intervene in a clash between the Malays in Malaya and the Chinese in Singapore. 
Lee was afraid that the Johnson administration’s containment policy would mark 
Singapore as a potential Chinese communist fifth column after Singapore’s failed 
merger with the Federation of Malaysia in August 1965. As long as the American 
government distrusted Singapore’s Chinese majority and regarded Singapore as a 
potential threat, Lee was hesitant to move Singapore too closely towards the United 
States. American efforts to engage Singapore, Lee feared, might be a ploy to ‘contain’ 
Singapore; hence, it was safer for Singapore to keep the US at arm’s length. But since 
Bundy had insisted that President Johnson had not promised America’s support for the 
Malays in a Malay-Chinese riot, Lee could now be less wary of the motives behind US 
policies towards Singapore. Lee concluded his meeting with Bundy by urging the US 
government to correct Kuala Lumpur’s misperception, stating that 
[t]he Malays have a very simple mind…and if they have any grounds for 
believing that the United States will move in and pick up the pieces, the 
possibility of an accommodation between the Malay and Chinese communities 
in Malaysia is gone.10 
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Lee urged the US to undo the damage that had been done in Malaysia by correcting the 
Malaysian government’s misunderstanding about US support for Malaysia.  
All in all, Lee was satisfied with the outcome of his meeting with Bundy, having 
found an answer to his “obsession” and beginning to shift gradually away from his 
erstwhile anti-American rhetoric.11 Bundy and Donald observed that Lee began to 
“mellow” after the latter’s public display of anti-Americanism.12 Despite signs that Lee 
was no longer critical of the American administration, the US State Department insisted 
that it was “vitally important to him [Lee], however, that there be no abrupt change in 
his public posture”.13 There was nonetheless clear indication that Bundy’s meeting with 
Lee had revised the State Department’s portrayal of Lee. In October 1967, State 
Secretary Dean Rusk wrote to President Johnson stating that  
at one time, he [Lee] had the suspicion that Americans were convinced that the 
overseas Chinese were a Chinese Communist fifth column. If he gets on this 
topic, you should leave him in no doubt we have no such belief today, and that 
we fully share his basic view.14 
The Bundy-Lee meeting removed obstacles hindering more intimate US-
Singapore bilateral ties. Yet centred in their discussion were the meetings between 
President Johnson and the Tunku in July 1964. The fact that Lee’s account of the 
Johnson-Tunku meetings was so different from Bundy’s understanding of what he had 
witnessed in July 1964 creates some puzzling uncertainties. There could at least be two 
possibilities; either the Tunku was trying to intimidate Lee by misleading him in 1964, 
or Lee was trying to mislead Bundy in 1966. Both scenarios beg a crucial question: 
What actually transpired between Johnson and the Tunku in 1964? Based on records 
held by the US archives and the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, there were 
reports related to the Tunku’s visit to Washington in July 1964, but no evidence that 
Johnson had promised America’s support against the Chinese in Malaysia. Johnson’s 
intention for inviting the Tunku was really to assure the Tunku of the United States’ 
support for Malaysia against the Indonesians when the Confrontation was still ongoing. 
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On 19 May 1964, President Johnson invited the Tunku to Washington for an 
official visit. The Tunku accepted the invitation within a week and the dates of the visit 
were set to be 22 and 23 July 1964.15 The Tunku’s visit to Washington was part of his 
two-week visit to the US and Canada, on his way back from the Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers’ Conference held in London in early July 1964. In preparing President 
Johnson for the Tunku’s visit, Robert Komer from the National Security Council 
advised that the president should raise the following talking points in his first meeting 
with the Tunku: 
No one who’s looked at US policy for the last 15 years can doubt our [US] will 
to protect free nations in [the] Far East. 
This is why we’re in Vietnam now. We regard this effort as directly protecting 
Malaysia too.… 
You [Johnson] could also describe your deep admiration for Tunku’s leadership 
since Malaya’s independence in 1957. Its prosperity, democratic institutions, 
and staunch anti-communism are much appreciated here.16  
When Komer stressed to the president that the US regarded its efforts in Vietnam “as 
directly protecting Malaysia too”, there was certainly a risk that President Johnson 
could have over-emphasised the protection of Malaysia, or the Tunku could have 
misunderstood the president’s assurance. But it is hard to be sure and probably not 
worth speculating here. With respect to the Malaysia-Indonesia conflict, Komer also 
added that Johnson should assure the Tunku that the Americans fully supported 
Malaysia in the Indonesian Confrontation, but must strongly urge the Tunku not to 
over-stress America’s support when talking to the media in order for “the US not to 
burn all its bridges to Sukarno”; Johnson’s invitation for Tunku’s visit was sufficient 
proof of US-Malaysian “solidarity”.17  
Komer’s worries came true after the first Johnson-Tunku meeting. In a press 
conference after meeting President Johnson, the Tunku announced that he had accepted 
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Johnson’s “offer” to train “a sizeable number of Malaysian troops in [the] US”.18 
According to the Tunku, President Johnson “instructed [US] DefSec McNamara to 
‘confer immediately’ with [Malaysian] MinDefSec Kadir on details of training 
program”. 19  The Tunku also disclosed that Johnson had sanctioned the sale of 
sophisticated military equipment such as jet aircraft, large helicopters and landing craft 
to Malaysia, ostensibly designed to counter the Indonesians in the Confrontation. The 
Tunku, in his eagerness to accentuate America’s support of Malaysia during the 
Indonesian Confrontation, inflated the extent of US military assistance to the press. 
Much of Komer’s briefing notes to President Johnson for his second meeting with the 
Tunku focussed on getting the president to qualify some of the assurances given to the 
Tunku during their first meeting. Komer reported that the Tunku was “pleased at the 
overt signs of [US] support, which strengthens him at home and vis-a-vis Sukarno 
(however, he’s gone a little far in using Washington as a platform for tough anti-Indo 
talk, and in baldly telling the press about everything you [Johnson] told him)”.20 “The 
problem now,” according to Komer, “is to make sure that he doesn’t get too cocky 
towards Sukarno because he thinks he’s got us in his hip pocket.”21 With respect to US 
military credit sales to Malaysia, Komer cautioned that “we don’t want Tunku to think 
he has a blank check”.22 Johnson might have attempted to calibrate his support for the 
Tunku in their second meeting but events occurring after the visit seemed to show that 
the president had not been very effective. Not only did the Tunku leave Washington 
thinking that he had received a blank check, but he also misled the Malaysian 
government to conclude that the US government was willing to give them unqualified 
aid and military assistance. Malaysia’s soaring expectations of the Johnson 
administration inadvertently led to a diplomatic imbroglio between Malaysia and the 
US, which involved US military sales to Malaysia.  
Clearly, the Johnson-Tunku meetings in July 1964 were focussed mainly on the 
Malaysia-Indonesian Confrontation. Singapore was hardly mentioned during the 
Tunku’s call on President Johnson, except for once during their second meeting, and 
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then only because the riots in Singapore had reached a death toll of fourteen.23 The 
memorandum of conversation for that meeting recorded that 
[t]he President asked the Tunku about the riots in Singapore, saying that we had 
our own problems in New York. He hoped the Tunku was more successful than 
he had been in stopping this sort of trouble. The Prime Minister replied that the 
situation in Singapore was still tense. There had been three more deaths but the 
situation seemed to be quieting down.24 
Based on US records, the Tunku did not seem to have asked the American president for 
assistance to deal with the communal problems in Malaysia. He, too, was more 
concerned about the Indonesian Confrontation. Perhaps a possible occasion that the 
Tunku and Johnson could have discussed Singapore was during a private meeting on 22 
July, where no notes were recorded.25 Insofar as the American records show, it was 
unlikely that President Johnson had given the Tunku any assurance that if Malays and 
Chinese in Malaysia fought, the Johnson administration would “shoot” the Chinese.26 It 
is difficult to speculate whether the Tunku regarded Johnson’s rhetoric on US-
Malaysian solidarity to include American assistance against internal and external threats 
to Malaysia, or the Tunku had assumed that Johnson would not refuse him if he 
approached Johnson for help against the Chinese in Malaysia. What seems clear, and 
most significant within the context of Lee’s conversation with William Bundy, is that 
Lee distrusted the Johnson administration’s motives in engaging with Singapore from 
1964 to 1966. Regardless of what transpired between President Johnson and the Tunku 
in 1964, it is sufficient, within the purpose of understanding Lee’s anti-American press 
campaign, to note that Lee was willing to go along with William Bundy’s account of the 
Johnson-Tunku meetings, and began to gradually change his anti-American position in 
the months after meeting with Bundy. At least that much was apparent in official 
American documents. 
After the Lee-Bundy meeting, Lee moved to improve ties with Washington, and 
closer US-Singapore relations ensued without much publicity. In fact, Lee’s hostile 
public demeanour towards the US took almost a year to change. The Singapore 
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government finally acceded to the US proposal to elevate the status of the American 
Consulate General to an American embassy in April 1966.27 Richard Donald became 
the Charge d’Affaires ad interim pending the appointment of an American ambassador 
to Singapore. A few months later, Francis J. Galbraith was appointed the first 
ambassador to the newly established American embassy in Singapore and presented his 
credentials to Singapore’s Yang di-Pertuan Negara, Yusof Ishak, in December 1966.  
The elevation of the American Consulate General to an embassy illustrated how 
Lee took sure steps to develop bilateral ties with the US but outwardly maintained a 
cold response towards American officials. At the initial stage, Ambassador Galbraith 
received rather cool treatment from the Prime Minister’s Office. When the Head of the 
political section of the US embassy, Roger Sullivan, contacted Lee’s office to arrange 
for a meeting between Galbraith and the prime minister, he was roundly snubbed by 
Lee’s personal assistant, Lim Tiong Ann.28 Based on Galbraith’s account, Lim told 
Sullivan that  
Lee does not see Ambassadors and only sees them if they are from countries 
important to Singapore. Roger made the obvious point that [Galbraith] came 
from such a country and also that [his] visit would not be purely a courtesy call, 
but would be for the purpose of discussing [his] mission.29 
Lim firmly stood by his initial response and refused Galbraith a meeting with Lee. 
Galbraith would not speculate whether “this reflects Lee Kuan Yew’s own attitude 
toward [him] or whether it is the automatic result of a general instruction”.30 Eventually, 
Galbraith managed to meet with Toh Chin Chye, the deputy prime minister. The 
meeting went well and Galbraith used the opportunity to assure Toh that the two 
countries shared common interests in promoting US investments in Singapore and 
regional stability. Francis Galbraith also reported to the Country Director for Malaysia 
and Singapore, Maurice D. Bean, the positive results from American investments in 
Singapore’s Jurong industrial park. American investors in Singapore praised the 
Singapore government’s “ability to conceptualize, plan, and execute”, and “the 
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productivity of [Singapore’s] labor”.31 Overall, Ambassador Galbraith’s first memo 
back to Washington was one of cautious optimism.  
Galbraith’s optimism was eventually rewarded and his relationship with Lee 
improved with time. “My own relationship with Lee has progressed,” reported 
Galbraith, “from icy reception of our first encounter to an easy relationship which 
enables me to see him or to get others in to see him if it is necessary and desirable to do 
so.”32 In fact, Galbraith later developed great sympathies for the Singapore government 
during his tenure as US ambassador to Singapore. Correspondence between Galbraith 
and the State Department in Washington reflected his frustrations with Washington’s 
“meanness” and “lack of response” more than complaints of difficulties with Lee or the 
Singapore government.33 By 1966, the United States administration and the Singapore 
government were taking the first steps along a path of closer and deeper engagement. 
William Bundy’s meeting with Lee Kuan Yew was a turning point for the US-
Singapore relationship. The next significant event that set US-Singapore bilateral ties in 
a positive trajectory was Lee’s visit to Washington in October 1967. 
In July 1967, William Bundy wrote to Lee, inviting him on an official visit to 
Washington. The American invitation came in the same month as the British 
announcement to withdraw its forces from Singapore and Malaysia. Despite being 
advised that the timing of the visit would create an impression that Singapore was 
nervous about the British withdrawal, Lee accepted the invitation, surmising that “Bill 
Bundy must have had a reason for wanting me to go to Washington that year”.34 The 
Johnson administration’s goals for inviting Lee Kuan Yew for an official visit to 
Washington were twofold: to use Lee as a spokesperson for US policies in Southeast 
Asia, and to develop personal ties between American officials and the Singapore prime 
minister. 
The US embassy in Singapore hinted that Lee Kuan Yew could be a credible 
advocate for American strategy in Southeast Asia since he had become more affable to 
the US. American embassy officials noted that the Singapore government projected a 
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degree of impartiality since it frequently pointed out that the Americans “spend too 
much time justifying [American] objectives in terms Asians do not understand.”35 Lee 
could therefore take on the role of a ‘neutral’ commentator who could explain US 
actions in Vietnam in terms more acceptable to an Asian audience. Apart from being 
credible to the Afro-Asian audience, State Department officials also felt that Lee was a 
strong orator. In June 1967, when Lee was in London to meet Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson and members of the British cabinet, US ambassador to the UK David Bruce sent 
reports to Washington that described Lee’s endorsement of the US as “most 
effective”.36 Bruce’s panegyric of Lee lauded that 
Lee’s vivid English, shrewd sophisticated political sense, and professed 
pragmatic socialism won him attention at all levels [of] HMG [Her Majesty’s 
Government] and with Labor MP’s.… [S]ome of Lee’s remarks on situations in 
Asia are worth recording as examples of most effective arguments for use with 
left-wing and other British critics of U.S. policies in Asia.37 
Bruce’s telegram also stressed that Lee’s views on the American role in 
Southeast Asia were very much in line with Washington’s position.  
[Lee] could see no substitute for American military presence in Asia for many 
years to come, although he was uncertain about the form that [the American] 
presence should take. If American power were withdrawn, there could only be a 
Communist Chinese solution to Asia’s problems.… [The] important thing was 
that North Viet-Nam could not be allowed to win. Therefore, ‘holding operation’ 
for an indefinite period — ten to twenty years — might do the trick…for non-
communist Asian states by then would be stronger. He said in effect he was [a] 
believer in domino theory and he personally had no doubt if [the] US were 
defeated in Viet-Nam that Thailand and Malaysia would quickly carry their 
symbolic tribute to Peking.38 
Impressed with the impact of Lee’s arguments in front of a British audience, William 
Bundy therefore wrote to Lee in July 1967 congratulating him for having “made a real 
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dent in the inadequate grasp” that British Labor Party politicians had of the “facts of life 
in Southeast Asia”, calling Lee “the ideal mentor” to the British Parliamentarians.39 To 
reciprocate Lee’s support of US efforts in Vietnam, Bundy concluded his letter assuring 
Lee that, in return, the US “shall continue to be in the front row of the pavilion…on the 
East of Suez matter”.40 Formerly a fierce critic of the United States, Lee was now 
sought after by Washington to be a spokesperson for Vietnam. 
But Lee Kuan Yew’s statements supporting the United States in Southeast Asia 
were only effective if quoted sparingly. Ambassador Francis Galbraith cautioned the 
State Department 
about our [US] making too much use of his [Lee’s] frequent statements 
supporting our position in this part of the world [Southeast Asia]. One of his 
great values to us is, of course, his credibility before Afro-Asian and other 
audiences that are unsympathetic to our position in Southeast Asia. The more we 
exploit his words, the more danger we run of eroding that credibility.41 
Lee once told Galbraith: “I will be of more use to you if I don’t seem too involved with 
you.”42 The last thing Washington, and Singapore, wanted was for Lee to be labelled an 
“Anglo-American stooge”.43 
Lee Kuan Yew had his own agenda for visiting Washington in 1967. Observing 
his speeches one month before his trip, Ambassador Galbraith concluded that 
[f]rom Lee’s general description of objectives he hopes to achieve with this visit 
to [the] U.S., I [Galbraith] conclude that he is somewhat torn between a direct 
appeal for assurances of future support and a feeling that to start down this road 
would compromise Singapore’s non-alignment and his own political position 
unacceptably.44  
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Galbraith thought that Lee sincerely hoped to enhance his understanding of America 
and its people before deepening US engagements with Singapore. Galbraith reported 
that  
[Lee] is also uncertain about us and about our probable response.… I suspect 
that he is still in the exploratory stage of determining [the] best course to insure 
Singapore’s survival in the 1970’s and that he wants to study [the] U.S. and 
probe [the] thinking [of] our leaders as part of his explorations. Lee 
unquestionably regards [his] forthcoming visit as [a] truly major step of crucial 
importance [to] Singapore and his own career.… [O]ne basic objective Lee 
clearly has in mind is to improve his knowledge and understanding of the U.S. 
He wants to see what the American ‘establishment’ is like, how it works, and to 
determine whether it is possible for him to deal with it in [a] way satisfactory to 
him.45 
Finally, and perhaps most important, Lee Kuan Yew wanted to find out how the 
US government could mitigate the security and economic repercussions of the 
impending British military withdrawal. Lee told Galbraith that he was “reconciled to the 
British withdrawal” but thought that there was a risk that the British would pull out 
even more rapidly if the British pound continued to weaken.46 Lee concluded that the 
United States would remain the only “countervailing power to communism” after the 
British withdrawal and wanted to know what the United States would do to maintain 
security in the area.47 Having categorically rejected the possibility of an American 
military presence in Singapore in the past, it would be embarrassing for Lee to be 
asking for US protection over Singapore. Hence, Lee told the American ambassador 
that he was merely suggesting ways that the US “might be able to help” in the region’s 
security.48 Lee made clear in his discussion with Galbraith and his deputy, John B. 
Dexter, that he did not want US troops to replace British troops “on the ground” in 
Singapore.49 After consulting with Lee, Rajaratnam and Singapore’s ambassador to the 
US, Wong Lin Ken, Ambassador Galbraith reported three areas which Lee was 
interested to work closely with the United States. 
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One is economic. He [Lee] would obviously like to use the [bases] as a 
continuing source of employment and minimize the [effects] of the [British 
withdrawal]. In addition, he probably [wants] America’s use of Singapore’s 
facilities as a means of drawing U.S. deterrent power into this area. [Finally], 
there is probably a political [function] that [Lee] hopes to see the U.S. perform 
and which may be the most [important] of all in his mind, namely, protection 
from Indonesian and/or Malaysian dictates.50 
Galbraith also detected Lee’s concern that the American press might revive 
“questions relating to [Lee’s] outbursts against the United States” in late 1965 during 
his visit.51 He concluded that Lee was “anxious” not to be “goaded into” saying 
something that would “spoil his image in the United States, Australia or Singapore”.52 
Lee indicated to Galbraith that he would require “qualified” US embassy staff to 
accompany him when meeting the press during his visit to Washington.53 It was 
possible that he wanted to use the Washington trip to repair his image in America, 
without sending the wrong message to his Commonwealth observers. If the Australians 
saw that Singapore was cleaving to the US, Lee feared that the Australians might decide 
to withdraw at the same time with the British.  
Sensing that he might have moved too far from a neutralist position by accepting 
President Johnson’s invitation, Lee indicated that he would have accepted an invitation 
from the PRC as well if he had received one from Beijing.54 Galbraith noted that Lee 
was clearly making efforts to “protect his ‘left flank’ exposed to Chinese chauvinists” 
by stressing that his trip to the US did not imply that Singapore was “moving into 
American camp”.55 As the date of his visit drew nearer, Lee expressed that he deemed a 
replacement of the British by US forces “as unprofitable ‘either from their [the US] 
point of view or mine [Lee’s]’” and that he would welcome the US Seventh Fleet, and 
Soviet vessels to use the dockyard facilities in Singapore.56 Lee was also cautious about 
Singapore’s domestic response to his US visit. When planning for his visit to 
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Washington in October 1967, Lee was “dubious about stopping in Honolulu”.57 
Apparently, Lee’s in-laws were residing in Hawaii. Lee feared that Singapore’s Chinese 
media might suggest that he wanted to make “the Chinese in Honolulu to be models” 
for the Chinese in Singapore.58 Lee was concerned that “speculation about political 
significance of his Hawaiian connections” would be “politically damaging” to him.59 
Hence, Lee wanted Galbraith to ensure that his stopover at Hawaii should be brief and 
low key. 
The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office also took considerable interest 
in Lee’s October 1967 visit to Washington. In an FCO brief circulated to the Permanent 
Under-Secretary, British officials gathered from Lee’s speeches that “Lee is not seeking 
an American presence in Singapore but may be hoping to secure ship-repairing business 
from the U.S. Navy”.60 The FCO brief hinted that Lee now saw America as “the power 
that will secure Singapore’s long-term future independence”.61 In this regard, Lee’s visit 
to Washington was clearly an important step towards a more enduring relationship 
between the US and Singapore; so important, in fact, that Lee requested for his British 
hosts to conduct a briefing for him about senior US foreign policymakers before he left 
London for the US in October 1967.62 Since it was in the interest of the United 
Kingdom that Singapore and the US develop closer ties, the FCO obliged and scheduled 
a briefing session for Lee on the evening of 11 October 1967 to explain the workings of 
the US administration, including the vital role of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, and the rivalry between its influential chairman, Senator William Fulbright, 
and President Johnson.63 By the time his London visit ended, Lee had gone through 
considerable British tutelage to handle his first official visit to Washington. 
When Lee arrived in Washington in October 1967, the State Department and 
White House staff gave him a generous reception. Lee recalled in his memoir that he 
was “embarrassed by the extravagant praise” that President Johnson lavished on him 
and Singapore when he arrived,64 and thought that “most un-British”.65 Nevertheless, 
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Lee reciprocated the kindness of his host by endorsing the Johnson administration’s 
policies in Southeast Asia and commended Washington’s perseverance in Asia. Lee 
thought that it was vital for Singapore that the US remained committed in Vietnam and 
avoided criticising the bombing of Vietnam. Most of Lee’s statements during his US 
trip were aimed at projecting a positive image of himself to his American hosts. As Lee 
notes in his memoir, he “was not prepared to do what was against Singapore’s interest” 
by criticising Johnson during the visit.66 According to Galbraith’s report of the visit,  
Lee asked me [Galbraith] several times if anything he had said would make it 
more difficult for the President, and the impression was reinforced through to 
the end of the visit that Lee was trying to be helpful to the President on Viet-
Nam.… Lee went even further than this in defense and praise of the President on 
two or three occasions.… [H]is implied and often explicit praise of the President 
and the Secretaries of State and Defense seemed to spring from conviction as a 
result of his talks with them.67 
Although able to create a positive impression at most times, Lee’s anxiety about 
British announcement of withdrawal from Singapore led to “one of his poorest 
performances” of the trip when meeting Secretary of State Dean Rusk.68 Lee spoke 
critically of America’s tendency to favour relations with Europe more than Asia, and 
attributed America’s bias against Asians to the former’s racist attitude. Dean firmly 
rejected Lee’s insinuation of America’s racism and urged him to assess America’s 
determination and commitment by recounting US actions in Asia since World War II 
rather than seek verbal assurance from the US government.69 Galbraith observed that, 
during the meeting, 
Lee’s expressions were overdrawn and he sounded less reasonable and attractive 
than he was on most other occasions. He seemed to be trying to draw the 
Secretary into a statement of commitment, or of willingness to consider 
commitment, to Singapore as a quid pro quo for more explicit Singapore support 
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for the United States on Viet-Nam. In the face of the Secretary’s non-committal 
responses, Lee’s argumentation took on an urgent, almost desperate note.70 
Lee told Rusk that “he didn’t know when or whether he would be able to come to the 
United States again” and urged Rusk to giving him an assurance that the US would 
commit to Singapore’s security.71 Galbraith later opined that Lee could have been 
nervous about meeting the president later on, or was just under strain from a long day of 
meetings. In any case, Lee’s intention was clear: he wanted US defence commitment in 
exchange for Singapore’s support of the Vietnam War. In this regard, Lee’s request was 
similar to what Tunku Abdul Rahman tried to achieve in 1964 when he offered 
President Johnson a staunch non-communist partner in Malaysia in exchange for 
American protection.72  
In other meetings related to Singapore’s security, Lee was more successful in 
getting what he wanted to achieve. He convinced Defense Secretary Robert McNamara 
to send a mission to assess the feasibility of American use of the Singapore naval 
dockyards and military airfields for maintenance and repairs on a commercial basis.73 
Lee also spoke with William Bundy “of his [Lee’s] desire to arm Singapore sufficiently 
to ‘give anyone a bloody nose who is going to rob the house and take my jade 
pieces’.”74 Bundy assured Lee that the United States could supply Singapore with the 
“rifles already ordered, …and perhaps permit the supply of other light weaponry”.75 
Again, Lee tried to press the US to offer protection over Singapore so that Malaysia and 
Indonesia would not threaten the island’s security. To that effect, 
Lee asked whether the Seventh Fleet couldn’t ‘drop a word’ that would give 
Singapore assurance that it would be safe against Malaysian/Indonesian 
incursions. Lee implied that the ability of the United States to operate in the 
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Indonesian and Malaysian milieu in a way that would provide protection for 
Singapore was crucial to U.S.-Singapore relations.76 
In his analysis of Singapore’s relations with Malaysia and Indonesia, Ang Cheng Guan 
notes that Lee was worried that the end of confrontation and the Malays’ fear of the 
Chinese would “drive Malaysia and Indonesia closer together, to the detriment of 
Singapore”.77 It was possible to provide a greater US military presence in Singapore 
since the US Navy was already utilising the Singapore naval dockyards with British 
permission. 78  But because US relations with Indonesia and Malaysia were more 
politically important than US-Singapore relations, Bundy did not wish to give Lee the 
impression that the United States was in any way committed to protecting Singapore.79 
Lee’s preoccupation with the impending British withdrawal was noticeable up to the 
end of the trip. Before leaving Los Angeles for Hawaii, on the way back to Singapore, 
Lee “emphasize[d] again the importance of the United States helping, ‘in both our 
interests,’ to keep some of the air and naval facilities and the trained personnel who 
operate them intact and the British in the habit of using them”.80 Lee’s final appeal did 
not yield any verbal commitment from the US that it would undertake to guarantee 
Singapore’s security. 
Whereas Lee Kuan Yew’s aims of securing American protection over Singapore 
achieved mixed results, he was more successful in attracting US investors into 
Singapore. In Chicago, Lee promoted Singapore in his “general pitch for American 
investment in Singapore”.81 
[Lee] described Singapore as a good base camp where businessmen could ‘leave 
their expensive machines’ and their families in confidence while they sallied 
forth into the less certain surrounding areas. He amused his listeners with 
statements such as ‘you can get a telephone connection with any place in the 
world in 5 minutes and if you can’t let me know and I’ll chop someone’s head 
off’. With such statements he also created an image of a ‘no-nonsense’ 
                                                
76 Ibid. 
77 Ang, “Singapore and the Vietnam War”: p. 363. 
78 Captain J. O. Mayo, “Possible Uses for Singapore’s Ship and Aircraft Repair”, 2 October 1967, in 
Malaysia/Singapore [Lot File 71D3], 1967, Box 21, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Office of 
the Country Director for Australia, New Zealand, and Pacific Islands, 1969-1974, RG 59, NACP. 
79 Galbraith, “Lee’s Visit to US”, November 1967. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
 85 
Singapore Government and a people willing and able to work – as was 
obviously his purpose.82  
Lee’s pitch to the American business communities turned out to be highly effective, 
bringing in millions of dollars in investments for Singapore beginning in 1968.83 
In London, the American Department of the British Foreign Office and the Far 
Eastern and Pacific Department of the Commonwealth Office received a report of Lee’s 
visit from a British diplomat stationed in Washington, Peter R. Spendlove, on 31 
October 1967. Spendlove reported that Lee had created a favourable impression of 
himself in Washington during the visit and was more interested in the security than the 
economic aspect of the British withdrawal from Singapore.84 The British diplomat 
pointed out that Lee’s attempts to “avoid controversial tangles” had caused some 
contradictions in his statements, and Spendlove asserted that there was “no reason to 
doubt that what [Lee]…said privately differs very much from…more public 
utterance”.85 Lee publicly claimed that he was not seeking any US security guarantee. 
“I’m not seeking American aid,” Lee told his audience at the Overseas Writers 
Luncheon on 18 October, “nor am I in receipt of any. I do not have an American 
guarantee of my security, nor am I seeking any.”86 Based on Ambassador Galbraith’s 
report, however, Lee had actually asked for American protection over Singapore during 
his private meetings with President Johnson and Secretary Rusk.87  
Lee’s speeches in the meeting rooms and public halls demonstrated his attempts 
to balance Singapore’s non-aligned position with the need for American economic and 
military support. With respect to Lee’s position on American involvement in Vietnam, 
the British embassy in Washington reported that at some points during the visit Lee 
tried to balance his ardent support for the US by labelling American actions in Vietnam 
as “inept intervention”.88 Lee opined that the US had missed several opportunities in the 
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past to leave Vietnam, and the best option left was to hold the line until other Southeast 
Asian countries developed some form of resistance against communism.89 “Of course 
Lee does not go ‘all the way with L.B.J.’,” explained another British embassy official, 
“but on the whole he understands why the Americans are in Vietnam and hopes that 
they will be able to find a way out which will ‘enhance the prospects of peace and 
security for the rest of South and South-East Asia’.”90 Lee asserted that the US should 
consider a withdrawal from Vietnam only if the region would be stable after the 
Americans disengaged. Lee also used his speeches to stress the poor timing of the 
British plan to withdraw from Southeast Asia, which would come at a time when the 
People’s Republic of China was expected to have around fifty Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missiles at their disposal by the 1970s.91  
Perhaps carrying the analysis too far, Spendlove surmised that “there may be a 
factor related to [Lee’s] domestic political situation and to the West Malaysian political 
situation where he calculates that American support, if plausible and discreet, would be 
a valuable asset for him in his pursuit of wider objectives than simply remaining the 
Premier of his Island state”.92 Without further evidence, it is difficult to acquiesce in 
Spendlove’s subtle assertion that Lee’s overtures towards the Americans stemmed from 
his ambitions to lead a political entity larger than Singapore. It was nonetheless clear 
that Lee wanted US support for him and Singapore to be discreet, if it was indeed 
forthcoming. Spendlove concluded that 
[a]lthough [Lee] described himself on arrival [to the US] as being neither a dove 
nor a hawk but as an owl, his tour has tended to produce the image of one who is 
a somewhat hawkish owl…. It is not clear to us here how far this is Lee himself 
or Lee the tactician in the United States.… He may well argue that regardless of 
his differences with the United States, if they are the only plausible force from 
without, which could back the weak governments of South East Asia, he would 
be prepared to do business with them.93  
Back in Singapore, Lee’s enthusiasm for America faded rather abruptly. In a 
meeting with Ambassador Galbraith’s deputy, John Dexter,  
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[Lee] alluded again to the theme of the United States as an organ-grinder dealing 
with its client-states as if they were monkeys.… One American shortcoming 
[Lee] then noted was our tendency to seek short-term advantages rather than 
looking to long-range objectives.… Despite the shortcomings he finds in 
American style and policy, …what [Lee] sought was not ephemeral friendship 
but an enduring relationship based upon real national interests.94 
The October 1967 visit had erased Lee’s prior suspicions about the United States’ 
intentions towards Singapore. Lee made clear to the American embassy that he was 
intent on building a partnership with the US that would last. 
Despite efforts by the Singapore government to avoid giving the impression that 
Lee Kuan Yew was given the “red carpet” and “VIP treatment” in Washington,95 
sections of Singapore’s local media held the view that Lee had received special 
treatment by the Americans during his trip.96 The editor of the Straits Times newspaper, 
Wee Kim Wee, met Ambassador Galbraith in late 1967 and discussed local impressions 
of Lee’s Washington trip. Galbraith was interested to hear Wee’s assessment of the trip 
because of the closeness between the Straits Times editor and the prime minister of 
Singapore. Wee also commented that he would have accompanied Lee to Washington if 
his travel plans had coincided with the prime minister’s.97 During the conversation, Wee 
asked the US ambassador, “Did the President often spend as much time with visiting 
Prime Ministers as he had with Lee?”98 Galbraith replied that Lee was an “interesting” 
visitor but “wouldn’t have been the only one to whom the President had devoted that 
much attention”.99 Wee, as well as some Chinese-educated members within the PAP, 
thought that Lee “had taken a sharp turn away from nonalignment while he was in the 
United States” and “[c]oncerted efforts were being mounted by Party workers to repair 
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the damage”.100 Wee also thought that “it was clear” that Lee was seeking American 
assurance of “protection for Singapore” after the British withdrawal.101 
If Singapore’s local newspapers were able to conclude that Lee’s visit was a sign 
that he was leaning too closely towards the United States, foreign media reports also 
made similar observations. Australian newspapers emphasised the volte face of Lee’s 
1965 anti-American comments to his October 1967 statements of support for the US in 
Vietnam and long-term military presence in Southeast Asia. 102  The Australian 
newspaper reported that the Singapore prime minister made deliberate efforts to avoid 
commenting on US policies in Vietnam during the Washington visit. 103  Other 
Australian newspapers also noted that Lee was keeping a balancing act with his 
comments made during the visit, observing that Lee had to show some level of 
solidarity with the United States, while at the same time not appear to be an American 
stooge.  
In a televised interview with four foreign correspondents on 5 November 1967, 
Lee insisted that he had not been backtracking on any of his statements since his return 
from Washington. Halfway through the program, Lee’s interviewer from the Melbourne 
Age, John Bennetts, queried him with this observation: 
Prime Minister, it seems to me, in this interview, you have been at some point to 
moderate a rather pro-American image of yourself that was projected while you 
were abroad [in the US]. Is this because you have found some criticism back 
home of what you said over there?104 
Lee replied by expressing confidence that he could correct any “slanted reporting” in 
Singapore newspapers within a fortnight because he could “get through to [his] own 
people”.105 Lee explained that he was expecting “a very abrasive time” with American 
journalists who might “rake up the old feuds”, probably alluding to Lee’s anti-American 
criticisms in late 1965. “But they decided that they would adopt me and say, ‘What a 
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great champion of American policy’,” Lee told his interviewers with a tinge of 
irritation. “I thought it was a very cunning line, because I am the only chap in the whole 
of Southeast Asia that is not on the American payroll and therefore, credible to the 
American people.”106 Fred Emery of The Times, London, interjected by pointing out 
that the American press were rightly surprised by Lee’s pro-American statements 
“[b]ecause you [Lee] said things publicly…that you haven’t said before or, shall we say, 
that have not been heard in America before”.107 Lee insisted that he had been very 
careful with his statements and the newspapers in America and Singapore had not 
reported accurately.108 
Still anxious about public opinions of his statements made in the US, Lee asked 
the British High Commission in Singapore for an assessment on British press coverage 
of Lee’s US visit.109 The Singapore prime minister’s press officer requested the British 
High Commission to “keep him informed of any indication of British reactions”.110 
British press coverage of Lee’s statements made in the US had nonetheless been 
“sparse, and editorial comment largely absent”.111 The Commonwealth Office agreed 
with Deputy High Commissioner Paul Holmer that “there have been no official 
reactions here” in London.112 Without much to report, Holmer was somewhat hesitant to 
meet Lee, who would surely try to extract a British response towards his trip to the US. 
But Lee was not interested anymore with response to his US trip; he spent the entire 
meeting with Holmer discussing aid for Singapore after the British withdrew.113 Ang 
Cheng Guan notes that Lee used his trip to Cambodia in December 1967, meetings with 
the North Korean and North Vietnamese officials, and “disparaging remarks” about 
America’s Asian allies to shore up his non-aligned image.114 
The US Department of State was equally careful not to contradict Lee’s efforts 
to salvage his non-aligned position and undo the political damage caused by his 
Washington visit. According to Washington, Lee’s credibility as a neutralist was his 
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most valuable quality. Hence, the Officer-in-Charge of Malaysian and Singapore 
Affairs at the State Department, Albert D. Moscotti, cautioned in April 1968 that the US 
should not hasten to arrange any visits of senior US military officers to Singapore 
because it “might be seen as evidence of US military interest in Singapore and its 
bases”.115 Both Singapore and the United States sought to maintain a distance in the 
public sphere so that Singapore’s non-alignment and America’s containment policy 
could co-exist. 
In March 1966, William Bundy’s clarification on US policies towards overseas 
Chinese and Singapore removed a layer of suspicion through which Lee saw the 
American administration. Lee was satisfied with Bundy’s assurance that there was no 
American promise to support the Malaysian government if conflicts between the Malays 
and Chinese came to a head in Malaysia and Singapore. The visit to Washington in 
October 1967 was Lee’s attempt to move Singapore close enough to the United States, 
without sacrificing Singapore’s non-aligned policy, which Washington had come to see 
as a valuable quality. Once Washington and the Singapore government were able to 
develop mutual trust, non-alignment and containment became complementary towards 
achieving common goals. To the British government, the entente between Singapore 
and Washington was an immensely positive development. While British Deputy High 
Commissioner Paul Holmer was expecting Lee to discuss the British official reaction to 
his October visit to Washington when the two eventually met on 16 November 1967, it 
was really the British withdrawal that preoccupied Lee Kuan Yew. In some sense, the 
British withdrawal contributed to strategic cooperation between Singapore and the 
United States. 
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Chapter 4 
Resolving the British Withdrawal 
US-Singapore Defence Cooperation After East of Suez 
 
After a rocky start, the United States and Singapore began to develop mutual 
understanding and found a stronger basis for cooperation during the height of the Cold 
War in Southeast Asia. The British withdrawal from Singapore, first announced in July 
1967, became a catalyst for closer relations between Singapore and the US. Britain’s 
military presence in the region played a key role in the American strategy of 
containment in Asia and also ensured Singapore’s security. The retreat of the British 
armed forces from Singapore opened new platforms for US-Singapore cooperation in 
the maintenance of peace and stability in the region. The United States, although not 
part of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), was able to influence the 
negotiations of the FPDA through its alliance with Britain, Australia and New Zealand, 
and military assistance to Singapore and Malaysia. With the withdrawal of the British 
forces from the subregion, Singapore gravitated towards Washington for its security 
needs, which had previously depended heavily on the British. 
As a British colony, Singapore had been under British military protection. When 
Singapore, Malaya, Sarawak and North Borneo (later renamed Sabah) merged to form 
the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement expanded 
its coverage to the whole of Malaysia, becoming the Anglo-Malaysian Defence 
Agreement. Britain’s military presence became crucial to the security of Malaysia and 
Singapore between 1963 and 1966. The formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 
1963 triggered the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation, a low-level conflict initiated by 
Indonesia in opposition to the federation of former British colonies into a new political 
entity. Confrontation led to skirmishes between Indonesia and Malaysia, occurring 
along the border between Indonesia and East Malaysia, and parts of the Malay 
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peninsula. Even after Singapore was separated from Malaysia in 1965, the AMDA 
remained in effect over Singapore under the Separation Agreement.1  
Apart from defence, the Singapore economy, too, depended on Britain’s military 
presence on the island. In July 1967, the British troops stationed on the island 
contributed almost 25% of Singapore’s Gross National Product.2 A briefing report 
prepared by the Far East and Pacific Department of the British Commonwealth Office 
in September 1967 noted that until about 1963, one quarter of the income and 
employment of Singapore was derived from the presence of British bases in Singapore.3 
The remaining quarter was contributed by other sources such as manufacturing. The 
separation of Singapore from Malaysia and the Indonesian Confrontation sharply 
reduced trade between Singapore and its two top trading partners from 1963 to 1966.4 
During that period, Singapore’s economy was stable largely because of revenue and 
employment linked to the British military presence on the island. In a National Policy 
Paper on Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore Subregion drafted by the US State 
Department in May 1968, a comprehensive study on the economic impact of the British 
military withdrawal noted that 
British bases in Singapore contribute directly or indirectly to the livelihood of 
22% of the country’s labor force and account for 20% of its national income, 
17% of its foreign exchange and 14% of its government revenues. Because of 
rapid population growth, the number of additional persons seeking work each 
year is increasing rapidly. The release over the next 3-4 years of some 30,000 
civilians from base or base-related jobs will aggravate Singapore's chronic 
unemployment problem and possibly affect political stability.5 
Hence, both American and British analysts predicted that a British military withdrawal 
from Singapore could greatly jeopardise Singapore’s security and economy.  
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With the British military scheduled to leave Singapore and Malaysia, defence 
cooperation between the two Southeast Asian countries became more unattainable. The 
Royal Malayan Navy had been based in Singapore since 1957 with the intention of 
protecting the island against communist subversion and internal unrest.6 The Singapore 
government now saw the Malaysian troops on the island as a threat to its independence 
and security.7 Huxley argues that the presence of Malaysian forces in Singapore “had 
the potential to compromise or at least complicate” Singapore’s efforts to “establish a 
separate national identity”, especially when these forces were responsible for guarding 
key installations such as Singapore’s water supply.8 Malaysian government officials, on 
the other hand, claimed that the newly independent Singapore posed a threat to the 
security of its troops stationed in Singapore. Zainal Sulong from the Malaysian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs argued that if the Singapore government became “hostile to 
Malaysia…Malaysian defence facilities located on the island…would be indefensible 
against attack by Singapore forces.”9 Malaysia was, therefore, determined to develop 
separate naval capabilities from Singapore.10  
The British withdrawal from the Singapore-Malaysia subregion altered the 
security structure of Southeast Asia and the defence arrangements of the two Southeast 
Asian countries. Most significantly, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and 
Singapore conferred to update the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement with the Five 
Power Defence Arrangements. Indeed, the FPDA was a clearer reflection of the reduced 
commitment among the ANZUK nations for Singapore and Malaysia, as well as the 
need for Singapore and Malaysia to plan for an independent defence force 
commensurate with their political separateness. In fact, the Singapore government had 
begun to develop plans for Singapore’s own defence force after independence. After 
failing to obtain help from Switzerland, India and Egypt, the Singapore government 
managed to reach an agreement with the Israeli government for military advisors to be 
deployed to Singapore. Israeli military advisors were in Singapore from late 1965 to 
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1974, and played a crucial part in the training of Singapore’s defence personnel and the 
development of training manuals for the Singapore Armed Forces.11 Both countries 
enjoyed an “extremely close and multifaceted military relationship”.12To maintain the 
credibility of the containment strategy in Southeast Asia without Britain’s military 
presence, the United States adopted a two-pronged approach: first, to ensure the 
viability of the Five Power Defence Arrangements as a mechanism for preserving 
stability in the region, and second, to assist Singapore and Malaysia in developing their 
respective armed forces. Singapore’s response to the British withdrawal evolved as the 
run-down of the British troops in Singapore began in 1968 and was completed in 1971. 
At first, the Singapore government decided to invite the US Navy and Army to utilise 
the island’s dockyards and air bases for repair works. Under the guidance of Israeli 
military advisors, Singapore was also developing a deterrent capability described as a 
“poisoned shrimp” defence strategy that aimed to “register the island’s indigestible 
qualities to any likely predator”.13 By the end of 1971, the Singapore government 
became more committed to the FPDA while strengthening its defence force with 
sophisticated military equipment from the US. The approaches taken by both Singapore 
and the US governments resulted in an intimate defence partnership, which involved 
frequent visits to Singapore bases by US military vessels and supply of US military 
equipment to Singapore. After the British withdrawal had fractured the Anglo-American 
division of responsibilities for Southeast Asian security, US-Singapore defence 
cooperation moved at an extraordinary pace and pushed Singapore towards the 
Americans in Asia.14 
During the early Cold War, British forces based in Malaya and Singapore were 
critical to America’s overall strategy in Southeast Asia in several aspects. While the US 
was fighting the communists in Indochina, Britain was responsible for preserving non-
communist regimes in Malaya and Singapore. By the mid-1960s, the United States was 
embroiled in armed conflict in Vietnam and resisted taking on more defence 
commitments in the region. The British also kept the area under non-communist 
influence and maintained control over the sea lanes of communication between the 
Indian and Pacific Oceans. A base policy study conducted in 1966 by the Strategic 
Plans Division of the US Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) concluded that “[t]he only 
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major geographic area where the existing US base structure to support the current 
strategy of containment of Communist China is inadequate is the Indian Ocean”.15 To 
overcome the inadequacy of America’s naval projection in the Indian Ocean, the CNO 
recommended a strategy of directing US efforts towards “keeping the British in 
Malaysia and Singapore”.16 A report written in 1971 by the US Department of Defense 
argued that Britain’s military presence was needed “to ensure continued US access and 
adequate berthing in Singapore” and “deny availability of the yard to USSR ships” that 
were using Singapore’s ship repair facilities more frequently after 1970.17 Moreover, 
Singapore’s non-aligned foreign policy during that period made it politically untenable 
for Singapore to accept American troops based in the area. By virtue of its historical 
connections with Malaysia and Singapore, Britain was in a better position than the 
United States to check communist influence in the area. 
The retreat of British troops to Europe not only forced the United States 
government to revise its strategic estimates in Southeast Asia, but could create domestic 
political problems for the United States. US Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressed 
concern about the possible reactions of the American public towards the British 
withdrawal. By 1967, public dissent against the war in Vietnam was escalating within 
America. Secretary Rusk feared that the announcement of the UK withdrawal would 
strengthen the voices demanding for a corresponding American withdrawal from 
Southeast Asia, putting the “validity of and necessity for [American] presence in 
Vietnam” in question.18 Furthermore, there might be pressure from the US Congress for 
the United States to reduce its military commitment in Europe, since the British planned 
to cut defence expenditure by deploying their forces away from overseas bases and back 
to the continent.19 Rusk’s concern was not the risk of political instability in Malaysia 
and Singapore after British forces left the subregion in 1971.20 Instead, his main protest 
was that Britain’s decision to retreat from Southeast Asia was made without 
consultation with the US. Since Britain’s unilateral decision had made a concerted 
Anglo-American withdrawal from Southeast Asia no longer possible, Rusk complained 
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that it had become more difficult for the US to pull out of Vietnam without destabilising 
the region. Rusk was worried that the British withdrawal would compel the American 
government to take on additional commitments in Southeast Asia. 21  The US 
government had to find an alternative to Britain’s military presence in the subregion that 
could maintain the stability of Southeast Asia should the US withdraw from Vietnam.  
America’s interests in the subregion were strategic, political and economic. If 
the governments in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore were taken over by communist 
regimes, the strategic impact on US military operations in the area would be 
detrimental. A National Policy Paper (NPP) prepared by the US State Department in 
1968 assessed that if the US military were to be denied access through the Strait of 
Malacca, US vessels from Manila to the Indian Ocean would need to increase cruising 
distance by 1,500 nautical miles. If America’s Pacific Fleet and Air Force were denied 
access through the air and sea space of Indonesia, cruising distance would increase by 
5,000 nautical miles. Furthermore, Australian support for operations in the subregion 
would also be greatly obstructed.22 Greater cruising distances would inevitably increase 
shipping costs to American allies in the Asia-Pacific region. The impact would be 
particularly felt by Japan since 20% of Japan’s foreign trade and 90% of its fuel imports 
passed through the Strait of Malacca.23 America and its allies, Japan and Britain, also 
relied on the subregion for its supply of tin and other raw materials. A break in the 
supply of the subregion’s resources would disrupt the economies of the US and its 
allies. In a zero-sum game mentality, where losses incurred by one party led to gains for 
its enemies, the US State Department feared that the Sino-Soviet powers would benefit 
immensely if they achieved prominence in the area. The NPP posited that once Britain 
withdrew from bases in Malaysia and Singapore, the Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore 
subregion was “no longer negligible”.24 
The US State Department outlined four objectives for the subregion. The chief 
aim of the US government for the area was to keep the three states free from 
“domination by a major power hostile to the United States”.25 Of the three Southeast 
Asian countries, Singapore possessed the least political significance within the context 
of the United States’ global conflict with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, since 
Singapore could become a potent asset against the US if controlled by the communist 
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bloc, ensuring that Singapore did not align itself with the Soviet Union and the People’s 
Republic of China became an important objective in US policy towards Singapore. 
Second, the United States aimed to promote the economic growth, political stability and 
communal harmony of each state within the subregion.26 Third, in order to promote 
stability, American planners and diplomats sought to reduce conflict and encourage 
cooperation among the countries within the area, and with other neighbouring states in 
the broader region.27 Finally, the NPP stressed that the US government must ensure 
“[c]ontinued maritime access by the U.S. and other states to the international waters of 
the area”.28 By 1968, Singapore’s naval dockyards had begun to play a critical role in 
US military operations in Vietnam. Hence, the US Department of Defense kept abreast 
of the negotiations between Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (ANZUK) 
and the government of Singapore to ensure that the ANZUK retained control over the 
berthing areas used by the US military for repairs and maintenance of its ships.29  
Beyond the four objectives, the 1968 National Policy Paper on the subregion 
also identified at least four key issues that needed consideration once Britain completed 
its withdrawal operations: 
1. Should the U.S. participate directly in new defense arrangements for the 
subregion, following the British withdrawal? 
2. If the U.S. decides not to participate directly in new defense arrangements, 
what position should the U.S. take toward new arrangements…? 
3. What should be the US attitude toward providing or increasing economic or 
military aid to each of the three states? 
4. To what extent is it feasible and desirable for the US to urge Japan to increase 
its responsibilities in the subregion?30 
Within the second question, the State Department explored a range of options, such as 
encouraging the UK to remain in the subregion, supporting a Commonwealth defence 
arrangement that linked with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and 
inducing Australia to play a greater role in the defence of the subregion through 
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American assurance under the ANZUS Treaty.31 The NPP followed with three proposed 
strategies: US deployment of troops to replace British forces stationed in the subregion, 
minimal US involvement, and a strategy that could strike a “proper balance between 
intervention and aloofness”.32 The first two strategies were assessed to be infeasible 
because the first strategy was deemed too costly and the second too risky, since 
American interests would be contingent on the effectiveness of the Five Power Defence 
Arrangements (FPDA), which would be negotiated after the British withdrawal.33 The 
third strategy was preferred since it took into account emerging regional conditions and 
would protect American interests. Ultimately, US policy in the subregion must be one 
that could promote cooperation among Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore and reduce 
intra-regional conflict.  
Embedded within the preferred strategy of engagement and aloofness was the 
emphasis on pushing Australia to lead the FPDA. The NPP discussed at length “serious 
increase in Communist subversion in Singapore” as one of the contingencies that might 
arise in the review period of 1968-1973.34 The State Department expected the People’s 
Action Party government to remain dominant in Singapore but feared that an 
unsatisfactory settlement in Vietnam and high unemployment aggravated by Britain’s 
withdrawal would weaken the PAP’s hold on power.35 If the spectre of a pro-communist 
party toppling the PAP government arose, 
the United States should be prepared to provide emergency bilateral economic 
assistance. If public order and security were threatened, we should, if asked, also 
be prepared to provide assistance to Singapore’s internal security apparatus.36 
To prevent a direct US intervention in Singapore, the US government would “follow 
closely the situation in Singapore, urge its Commonwealth partners to supply adequate 
aid, and be prepared to consider U.S. economic aid, should help from other donors be 
inadequate”.37 Hence, the US government embarked on a strategy that would push 
Australia towards the leadership of the FPDA, ensure that the region remained stable 
after the US withdrew from Vietnam, and support Singapore’s economic stability. 
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With the retreat of the British from Southeast Asia, the US State Department 
considered Australia to be the natural successor to British leadership in the security of 
the Malaysia-Singapore subregion. Shortly after the first announcement of withdrawal 
in July 1967,38 US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara met with Australian 
Minister for External Affairs Paul Hasluck in October 1967 to discuss the likelihood of 
Australia taking over the British bases in Singapore. If Australia would agree to take 
over the Singapore naval bases, the United States would share the cost of managing the 
bases.39 The US government agreed was prepared to shoulder “approximately 70 
percent of the Singapore naval base berthing area upkeep costs ($1-2 million), under 
Australian Navy management”.40 In a briefing memorandum before the meeting, the US 
State Department outlined why Australia was best suited to take over the Singapore 
bases. Based on historical factors, Australian management of the bases “would maintain 
Singapore as a Commonwealth responsibility and [avoid] having the United States 
assume a commitment to defend Singapore (or Malaysia)”.41 Politically, being part of 
the Commonwealth and gaining acceptance among Southeast Asian governments, 
Australian military forces based in Malaysia and Singapore would raise fewer 
objections than American troops. Strategically, “[i]t would provide the U.S. Navy with 
an alternate facility to Yokosuka and Subic, in the event that either of these bases is not 
available, or if restrictions on their use limit their capability, in the 1970s”.42 Finally, the 
State Department opined that the strength of the US alliance with Australia surpassed 
that of any other American allies in the region. State tried to argue that the transfer of 
British bases to Australian administration would serve both American and Australian 
interests in the region. But it was apparent that both Washington and Canberra were 
unwilling to take up the defence burden that Britain was dropping on them. 
Even if Canberra was willing to, it did not have the capacity to take over the 
defence obligations left behind by the British forces. Australia’s force level in Southeast 
Asia was meant to complement rather than substitute the deployment of troops from 
Britain and the United Sates. In fact, the Australian Defence Force did not have a 
significant presence in Malaysia and Singapore after Confrontation. Australia had a 
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total of 2,750 military personnel in Malaysia and Singapore, including about 1,000 
army personnel stationed at Terendak, Malacca, another 1,050 Air Force personnel at 
Butterworth, Penang, and 500 Navy personnel in Singapore.43 UK military forces in 
Malaysia and Singapore, on the other hand, comprised about 33,000 British personnel 
and 10,000 Gurkhas. In total, the British bases employed approximately 80,000 British 
and local personnel in the subregion.44 Although these estimates reflected the forces at 
much-reduced, post-Confrontation levels, it was still far beyond what Australia, with 
contributions from New Zealand, could expect to match. Furthermore, the Americans 
were cognizant that the British were “now removing the peg on which Australia hung 
its participation” in regional security.45 Thus, the likelihood of the Australians retreating 
from the subregion with the British was high because of Australia’s subordinate role in 
the British-led Commonwealth Strategic Reserve.46 Still, the US State Department 
hoped that whatever shortfall that Australia experienced would be overcome by 
strengthening the local forces in Malaysia and Singapore.  
Until late 1967, the Australian government showed willingness to take the lead 
in the defence of the subregion after Britain withdrew. According to a State Department 
report, the Australian government announced in October 1967 that even though 
Australia could not fully take over from the British, it would participate in the FPDA 
talks and “be prepared to discuss the size and role of an Australian contribution to 
combined defense arrangements which embrace a joint Singapore-Malaysia defense 
effort.”47 But Australia’s enthusiasm was short-lived. After John Gorton became prime 
minister of Australia, State Department officials observed that “there have been strong 
indications that Prime Minister Gorton is backing away from the GOA’s [Government 
of Australia’s] previously announced, tentative decision to station forces in 
Singapore/Malaysia after 1971.”48  Australia’s defence thinking during the Gorton 
administration was increasingly divided between supporters of a “forward defence” 
strategy, including Minister of Defence Malcolm Fraser and Minster of External Affairs 
William McMahon, and the prime minister himself, who was afraid that Australia’s 
troops deployments in the Malaysia and Singapore would be implicated if conflicts 
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arose between Malaysia and either the Philippines or Indonesia.49 The Australian 
government was nonetheless in accord on the need to keep the United States engaged in 
Asia “at all costs”.50 Australia’s deployment of troops to fight alongside the US during 
the Korean War and the Vietnam War was considered “a kind of premium which 
Australia must pay on its ANZUS insurance policy”.51 
Shortly after the first Five Power Talks held in June 1968, US Ambassador to 
Singapore Francis Galbraith wrote to William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for 
East Asian Affairs, describing Australia’s ambivalence towards the FPDA, and stressed 
that America’s “presence and activity” was the key to “encourage the Australians to 
play a security role in Singapore/Malaysia”.52 In a 1969 study on Australia’s strategy in 
Southeast Asia, the US State Department reported that 
[A]fter the British begin to phase out, the Australians will be asked to take up a 
portion of the burden in Malaysia and Singapore; they currently seem disposed 
to undertake such tasks. How far they go, and how consistently they will carry 
such burdens will be in part dependent upon the policy of the United States. 
American encouragement and support will greatly influence the future course of 
Australian policy and involvement.53 
Inasmuch as Washington aimed to encourage the Australian government to retain 
Australian forces in the region, Canberra, too, hoped to “strengthen Washington’s 
resolve” to keep US forces in Southeast Asia.54 
American encouragement came from the highest level, as US President Richard 
Nixon prepared to meet Australian Prime Minister John Gorton in the beginning of 
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1969. Robert Moore from the US State Department advised the president that Gorton 
“could not run the risk of involvement, particularly of his ground forces, in a local crisis 
in Malaysia/Singapore until he knew in advance who would ‘back him up.’ He therefore 
planned to make no decision on post-1971 deployment of ground forces until he had 
talked to President Nixon”.55 In the same memo, Moore added that “Gorton himself said 
his main purpose was to obtain assurances from the United States that it would back 
Australia up if her troops got into trouble in Malaysia defending it against attack from 
the north — Red China or North Viet-Nam.”56 Gorton needed to know how far the 
ANZUS Pact would cover Australia’s involvement in Malaysia and Singapore, and left 
Washington on 31 March 1969 with Nixon’s commitment that “the United States would 
act under Articles IV and V of the [ANZUS] Treaty” to support Australian forces in 
Malaysia and Singapore in the event of an overt attack by a communist country.57  
President Nixon’s assurance of support for Australia’s involvement in Malaysia 
and Singapore, however, lacked credibility. It was calculated by planners in 
Washington, Canberra and London that a communist attack in the subregion would 
most probably take the form of subversion; an overt communist attack on Malaysia and 
Singapore would only occur in the most extreme circumstances. Furthermore, the US 
added that their treaty obligations were bound by the “constitutional processes of the 
United States, as specified by the ANZUS Treaty”.58 The United States would not be 
able to come to the aid of their ANZUS allies if the US Congress did not sanction the 
move. With American troops already heavily committed to the war in Vietnam, it was 
difficult to foresee that Congress would support further US involvement in other parts 
of Southeast Asia under the circumstances at that time. After the promulgation of the 
Nixon Doctrine in July 1969 and the “Vietnamization” of the war in Vietnam, the value 
of Australia’s troop deployments in Southeast Asia came into question among 
Australia’s policymakers.59  
By late 1969, the US State Department could observe Australia’s wavering 
commitment to the establishment of the FPDA. The US embassy in Singapore followed 
                                                
55 Robert W. Moore, “Applicability of ANZUS to Australian Forces in Malaysia/Singapore”, 14 February 
1969, in DEF 15.9 Malaysia/Singapore (Infrastructure) - NZ/Aust [Lot File 71D3], 1969-1969, Box 25, 
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Office of the Country Director for Australia, New Zealand, and 
Pacific Islands, 1969-1974, RG 59, NACP. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Benvenuti and Dee, “The Five Power Defence Arrangements and the Reappraisal of the British and 
Australian Policy Interests in Southeast Asia, 1970-75”: p. 118. 
 104 
the developments of the Five Power Defence Talks closely and conducted a series of 
three studies on the security prospects of the subregion after Britain’s military 
withdrawal.60 Following the 13 May 1969 racial riots in Malaysia, the Australian 
government, not wanting to be entangled in the internal security problems in Malaysia 
and Singapore, showed “marked reluctance to take the lead among the Five Powers”.61 
Worried that “this embryo[nic] alliance”, the FPDA, would lose its “great psychological 
and symbolic value”, the US ambassador to Singapore, Charles Cross, recommended to 
the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, Marshall Green, that the US 
should encourage the Australians to take a more vigorous approach to the Five Power 
arrangements then they had so far. Ambassador Cross reported that the Australian 
government had been reluctant to “allow the joint Five Power air commander to employ 
Australian aircraft in combat without specific prior approval from Canberra”.62 The 
Five Powers Integrated Air Defence was only viable if the Australian government was 
cooperative. Commenting on the impact that the Australians had on joint air defence, 
Cross added that 
[o]n the nuts and bolts level there is much that Canberra could do to bolster the 
Five Power arrangements.… [I]f realistic air defense planning is to take place, 
some sort of commitment by the Australians for the instant repulsion of an 
external attack against the Malayan peninsula must be worked out.63 
Cross concluded that a commitment by Canberra to joint air defence would be “the most 
graphic possible indication” to both the Singapore and the Malaysian governments of 
Canberra’s serious involvement in the defence of the Malaysia-Singapore area.64  
Ambassador Cross was also concerned that the Five Powers had agreed in 
November 1969 that a Five Power Maritime Defence headquarters was not required.65 
In a study conducted in 1969, the US embassy in Singapore “believed” that maritime 
defence was integral to a joint air defence system and concluded that such a facility was 
“useful” because “any air attack against this area would almost certainly be followed by 
a naval threat”. 66  Moreover, establishing the Five Power Maritime Defence 
headquarters in the subregion “might help in combatting piracy and in patrolling the 
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Straits of Malacca”.67 Hence, in view of the importance of joint naval defence, Cross 
recommended that the American embassy in Canberra should hector the Australian 
government towards developing the Maritime Defence headquarters in the subregion. 
And if that did not work, “[a]nother possibility might be to raise this [joint Five Power 
Maritime defence] as a subject for discussion in Washington within the ANZUS 
forum”.68 Cross suggested that Washington should pull the full extent of its weight to 
bring about greater commitment in FPDA from the Gorton government. Cross’s letter to 
Marshall Green concluded sombrely: “If Canberra does not assume this [leadership] 
role, and does not act vigorously within the next several months, we fear that the Five 
Power alliance will never really amount to anything.”69 
Cross overestimated the US government’s willingness and capacity to be 
proactive in the FPDA. Although Washington shared the ambassador’s view that the 
Australians needed to show “leadership and activism” in the Five Power Defence 
Talks,70 State Department officials, Maurice Bean and Jonathan Moore, disagreed that 
the US could “prod the Australians effectively without [the US] assuming a more 
explicit commitment under ANZUS”.71 Jonathan Moore doubted that the US should do 
any more than “subtly and periodically” remind the Australians that the US remained 
interested in FPDA matters.72 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Trade Policy, Edwin Cronk, who previously worked with the Australian government 
also suggested that the US could “make the Singapore/Malaysian defense question a 
key topic on the agenda” for the next ANZUS Council meeting with the Australians.73 
Cronk suggested that the best way to get Australia more involved in FPDA was to work 
with the Australian prime minister. Cronk’s letter described Gorton’s concerns about 
the FPDA: 
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As you know, Gorton is the real problem on this. He has always been cool to the 
Five Power defense arrangements and even finds it difficult to be civil to the 
Malaysians and Singaporeans.… He looks on the Five Power arrangement as a 
very risky business which might accidentally involve Australia in an intra-
regional dispute. He wants to keep his options loose so he can extricate the 
Australian forces if anything like this materializes.74 
Cronk suggested that the US could encourage Gorton through a personal letter 
from President Nixon to Gorton, exhorting the Australian government to do more in the 
FPDA and indicating US commitments in Southeast Asia in the post-Vietnam period.75 
Cronk also felt that “some careful work” could be done on key members of the Gorton 
administration to nudge the Australian government towards greater involvement in the 
FPDA that “would be more acceptable to the Singaporeans and Malaysians”.76 In 
exchange for Australian leadership of the FPDA, the Nixon administration agreed to 
shoulder part of the costs of running the Singapore naval dockyards. Nevertheless, 
President Nixon’s pledge that the US would share the cost of running the Singapore 
bases with Australia became void when the US Congress rejected the US State 
Department’s proposal to bear 70% of the running costs for Singapore naval dockyards 
under Australian management. 77  Hence, in Assistant Secretary of State Marshall 
Green’s response to Ambassador Cross, Green explained that: 
We just do not have the possibility of an additional commitment to use as a 
bargaining counter in negotiating with the Australians to do those things which 
might strengthen the Five Power arrangement. Perhaps Prime Minister Lee 
[Kuan Yew] is correct in feeling that “over the long run…the best way the 
United States can assist the burgeoning Five Power arrangement is to maintain 
some presence in Thailand”.78 
The Nixon administration would continue to be interested in the developments of the 
FPDA but refrained from interfering with the planning of the defence arrangement. 
By August 1971, four months before the withdrawal of British troops was 
completed, it was no longer a matter of Australia taking the lead in the FPDA, but a 
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question of whether Australia would abandon the Five Power Defence framework. 
Washington had to “find ways of providing greater support to the Australians or see 
them pull out” as well.79 Gorton’s successor, William McMahon, also showed little 
commitment to the FPDA. In a June 1972 interview with the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation when visiting Jakarta, Prime Minister McMahon was asked if Australia 
would like to have a defence agreement with Indonesia of the same nature as the FPDA. 
McMahon tried to divert the question by describing the FPDA as ineffectual. He told 
the interviewer that the FPDA was unnecessary and was “only an obligation to 
consult”.80 McMahon’s comments alarmed the US State Department and offended the 
Malaysian and Singapore governments. The following day, while in Singapore, 
McMahon issued a statement saying that “the Five Power arrangements with Singapore, 
Malaysia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom are of great importance”.81 He 
explained that “what is vital in any relationship is the totality of it and that pacts and 
agreements are less important than the goodwill and mutual trust on which they must be 
based if they are to be effective”.82 After McMahon’s visit, the Australian High 
Commissioner to Singapore, Nicholas F. Parkinson, told the American Deputy Chief of 
Mission to Singapore, John J. O’Neill, Jr. that 
none of the ranking Singapore officials paid any serious attention to the story 
[carried in the Indonesian English language newspaper], and in fact when Mr. 
McMahon rather nervously broached the subject of the interview in his first 
meeting with the Foreign and Defense Ministers [of Singapore] they both 
laughed and put the subject aside.83 
Perhaps the lack of reaction from the Singapore government indicated that Singapore no 
longer looked to the ANZUK for its security. Indeed, by 1971, Singapore had begun to 
develop the Singapore Armed Forces with the assistance of the United States. 
In October 1967, US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara promised Singapore 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew that an exploratory team would be sent to assess the 
feasibility of using Singapore’s bases after the British withdrew. Less than two months 
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later, the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Command (CINCPAC), 
Admiral Ulysses Simpson Grant Sharp, Jr., visited the Singapore naval dockyards with 
US Ambassador Francis Galbraith. When CINCPAC evaluated Singapore’s naval 
dockyards, he recognised that the Singapore naval dockyards would be suitable for 
solving a problem for the US Pacific Command. After the tour, Ambassador Galbraith 
reported that the British naval base in Singapore was 
an absolute first-class installation with a great deal of heavy equipment and 
about 2500 highly skilled workers who handle the electronics equipment (sonar, 
radar, radio, etc.) and do the machining on propellers, propeller shafts, gears, 
etc., and keep the motor equipment in shape. They are also equipped for the 
heavy work and can fit (as the Navy calls it) any ship up to the size of a frigate.84 
Admiral Sharp and Ambassador Galbraith recommended that ship repair 
operations in Singapore should commence immediately. Admiral Sharp “seemed to 
think that an immediate possibility, and one in fact of answering a rather urgent need in 
Vietnam, would be the repair of small landing craft and river boats of all types”.85 
Admiral Sharp told the ambassador that the shipyards in Japan were “overloaded” with 
orders that Singapore dockyards could take over.86 The dockyards in Japan were 
handling repair orders for both large and small vessels, but were giving priority to larger 
craft because no other facilities were available to service the larger vessels. As a result, 
repair works on smaller craft were delayed. Galbraith proposed that representatives 
from Singapore should be invited to visit CINCPAC to get more details from the US 
Navy on the type of repair needs in the future, and that small craft from Vietnam that 
were being held up could be sent for repair work at Singapore “almost immediately”.87 
At that point, Whitehall had not announced the accelerated withdrawal date of 31 
December 1971. Hence, US State Department’s reply to the ambassador was: “No point 
at this time”.88 
In January 1968, just after the British shocked its allies with plans for an earlier 
withdrawal, a delegation from the US Department of Defense set off on a mission to 
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discuss the technicalities of sending US military vessels for maintenance and repair in 
Singapore. Ambassador Galbraith commented that  
how we [the US government] respond to the GOS interest in engaging us in 
Singapore as the British withdraw is a question of profound importance in our 
relations with Singapore and that no aspects of it should be treated as purely 
technical or outside the immediate concerns of the State Department.… I am 
apprehensive that DOD may have a tendency to let its interests run beyond 
technical questions…and into political and economic questions for which the 
Embassy and State Department ought to have primary responsibility.89 
Galbraith suggested that Washington and the embassy must work in full consultation 
with each other at every point of the discussion with the Singapore government to avoid 
sending conflicting signals to the Singapore government.90 
Plans to use Singapore for repairs started hastily but was soon halted because 
both the US and Singapore governments were still weighing the effects of an increased 
visibility of US military vessels and personnel in Singapore. In March 1968, the US 
Department of Defense approved plans for US ships to be repaired at the Singapore 
dockyards. 91  A month later, the Second Logistical Command Field Office was 
established to coordinate the repair of vessels from the US Army and Navy. The US 
military’s use of the Singapore ship repair facilities seemed to cohere well with Lee 
Kuan Yew’s request. Ambassador Galbraith reported that  
if we [the US] should utilize these facilities and find them valuable to us, we 
would, even without a permanent “presence”, have that much more stake in 
Singapore and be that much more interested in its fate.92 
Nevertheless, the impression of an American alliance with Singapore would affect 
America’s relations with other countries in the region. Singapore’s assertion that its 
immediate threat came from within the subregion made Malaysia and Indonesia wary of 
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American presence in Singapore. 93  Ambassador Galbraith therefore qualified his 
“wholehearted backing” for the use of Singapore’s shipbuilding and repair facilities by 
US naval forces with the warning that the US military should not establish a “sizeable, 
permanent ‘presence’” in Singapore.94 
Singapore and Washington decided that a cautious start in the ship repair 
operations was preferred.95 In its first month of ship repair operation, Singapore gave up 
US$1 million worth of repair contracts because it was uncertain about local and regional 
reactions to American warships arriving at the island in large numbers. One ship repair 
contract involved the repair of a nuclear-powered US frigate, Enterprise, which was too 
large to berth at the naval base in Sembawang.96 It could, however, fit the man-of-war 
anchorage situated at the commercial shipping area off downtown Singapore.97 The 
conspicuous arrival of the massive US Navy warship would be followed by 6,000 US 
military personnel going ashore on the city’s waterfront. It was a spectacle that might be 
misinterpreted as American soldiers landing in Singapore to take over from the British. 
Lee Kuan Yew’s initial response was to allow the Enterprise to berth at the man-of-war 
anchorage, but he was dissuaded by Rajaratnam, who considered the deal ill-timed due 
to the recent British announcement and the uncertainty of how the FPDA might take 
shape.98 Ambassador Galbraith shared Rajaratnam’s assessment in a report to State 
Department after the deal fell through, expressing that 
I’m inclined to think this [decision to reject the US$1 million ship repair 
contract] also turned out well for us…. Their [Singapore government] decision 
justifies our [US government] continued low posture and even aloofness while 
they’re negotiating their new defense arrangements with their Commonwealth 
allies….99 
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Galbraith also stressed that Lee should not be encouraged to make the US a “first point 
of reference for any and all assistance” in the future, especially with the Five Power 
Defence Conference still at a rudimentary stage.100 
Despite the false start in ship repair contracts between Washington and 
Singapore, the volume of US military vessels using the repair facilities in Singapore 
soon increased because ship repairs in Singapore cost less than in Japan, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong and the Philippines. The Office-in-Charge of repair contracts for the US Seventh 
Fleet, Admiral Ward, told Ambassador Galbraith that the use of Singapore repair 
facilities would take the pressure off the dockyards in Subic Bay, located in the 
Philippines, and Sasebo, in Japan.101 In May 1968, the Singapore government had yet to 
recognise “the full potential” of the business that could be generated, and the US 
government had yet to realise the “extent to which Singapore’s convenience and 
usefulness as a military ‘service station’” could become “a desirable, if not 
indispensable, asset from the standpoint of [the US] Navy and Air Force”.102  
Before the British withdrawal was completed in December 1971, the Singapore 
government instructed US Navy ships to arrive in Singapore “quietly and with little 
fanfare”.103 In 1972, Rajaratnam informed John J. O’Neill, Jr. that Singapore was no 
longer anxious about the visibility of US military vessels on the island. The 
deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations partially accounted for Singapore’s relaxed 
attitude towards greater US military presence in Singapore. Rajaratnam believed that 
the Sino-Soviet split had worsened to the extent that: “Any Russian moves in the area 
are similar in a way to the Dulles policy of containment of China and designed to keep 
[the PRC] worried on its entire periphery.”104 Hence, when the Enterprise, which was 
denied access in 1968, arrived at the man-of-war anchorage off downtown Singapore, 
the Singapore Foreign Ministry observed no PRC reaction. Rajaratnam concluded that 
the PRC’s lack of protest for US military presence in Singapore could stem from 
Beijing’s preference for America’s presence in Singapore over the Soviet Union.  
Although Lee Kuan Yew invited US military presence in October 1967, he no 
longer deemed it beneficial for USN ships to be permanently based in Singapore after 
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the British withdrawal. In 1972, an Interagency Study Group formed by the US State 
and Defense Departments concluded that the US should maintain a presence in 
Singapore after US forces withdrew from Vietnam.105 The Singapore government 
would allow more USN ships to use the island’s naval dockyards for repairs, but 
rejected a USN proposal to “homeport” several American destroyers in Singapore.106 
‘Homeporting’ US warships in Singapore would make Singapore the port of origin for 
US vessels, thereby increasing the number of US military personnel and their families 
residing in Singapore. Acceptance of the ‘homeporting’ arrangement would in fact 
make Singapore a host to US military bases and put Singapore’s non-aligned credentials 
at risk. Singapore could also become a target for anti-American attacks, which might 
involve the use of nuclear weapons. The Singapore government rejected the 
‘homeporting’ proposal but hoped to preserve the current arrangement since Singapore 
would continue to enjoy both the economic benefits from US ship repairs and the 
psychological effect that visiting US warships provide. After the withdrawal of 
American troops from South Vietnam in March 1973, the number of USN ships visiting 
Singapore’s ship repair facilities increased sharply. From an average of seventeen visits 
per quarter previously, the US Seventh Fleet increased the number of ships scheduled to 
visit Singapore’s naval dockyards by 65% from June to September of 1973. 107 
American use of Singapore’s naval dockyards from 1968 to 1973 was a major 
contribution by the US to mitigate the economic impact and the loss of confidence 
caused by the British withdrawal. 
Along with the commercialisation of Singapore’s naval dockyards, the air bases 
handed over to the Singapore government by the British were converted to perform 
maintenance and repair services on military aircraft. After Lee Kuan Yew’s visit to 
Washington in October 1967, an Air Force Study Team was sent by the US Department 
of Defense to Singapore in early 1968. Like the study team despatched by the US Navy, 
the US Air Force Study Team observed keen interest by the Singapore government to 
establish aircraft repair facilities after the British withdrew.108 Singapore’s Defence 
Minister Lim Kim San soon held talks with US companies interested to establish 
aircraft repairs and maintenance facilities in Singapore.109 By April 1969, two American 
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companies, Lockheed Aircraft Services and Lear Siegler, proposed to set up aircraft 
repair facilities in Singapore.110 On 23 September 1969, the Singapore government 
awarded Lockheed a contract to establish an aviation maintenance facility at Paya Lebar 
International Airport. 111  The contract granted Lockheed exclusive permission to 
establish and develop facilities to perform “third and fourth line” service, maintenance, 
repair, overhaul and modification of US military aircraft and large civilian aircraft in 
Singapore for six years, with a possible five-year extension.112 The Defense Attaché 
Office of the US embassy in Singapore observed that the deal with Lockheed might 
have been struck too hastily. The Singapore government was so eager to perform 
maintenance on US DOD aircraft in Singapore over a long term that it was willing to 
offer significant concessions to Lockheed by providing facilities and equipment under 
lease.113 In return, the contract bound Lockheed to obtain sufficient DOD maintenance 
contracts for the Paya Lebar facilities, apart from supporting the maintenance of the 
Singapore Air Defence Command.114 The Defense Attaché Office also reported that “an 
American owned and operated, first class facility in this Republic is strategically of long 
term advantage to the U.S. in view of the political stability of the government and the 
strategic geographic location of Singapore”.115 Three days after signing the contract 
with the Singapore government, representatives from Lockheed met the Commander-in-
Chief of the US Pacific Fleet “to start [the] ball rolling”.116  
The major contract between Singapore and Lockheed was soon followed by an 
exploratory visit by a third US aviation company, Grumman Corporation. In November 
1969, Grumman Corporation’s President, Thomas P. Cheatham, Jr., met Lee Kuan Yew 
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and other Singapore government officials to express interest in taking over the air bases 
at Seletar and Changi from the British Royal Air Force and establishing an aerospace 
complex. The complex managed by Grumman would be used for manufacturing 
aircraft, and performing maintenance on helicopters, generators and aircraft equipment 
such as Airborne Early Warning Systems. 117  To gain US State and Defense 
Departments’ approval, Cheatham wrote to the Deputy Commanding General of the US 
Army Materiel Command, Lieutenant-General Henry A. Miley, and visited Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, Marshall Green, in December 1969. Cheatham 
proposed that Grumman’s facilities in Singapore would solve the logistical problems 
arising from future US withdrawal from South Vietnam and simultaneously assist 
Singapore in air defence after the British withdrawal. He foresaw an impending need for 
a staging facility for sorting, cataloguing, overhauling, repairing, protecting, and 
repackaging military equipment when the US troops eventually withdrew from South 
Vietnam.118 Cheatham argued that Singapore was the most suitable location for US 
withdrawal operations because it was situated at “strategic cross-roads of importance to 
Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean”.119 Moreover, Singapore was run by an “honest 
government” which maintained Singapore’s “low cost and cooperative environment”.120 
At the same time, Cheatham highlighted that current staging areas that the US military 
had access to, such as Okinawa, Manila, Taiwan and Japan, were experiencing “rising 
political, psychological, and financial problems”. 121  “By comparison,” Cheatham 
opined, “I feel Singapore has much to offer.”122   
The US State Department was willing to accept Cheatham’s proposal but was 
concerned that competition between Lockheed and Grumman would damage diplomatic 
relations between Singapore and the US. Cheatham assured Assistant Secretary 
Marshall Green that Grumman’s aviation complex would not duplicate the functions of 
Lockheed’s aircraft maintenance facilities.123 Cheatham stressed that Grumman’s main 
objective was “to form a consortium with British, Japanese and Australian firms to 
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establish a facility for rehabilitating millions of dollars worth of goods to be taken out 
of Viet-Nam upon the completion of hostilities”.124 Grumman proposed to begin 
operations within six months and had committed to train and employ 2,000 locals while 
injecting capital investment of an aggregate of US$31.5 million over the following five 
years.125 The Grumman training facility in Singapore would be of exceptional value to 
Singapore, as it would provide training for Singapore and other Southeast Asian air 
forces in the maintenance of military aircraft. In fact, Grumman’s proposal was so 
enticing that the Singapore government requested an “early release” of the facilities by 
the British in July 1970.126 Given that Lee Kuan Yew reacted with such vehemence 
against Britain’s announcement to accelerate its military withdrawal in January 1968, 
the Singapore government’s request now surely reflected a curious change of heart. 
United States-Singapore cooperation in defence was strengthened on both 
governmental and personal levels during the years leading to the British withdrawal. In 
1968 and 1969, Lee Kuan Yew and the Defence Minister Lim Kim San made courtesy 
calls to the headquarters of the United States Pacific Fleet at Hawaii. During these 
visits, the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral McCain, and Lee “sized each other up” 
favourably.127 Along with senior cabinet ministers, officials from Singapore’s Ministry 
of the Interior and Defence and several senior US military personnel also developed 
affable personal and professional relationships.128 By 1969, the American embassy had 
cemented strong ties with the government of Singapore. The “special nature of the 
relationship” between the US and Singapore was apparent from the correspondence 
between George Bogaars, the Permanent Secretary of Singapore’s MID, and Colonel 
James Larkin, the Army Attaché at the US embassy.129 In 1969, the MID issued a 
document outlining the guidelines that govern the interaction between MID and foreign 
military attaches accredited to Singapore. The document, entitled “Procedure for 
Military Attaches Accredited to the Republic of Singapore”, provided pedantic 
instructions on how newly assigned military attaches should distribute their calling 
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cards within the MID, whom they should make formal calls on, and how they should 
make appointments to meet senior officials in the MID. After sending a copy to the US 
embassy, Bogaars followed with a note to Colonel Larkin stating that 
[w]ith a view to maintaining the present close and full co-operation between 
yourself and the Ministry of the Interior and Defence, I propose exempting you 
from the procedures laid down for ‘Military Attaches accredited to the Republic 
of Singapore’. I enclose herewith a copy of those established procedures which 
because of the special nature of the relationship existing between our two 
organisations especially on defence matters will not apply.130 
The tone of the letter and special exemption given by the MID to the US Army Attaché 
demonstrated the goodwill between the Singapore government and the United States. 
Marshall Brement, First Secretary of the US embassy in Singapore, described the MID 
document as “a rather lovely example of the sledgehammer way with which the GOS 
sometimes operates” and expressed delight that “the sledgehammer” was not meant for 
the US, but “only for those other guys”.131 
After the British withdrew in December 1971, US-Singapore defence relations 
grew closer. In 1972, when Defence Minister Goh Keng Swee found out that the 
Singapore Foreign Ministry had turned down the landing rights of an American military 
aircraft in Singapore without consulting the Defence Ministry, Goh “was sufficiently 
distressed to write a letter to the Foreign Minister [Rajaratnam] in which he took him to 
task, using some sharp language, for not cooperating with the USG”.132 This incident 
was reported by John J. O’Neill, Jr. to Theodore Heavner in the US State Department. 
O’Neill added, “The Defense Minister is an extremely important individual in this 
Government and I think it worthwhile for you and others in the Department to have this 
as background.”133 Hence, it became apparent within the US government that Singapore 
was no longer a distant Southeast Asian country that rejected American influence, but a 
country run by a government that valued close relations with the United States. In fact, a 
formal defence alliance between the US and Singapore did not serve the interests of the 
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two countries since Singapore was deemed more valuable to the United States if it 
maintained its non-aligned image. Hence, Washington showed its support for the 
Singapore government by supplying US military equipment to Singapore’s defence 
force. 
In response to the British withdrawal from east of Suez, the Singapore 
government devised what it called a “poison shrimp” defence strategy.134 The ‘poisoned 
shrimp’ concept was articulated by Lee Kuan Yew as early as October 1967, during his 
first official visit to Washington, where he pledged to “give anyone a bloody nose who 
[was] going to rob the house and take [his] jade pieces”.135 “The idea” behind the 
poisoned shrimp defence concept, according to Tim Huxley, “was that any aggressor 
would find that the costs of attempting to invade and occupy Singapore outweighed any 
conceivable benefits.”136 Singapore’s ‘poisoned shrimp’ defence strategy, which was 
developed under the guidance of Israeli military advisors, was “intended to register the 
island’s indigestible qualities to any likely predator”.137 In order to achieve a strong 
deterrent against likely aggressors, the Singapore defence ministry invested heavily in 
sophisticated US military equipment. Together with the acquisition of weapons, the 
Singapore government introduced the conscription of male citizens into the Singapore 
Armed Forces. 138  Foreign Minister Rajaratnam highlighted the importance of 
conscription in a 1972 speech: 
[A]n effective defence policy should make the probable invader aware before he 
invades the country that this would be the situation in which he will find 
himself. He is more likely then to keep out. This should be done not by bluffing 
or posturing but by convincing him by deeds rather than words that occupation 
would be costly; that he would get none of the benefits of occupation. This is 
one reason why we have instituted National Service.139 
Whereas Washington acquiesced in the logic behind Singapore’s ‘poisoned 
shrimp’ strategy, State Department officials doubted if Singapore could afford the 
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expensive military hardware. Since the economic impact of the British withdrawal was 
predicted to be severe, the Singapore government’s high defence spending was 
particularly worrying for London and Washington. Still, the Singapore government 
muted calls for caution and pursued the ‘poisoned shrimp’ strategy with single-
mindedness. In mid-1971, the American embassy in Singapore estimated that the 
Singapore government’s ‘poisoned shrimp’ strategy cost the island 32% of its budget in 
1970 and would increase to 37% in 1971.140 Technological superiority was seen as a 
“force multiplier” that compensated for Singapore’s lack of strategic depth and 
manpower.141 A comparison between Singapore’s defence and welfare expenditures 
reveals that the Singapore government spent 100% more on welfare than defence in 
1968, but ended up spending 30% more on defence than welfare in 1971 and 1972.142 
The reversal of spending patterns clearly signalled a shift in priorities. The US and 
Britain were compelled to supply Singapore with American and British military 
equipment because if they were overly obstructive, Singapore could turn to the Soviet 
Union to supply military equipment.143 
Singapore’s ‘poisoned shrimp’ strategy was intended to work hand-in-hand with 
the FPDA after the British withdrawal. Ambassador Cross observed that Singapore’s 
MID had gradually become less dependent on Israeli defence advisors and was 
beginning to work closer with Commonwealth and American advisors. 144  Cross 
reported that Singapore needed to rely on the “possible stabilizing effect” of the Five 
Power Defence Arrangements on Singapore-Malaysian relations, and to take advantage 
of the FPDA’s potential to “discourage aggressive acts by Indonesia”.145 Hence, after 
the signing of the FPDA, Singapore aligned its military equipment with partners of the 
FPDA by matching aircraft technology with Britain, Australia and New Zealand. In 
1970-1972, the Singapore government acquired forty-seven Hunter fighter ground-
attack aircraft from Britain.146 In mid-1972, Singapore acquired forty A4B ground 
support aircraft to complement the A4M aircraft that Australia and New Zealand used in 
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their air fleets.147 The US Department of State reported that Singapore’s decision to 
align its air defence technology with the A4M fleets used by Australia and New Zealand 
was a sign that Singapore’s air defence would be complementary to the FPDA. The 
State Department concluded that Singapore’s acquisition of forty A4B aircraft could 
also be a response to its threat perception. Since the A4B had “considerable potential to 
defend against seaborne attack”, the Country Director for Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore, Theodore Heavner, thought the Singapore government would have intended 
to use it against a naval attack from or through Indonesia.148  
Whatever reasons Singapore wanted the A4B aircraft for, the US State 
Department did not probe. The State Department was concerned, however, that 
Singapore was building its defence at the expense of economic prudence. Theodore 
Heavner, reported that “Singapore is arming itself to the teeth with a variety of modern 
weapons in the absence of any very sophisticated external threat. The only potential 
aggressors are close to home and they are not armed with sophisticated weapons 
requiring F-4 defenses”.149 Hence, Washington would be less responsive when the 
Singapore government expressed interest in purchasing expensive and highly 
sophisticated military equipment. Furthermore, Singapore’s non-aligned foreign policy 
and Lee Kuan Yew’s earlier anti-Americanism still evoked negative sentiments among 
American politicians and government officials who did not support the selling of 
military equipment to Singapore. At almost every stage of negotiating US-Singapore 
military sales, sections of American government officials and members of US Congress 
questioned the sagacity of supplying arms to a non-aligned country that used to be 
hostile to America. Nevertheless, the US State Department managed to follow through 
with the arms sales, albeit with some resistance from the US Congress from time to 
time. Between 1967 and 1975, the US government supplied Singapore with a range of 
military equipment, which included small arms, armoured vehicles, air defence 
equipment and naval vessels.  
During Lee Kuan Yew’s visit to Washington in October 1967, William Bundy 
assured Lee that the US government would supply Singapore with the AR-15 rifles 
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needed to equip Singapore’s conscripted defence force.150 The supply of the rifles 
turned out to be more problematic than either Washington or Singapore had anticipated. 
In 1967, and again in early 1968, shipment of the rifles to Singapore was disrupted 
because of concerns raised by the US Congress that Singapore might re-export the rifles 
to North Vietnam and North Korea, which had trade relations with Singapore. 
Moreover, Colt, the company that was producing the rifles, was handling large orders 
from the US Department of Defense, which needed the rifles for American troops in 
South Vietnam.151 The view of Congress was that DOD’s purchase orders should be of 
higher priority than the Singapore order, and should not be delayed at the expense of 
trying to meet Singapore’s requests. In May 1967, US State Department officials — 
Maurice Bean and Samuel Berger, together with Defense Department representatives — 
Richard Steadman and Frank Fede, testified before the House Armed Services 
Committee Special Sub-committee that was investigating the sale of AR-15 rifles to 
Singapore.152 One of the questions raised by the sub-committee was: 
Why DOD had not raised objections to the proposed sale in view of the 
“shortage” of the rifle for our [US] troops in Viet-Nam or in training for Viet-
Nam.153 
Richard Steadman from DOD clarified that there was no shortage of rifles for American 
troops and that Colt was meeting delivery schedule for its contract with the US 
Department of Defense. 154  After much questioning, the sub-committee eventually 
approved the sale of AR-15 rifles to Singapore. 
To avoid future obstruction from the US Congress, the Singapore government 
proposed for Colt to set up a factory in Singapore to produce rifles for the Singapore 
military. In August 1968, the Director of Logistics in Singapore’s Ministry of Defence, 
Ong Kah Koh, “complained bitterly at the continued slowdown in AR-15 rifle 
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deliveries to Singapore”.155 Upon hearing various explanations for the delays, Ong told 
the US embassy Army Attaché, Colonel James Larkin, that “the real reason for 
curtailment of deliveries” for the shortfall of 12,000 AR-15 rifles was the “lack of trust” 
on the part of Washington.156 In December 1968, Ong visited the US to negotiate the 
building of a rifle manufacturing factory in Singapore.157 State Department officials 
advised that building the factory was “not economically viable”, but worried that US 
refusal might cause the Singapore government to seek help from another country, and 
potentially damage US-Singapore relations.158 Despite an offer by Washington to 
“expedite delivery of the current rifle order and to guarantee minimum annual deliveries 
of future orders with soft financing”, Singapore insisted on making its own AR-15 
rifles.159 Earlier in 1968, Ambassador Galbraith had written to Washington, explaining 
the strategic significance of the US supplying the rifles to Singapore: 
I would regard it as contrary to our interests if Singapore, failing to satisfy its 
security requirements, including procurement of a certain amount of weaponry 
from either a combination of Commonwealth powers or from the U.S., should 
turn to the Soviets with all that might mean for the availability of Singapore as a 
service center for our ships, sailors and any fighting men we might have in this 
part of the world at any time. This contingency seems rather remote today but it 
is not out of the question in the long run. If effective Commonwealth security 
arrangements do not materialize, if Singapore loses confidence in the future 
American role in this area and if communist China resumes its progress toward 
superpower status, we are likely to see a growing Singapore desire to involve the 
Soviet Union here to help maintain the power balance.160 
With broader strategic interests at stake, approval was granted for Colt to set up a 
factory in Singapore. More significantly, Ambassador Galbraith portrayed the mentality 
of the Singapore government as one that would consider the United States and the 
Soviet Union as viable partners that could be useful for balancing China’s influence in 
the region. 
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Within two months, a contract was signed between the Singapore government 
and Colt.161 One key element of the contract that Singapore’s negotiator, Ong Kah Kok, 
might have missed was that Washington would retain control over the pace of rifle 
production in Singapore by maintaining the option to withhold export licenses for key 
parts from the US.162 Washington could stop Colt Singapore from obtaining key parts 
by citing that the US “needed the parts” for its “own defense”.163 In his letter to Country 
Director for Malaysia and Singapore Maurice Bean, Galbraith pointed out that the 
contract signed between Colt and the Singapore government to produce 200,000 AR-15 
rifles involved the Singapore government paying Colt a total of US$350,000 plus a 10% 
royalty on the rifles produced. Galbraith remarked that Singapore was making a hasty 
decision by “paying a heavy price” for “an assured source of AR-15 rifles” and might 
not have considered the full effect of Washington’s rights if the US government 
restricted the export of the parts.164 Hence, he urged Washington to spell out the 
“pitfalls” to the Singapore government “in as much detail as possible in order to avoid 
possible future accusations of bad faith” on the part of the US.165 
The US Congress queried the Department of State over the approval of the Colt-
Singapore contract shortly after the Colt factory had gone into operation in Singapore. 
Director of Survey and Investigations Staff under the House Appropriations Committee, 
Paul Mohr, met with State Department officials in April 1970 to conduct a general 
investigation on “the establishment of small arms production facilities abroad utilizing 
U.S. manufactured and/or patented components or technology”. 166  The State 
Department assured the investigators that careful consultation was made between the 
State and Defense Departments throughout the negotiations, and the political and 
economic factors were considered before the deal between Colt and the Singapore 
government was approved. Maurice Bean informed Paul Mohr that the US government 
retained two forms of control over the production of the rifles: the right to reject the 
Singapore government’s request if it wanted to sell the rifles to a third country; and the 
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right to disapprove licensing for most of the parts from the US that were needed to 
produce the rifles.167 Bean also dismissed the likelihood that Singapore would export 
any of the rifles since the Singapore military greatly needed to make up for its shortage 
in those weapons.168 
One year later, however, the United States government began to contemplate 
lifting the restriction on the export of Singapore-produced rifles to third countries. Colt 
Company in Singapore and South Korea were the only two Asian countries authorised 
by the US government to manufacture M-16 rifles. In 1971, Colt requested to export M-
16s made in Singapore to Laos, Cambodia and Thailand. The request was rejected at the 
time by the US Defense Department, which deemed the arrangement “not in the best 
interest of the US Government and [might] endanger US security”.169 The security 
environment in Asia had nonetheless evolved to a point where it became strategically 
attractive for Washington to approve Colt Singapore’s request to export rifles to third 
countries. The Munitions Control Office and the State Department fearing that 
Southeast Asian countries would try to produce their own rifles, which was an 
“expensive as well as uneconomic utilization of resources”.170 The US government was 
therefore willing to “encourage the Malaysian and others to buy from either Singapore 
or South Korea”.171  
Colt Singapore was eventually allowed to export M-16 rifles made in Singapore 
to regional countries, under the condition that every transaction had to attain prior 
approval from the US government. The Singapore government, however, shipped M-16 
rifles for the Philippines and Thailand in 1974 and 1975, respectively, without waiting 
for the approval from the US government.172 Although US Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger empathised that the Singapore government was trying to be “forthcoming 
with the Thai” and that he did not foresee difficulties in approving the export licences, 
Kissinger was concerned that the conditions set in the M-16 Manufacturing License 
Agreement signed in 1969 were blatantly ignored by the Singapore government.173 
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Kissinger urged the US embassy in Singapore to remind the Singapore government that 
the agreement could be suspended if there was further breach.174 When US ambassador 
to Singapore, John Holdridge, met with Singapore defence minister, Goh Keng Swee, to 
discuss the matter, Goh explained that “GOS had been under tremendous pressure from 
the Thai to make the shipment”.175 Holdridge informed the State Department that Goh 
was under the impression that Colt had submitted a complete set of documents to the 
US government that were only pending approval. Seeing no likely restrictions on the 
deal, the Singapore government made the delivery before the approval was given. Goh 
“appeared surprised” to learn from Holdridge that Colt had not completed the 
paperwork needed.176 
Whereas the story of the supply of rifles to Singapore ended well, the Singapore 
government’s attempt to purchase M-109 Howitzers Self-Propelled artillery vehicles 
from the United States turned out to be a “fiasco”.177 The Singapore government 
showed interest in buying M-109s and tanks from the US in October 1969. In 
November, the US government authorised the American embassy in Singapore to 
inform the Singapore government of the price and availability of the M-109s.178 But on 
17 March 1970, after delays in correspondence, the US embassy was put in an awkward 
position when it had to inform the Singapore government that the M-109s were “out of 
production” and would no longer be available.179 The Singapore government was 
“greatly disappointed” that the US government had reversed its “earlier commitment” to 
supply the M-109s.180 Furthermore, news that a new shipment of M-109s had recently 
arrived in Israel caused the Defence Ministry of Singapore to be suspicious of American 
intentions in not supplying the M-109 artillery vehicles.181 The US government offered 
the “105” or “8” Self-Propelled artillery vehicles instead, but Singapore remained solely 
interested in the M-109 and urged the US government to find supplies from South 
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Vietnam.182 After the affair blew over, US Ambassador Cross reflected that: “It is only 
a small consolation that they [the Singapore government] lay the blame on our [US 
government] incompetence rather than on some malevolent motive.”183 The M-109 
fiasco demonstrated the negative effects that unsuccessful military sales had on US-
Singapore relations.  
From the M-109 episode, the Singapore government learnt to go through less 
formal channels to test the response of the US government before making formal 
requests and risking rejection. In 1973, the Singapore Defence Ministry was interested 
to buy forty M60 tanks from the United States. Ted Mataxis, a retired Brigadier General 
from the US Army who was a consultant to the Ministry of Defence, mentioned the 
request to the US ambassador, Edwin Cronk. The peculiarity of the request lay in the 
locations that the Singapore government intended to store the tanks. Mataxis told the 
ambassador that the MID planned to store the forty M60 tanks in Taiwan or Thailand. 
When Ambassador Cronk relayed the request to the US State Department on behalf of 
the Singapore government, he remarked that: “I don’t know what to make of the idea of 
storing the tanks in Taiwan or Thailand, but it does show some sensitivity to the 
political implications of parading these tanks around Singapore.”184 Cronk speculated 
that Singapore could be planning to use Taiwan and Thailand as training facilities for its 
armed forces. 
The US government was unwilling to reject outright Singapore’s request to store 
the M60 tanks in a third country, but tried to delay the process. In a reply to 
Ambassador Cronk’s letter, Arthur W. Hummel, Jr. from the US State Department 
instructed the American embassy in Singapore to make clear that a formal request 
needed to be made by the Singapore government before any consideration was given. 
Hummel advised Cronk to “reserve judgment” on Singapore’s proposal to store the 
tanks in Taiwan or Thailand until a formal request for the M60 tanks had been 
tendered.185 After two months of silence from the Singapore government regarding the 
tanks, Cronk concluded that the passing interest of the M60 tanks was a “pipe dream” of 
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the logistics director at Singapore’s Defence Ministry, Ong Kah Kok, as well as 
Defence Minister Goh Keng Swee.186 The US State Department and embassy in 
Singapore had averted another diplomatic imbroglio. 
Apart from artillery vehicles, the Singapore government also expressed 
intentions to purchase the improved Hawk Air Defence system. Singapore’s interest in 
buying two batteries, or 32 I-Hawk missiles, alarmed US State Department officials 
because it would cost the Singapore government over US$10 million.187 Furthermore, 
Singapore’s acquisition of the “very sophisticated” missiles would “cause envy and 
resentment in neighboring countries”. 188  As a consequence, the US government 
introduced a guideline stating that 
[n]o offensive weapon which might threaten political repercussions or 
jeopardize SEA [Southeast Asian] stability should be considered for sale to 
Singapore unless we and/or the GOS have discussed it with other appropriate 
governments in the ASEAN and FPDA contexts.189  
Hence, in order to block the purchase, the US government restricted the I-Hawk 
manufacturer, Raytheon Company, from disclosing classified information on the 
missiles to the Singapore Defence Ministry. Nonetheless, Washington had no control 
over Singapore’s attempts to purchase costly and advanced military equipment from 
other countries. Other than expressing interest in the I-Hawk Air Defence system, 
Singapore’s Defence Ministry was also in talks with the British about the “Rapier” and 
conferring with the French about the “Crotale” Air Defence system.190 Seeing that 
Singapore would acquire weapons from other sources anyway, the National Disclosure 
Committee of the US Defense Department eventually authorised Raytheon Company to 
disclose related ‘Secret’ information to the Singapore Defence Ministry during sales 
negotiations.191 The State Department nonetheless emphasised that Raytheon needed to 
make clear to the Singapore government that sharing of classified information must not 
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be interpreted as “a commitment, express or implied, for the USG to approve eventual 
sale”.192 A separate request would still need to be submitted, should the Singapore 
government decide to purchase the missiles. By prolonging the process of acquiring the 
M60 tanks, the US government hoped that the Singapore government would eventually 
lose interest. 
From 1971 to 1974, the Singapore government intermittently expressed interest 
in purchasing supersonic military aircraft, the F-4, from the United States.193 The US 
government was hesitant to supply the advanced aircraft to Singapore for fear of setting 
off a regional arms race in Southeast Asia. If Singapore acquired the F-4 from the 
United States, it would be less able to integrate its air defence with the Five Power 
Integrated Air Defence system and thus undermine the cohesiveness of the FPDA. 
Eventually, Singapore dropped plans to buy the F-4s and decided to match its aircraft 
fleet with the Australian and New Zealand fleets of A4M aircraft at the signing of the 
FPDA. Ambassador Edwin Cronk reported in July 1973 that the Singapore government 
had ceased to talk about buying the F-4 aircraft, and surmised that the F-4s were “more 
of a gleam in Ong Kah Kok’s eye than an active subject of defense planning in the 
Ministry”.194 
Plans to purchase the F-4 supersonic aircraft were revived in 1974, however, 
when Singapore’s ambassador to the US, Ernest Steven Monteiro, wrote to the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Richard Sneider, to request 
permission for a Singapore delegation to obtain classified information on the F-4 from 
McDonnell-Douglas.195 The State Department decided not to obstruct Singapore’s 
purchase of the F-4 any further because “if the GOS [had] decided to go supersonic, 
[the US government] should try to give the U.S. supplier ample opportunity to close the 
sale”.196 Hence, the State Department acceded to Ambassador Monteiro’s request to 
allow the Singapore delegates access to information related to the F-4 aircraft from 
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McDonnell-Douglas but only after consultation with the US embassies in Kuala 
Lumpur and Jakarta.197 
Apart from supplying arms and providing training to the SAF, perhaps the most 
direct way the US contributed to Singapore’s security was to keep fighting in Vietnam. 
The US Secretary of State during Nixon’s administration, William P. Rogers, described 
Lee’s expectations of the US in the following way:  
[Lee] has come to realize that British disengagement in Southeast Asia is real 
and imminent. The realization has led him to two related beliefs: 
a. That a continuing American role in Viet-Nam and in support of national and 
regional economic development programs is vitally important to all of the 
nations of Southeast Asia; and  
b. that the nations of the region must use the time we have bought for them in 
Viet-Nam (his [Lee’s] own formulation) to strengthen themselves and to 
cooperate much more closely and effectively.198 
Of the many roles played by the United States in Singapore and the region, the 
government of Singapore regarded the most crucial role to be America’s military 
engagement in Vietnam. According to Cross, 
Singapore believes that only the United States can instill that confidence [that 
the spread of communism would not eventuate] and we [the US] cannot do so by 
words or even vast amounts of economic assistance and military equipment but 
only by our coolness and steadiness in settling Viet-Nam. Therein lies the 
greatest implication for American policy in terms of this tiny republic 
[Singapore].199 
In a less direct but significant way, American ties with Singapore’s neighbours, 
Malaysia and Indonesia, also contributed to Singapore’s security in the subregion. 
Being a major supplier of military equipment to Singapore, the US government worked 
in concert with its embassies in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta to “enhance the 
FPDA and to minimize alarm among Singapore’s neighbors”.200 Timely and opportune 
counsel from US ambassadors in Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta played down Singapore’s 
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‘poisoned shrimp’ defence posture, as well as sources of tension between Singapore and 
its two neighbours. Differences in positions regarding Singapore’s use of the Jungle 
Warfare School in Malaysia, water supply agreement between Singapore and Malaysia, 
and the Malaysian government’s “overtures” to China were issues that hindered 
Malaysia-Singapore rapprochement.201 According to Ambassador Cross, Indonesia-
Singapore cooperation lacked depth largely because Jakarta held the view that 
“Singapore’s little navy and air force” were designed for defence against Indonesian 
attack. 202  American mediation from the background not only benefited regional 
cooperation but also reduced the perception that Singapore was a threat to its larger 
neighbours. In April 1971, Ambassador Cross told US Assistant Secretary of State 
Marshall Green that there were probably some “diplomatic efforts” the US could make 
to help improve relations between Singapore and its neighbours but these should be 
“quiet and behind-the-scenes”.203 
The United States attempted to maintain the security of the Malaysia-Singapore 
subregion after the British withdrawal by forcing the Australian government to lead the 
FPDA. But diplomatic pressures from Washington failed to push Canberra towards 
greater engagement in the subregion. The US government then resorted to supplying US 
military equipment to the armed forces of Singapore and Malaysia. By 1973, the 
Singapore Armed Forces had grown considerably. Singapore’s achievement was owed 
largely to American support in supplying the island with equipment and training, while 
enhancing Singapore’s ship and aircraft repair industries by utilising Singapore’s repair 
facilities. The SAF had established two infantry brigades, one reserve infantry brigade, 
one armoured brigade, one artillery command, two engineering battalions and one 
signal battalion, comprising a total of 14,500 personnel in its land forces.204 Singapore’s 
Navy consisted of approximately 1,000 personnel who received training at military 
schools in New Zealand and the US Naval War College.205 The Republic of Singapore 
Air Force staffed by approximately 1,400 personnel, 130 pilots, operated two Hawker 
Hunter squadrons, two flying training squadrons, two A4B squadrons, one Short 
Skyvan search and rescue team, one Bloodhound Air Defence Missile squadron and one 
anti-aircraft gun battalion.206 Yet America’s role in Singapore’s defence was only one 
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part of Washington’s strategy in Singapore. Another indispensable contribution of the 
United States government to Singapore’s survival was American economic support 
towards Singapore. 
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Chapter 5 
Activating Singapore's Economy 
US Economic Diplomacy in Singapore 
 
At the height of the Cold War in Southeast Asia, American policy towards 
Singapore constituted a crucial part of a larger Southeast Asian strategy, which was to 
contain communist influence in the region by strengthening diplomatic relations among 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. United States policy towards Singapore between 
1965 and 1975 was to maintain Singapore’s stability through economic assistance. 
From the beginning of 1966, after Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew stopped 
making anti-American statements, American trade with Singapore expanded. In less 
than a decade, the United States replaced Malaysia to become Singapore’s top trading 
partner. 1  Accelerated growth in US-Singapore trade was the result of American 
investors expanding their operations into Southeast Asia through Singapore. 
Furthermore, the American military campaign in Vietnam benefitted Singapore through 
the use of the island’s ship and aircraft repair facilities, as well as the transhipment of 
sundry supplies needed for the war. As American involvement in the Vietnam War 
escalated, war-related trade between Singapore and the US grew apace. By the time the 
American embassy in Saigon closed in 1975, Singapore had evolved into an 
industrialised economy and begun to play a role in regional cooperation.2 During the 
Johnson administration, the United States and Singapore strengthened diplomatic ties 
and laid the foundation for increased US-Singapore trade. 
American economic assistance to Singapore formed part of the US 
government’s overall strategy towards Asia, and specifically what it designated as the 
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Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore subregion. The objectives of the US government in 
the subregion were reduction of competition and enhancement of cooperation among 
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. To be sure, it was not easy for an outside power to 
smooth existing tensions among the three Southeast Asian governments. Relations 
between Singapore and Malaysia immediately after Singapore seceded from the 
Federation of Malaysia on 9 August 1965 were strained and acrimonious. Singapore-
Indonesian relations improved slightly after the end of Confrontation but deteriorated in 
1968 when the Singapore government executed two Indonesian marines convicted of 
terrorist attacks in Singapore during Confrontation. 3  When engaging with both 
Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, Washington trod between the sensitivities of both 
governments, not wanting to appear partial in its policies. Washington, however, did not 
adopt a policy of passivity towards Singapore-Malaysian relations. When American 
interests were threatened, the US government exerted its influence diplomatically, 
though often in the background. The US government aimed to induce the Singapore 
government to embrace regionalism on the one hand, and to enhance regional cohesion 
on the other. 
The improvement of diplomatic ties between Singapore and the United States 
after Lee Kuan Yew’s meeting with the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs, William Bundy, in March 1966 marked the start of trade and 
economic assistance from the US to Singapore. Lee’s personal rapport with Bundy 
contributed greatly to the warming of US-Singapore relations. In his memoir, Lee 
referred to Bundy fondly, as someone he could “trust” and who “had an air of quiet 
confidence”.4 Reporting on his successful trip to Singapore, Bundy informed the State 
Department that his meeting with Lee 
found him more mellow, and may have opened the way to a more serious and 
deep relationship than we have ever had. He committed himself to accept an 
Ambassador, but was evasive on timing.5 
US Consul General in Singapore, Richard Donald, similarly reported that Lee’s attitude 
towards the elevation of the American consulate general to an embassy seemed to have 
changed, stating that Lee “had already decided in principle that this should take place 
but that it must be done in a ‘very wily fashion’ and on his own timing, on which he 
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gave no clear indication”.6 Very soon, the US embassy in Singapore was established in 
April 1966 and Singapore’s embassy was set up a year later in Washington, D.C., in 
April 1967.7 Shortly after Bundy departed Singapore, the Singapore government and the 
United States established new platforms for trade and investments that catalysed 
Singapore industrialisation and resolved the unemployment problem in Singapore. 
When Lee Kuan Yew met William Bundy, he admonished the American 
government to steer clear of Singapore-Malaysian affairs. He particularly warned 
Bundy that if the US government showed support for Malays in communal conflicts 
between Malays and Chinese populations in Malaysia, the possibility of an 
accommodation between the Malays and Chinese in Malaysia would be gone.8 Lee 
warned that American attempts to interfere in racial conflicts in the subregion would 
surely be counter-productive. After hearing Lee’s analysis, Bundy agreed with the 
prime minister that Washington should not interfere in racial matters in the subregion.9 
But other than communal issues, the US administration played an active role whenever 
there were opportunities for the US embassies in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur to 
facilitate positive relations between the two Southeast Asian countries. 
Correspondence between the US embassies in Singapore and Malaysia revealed 
efforts by American diplomats to reduce the level of suspicion between the 
governments of Singapore and Malaysia. In March 1971, the US Ambassador to 
Singapore, Charles Cross, wrote to his counterpart in Kuala Lumpur, Ambassador Jack 
Lydman. Commenting on unspecified and “largely unfounded” complaints against 
Singapore by Malaysia’s Minister of Home Affairs, Ghazali Shafie, Cross told Lydman 
that he had not observed “anything recently that might have upset the Malaysians”.10 
Cross suggested that it would be “useful” for Lydman to discuss “GOM’s concerns 
about Singapore” with Ghazali, in the hope that 
[i]f you [Lydman] can get him [Ghazali] on this subject more frequently, it is 
possible that we might be able to do something in a quiet way about one or 
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another of his complaints without of course getting in the middle or serving as a 
channel for him to the GOS.11 
It is unclear how actively Ambassadors Cross and Lydman played the role of peace-
maker between Malaysia and Singapore, but their correspondence suggested that the 
American diplomats saw their usefulness as mediators. 
The United States government adopted the same approach towards Singapore-
Indonesian relations. The US government promoted Singapore-Indonesia ties by 
encouraging the Singapore government to increase the flow of Singapore investments 
into the Indonesian economy in 1970. The Singapore government intended to develop 
cordial relations with Indonesia on the condition that neither country interfered in the 
other’s domestic affairs.12 When Marshall Green was US Ambassador to Indonesia in 
1969, he met Singapore Finance Minister Goh Keng Swee to discuss investment 
possibilities in Indonesia.13 One year later, Goh wrote to Green, who was then Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs at the State Department, to inform 
Green of the progress Singapore investments had made since the beginning of 1970. 
Under the inducement of US diplomats posted to Singapore and Jakarta, the Singapore 
government encouraged Singapore businessmen to develop tourism and hospitality in 
the Indonesian island of Bali, providing 49% of the finances used to build hotels in 
Bali.14 Singaporean investors were involved in several industries — rubber production, 
logging, flour milling, banking, iron and steel production, electrical products, food 
making, and hospitality. For the first three months of 1970, these businesses invested 
approximately $50 million in Singapore dollars.15 
The Singapore government’s economic links with Indonesia was not only aimed 
at improving regional economic cooperation, but also in response to the US 
government’s reluctance to offer direct economic aid to the Singapore government. 
Despite the US State Department’s recommendation for more economic assistance to 
Singapore, American economic policy towards Singapore excluded direct grants for 
subsidising Singapore’s economic plans. In November 1966, the Adviser to the 
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President on Southeast Asia Economic and Social Development, Eugene Black, led an 
economic mission to Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore to explore ways that 
the United States could support the region’s economic development.16 The Black 
mission held talks with Singapore’s prime minister, defence and finance ministers, the 
Economic Development Board and the Port of Singapore Authority to explore further 
areas where the United States could assist Singapore. 
In a meeting with delegates of the Black mission, Singapore’s Finance Minister 
Lim Kim San and Defence Minister Goh Keng Swee spoke of how Singapore’s 
economy was in need of urgent help from the US.17 In particular, Lim attempted to 
convince the American delegates of the severity of Singapore’s unemployment problem. 
Despite Singapore’s high growth rate of almost 10% per annum,18 Lim asserted, 
Singapore lacked new industries to provide enough jobs for Singaporeans.19 Positing a 
worst-case scenario, Lim stressed that prolonged high unemployment in Singapore 
would lead to political instability, which would result in the loss of confidence by 
foreign investors. If foreign investors began to withdraw their businesses from the 
island one after another, the Singapore economy would be in crisis.20 Lim noted that an 
obstacle that needed quick solution was the lack of skilled workers in Singapore to 
attract foreign manufacturing ventures. Singapore had a five-year training plan that 
would cost the government US$60-70 million. Lim asked if the US government could 
offer some form of assistance for the training plan. The Black mission acquiesced in 
Lim’s analysis but told the minister that country-specific projects were less likely to 
gain US Congressional approval than multi-lateral Asian initiatives for regional 
development.21 The Singapore ministers shifted the discussion from seeking monetary 
aid to soliciting ways the US could open its market to Singapore’s exports. 
Nevertheless, the Black mission was unable to offer tangible assistance, apart from 
advising that the Singapore government “should survey the entire United States market, 
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identify products for which relatively free access was traditional, and then encourage 
their production in Singapore”.22 All in all, the Black mission did not result in concrete 
solutions for Singapore’s economic difficulties. Nonetheless, Eugene Black’s economic 
mission led the Singapore prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, to commend the calibre of 
American officials. In Lee’s letter to Black, he wrote: 
I thought you and your team would like to know that my colleagues and I were 
agreeably impressed by the calibre of the men that the President sent out.… It 
was…reassuring that now Americans in high places who decide policies which 
will shape the destinies of hundreds of millions of people in this region are men 
of ability, whose approach to the complex problems of this area are both subtle 
and sophisticated.23 
America’s economic assistance towards Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore took 
varied forms. According to a 1968 National Policy Paper on the Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Singapore subregion, Malaysia received approximately US$58 million in loans 
from the Export-Import Bank of the United States. 24  Since April 1966, the US 
government had provided the Indonesian government with US $76 million in loans and 
aids, and added a further US$27 million in 1968.25 Instead of generous loans and grants, 
however, US economic assistance to Singapore came in the form of US-Singapore 
trade. Apart from direct US-Singapore trade, the US State Department also increased 
Singapore’s trade with regional countries through aid agreements signed between the 
US and other Southeast Asian countries — Indonesia and Thailand. A US$10 million 
loan agreement signed between the US government and the Indonesian government 
facilitated the sale of goods produced by American companies in Singapore into 
Indonesia.26  Following the same model, American-funded construction projects in 
Thailand increased demand for supplies from US manufacturers based in Singapore.27 
These arrangements provided jobs for Singaporeans and a ready market for products 
manufactured in Singapore. From 1966 to 1968, the US ambassador to Singapore, 
Francis Galbraith, promoted Singapore as a regional hub with favourable financial and 
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labour conditions for US investments. Ambassador Galbraith urged the State 
Department to encourage US diplomats posted to the region to base their families in 
Singapore. 28  Although American interests were foremost in his considerations, 
Galbraith served not just as America’s ambassador to Singapore, but at times also as 
Singapore’s ‘ambassador’ to American investors. During the Johnson administration, 
Galbraith’s dual role contributed towards better understanding towards Singapore. 
During the late 1960s, the Singapore government began developing regional 
initiatives to complement its domestic economic projects. Besides rapid industrialisation 
of its domestic economy, the Singapore government concurrently developed its 
credentials as a Southeast Asian regional centre. Singapore’s regionalisation strategy 
was a response to Eugene Black’s advice given in November 1966, when he explained 
to Goh Keng Swee and Lim Kim San that the US Congress was more likely to support 
projects that involved more than one country.29 Having understood that aid was more 
likely to be granted for regional projects, the Singapore government initiated regional 
projects so that US grants would indirectly flow into Singapore. In 1969, the US 
embassy in Singapore reported that 
[i]n a recent speech GOS Minister for Science and Technology Dr. Toh Chin 
Chye gave cogent and illuminating reasons for Singapore’s support for 
regionalism. “We cannot regard Singapore’s economic development in 
isolation,” said Dr. Toh. “There is no doubting the need for Singapore to involve 
itself in cooperative projects which will bring economic and social benefits to 
countries in this region. A more active participation by Singapore in such 
projects will build us a reserve of goodwill and also help towards establishing 
our political position in Southeast Asia.”30 
Since the establishment of regional centres in Singapore attracted sponsorship from the 
United Nations and the US Agency for International Development, the Singapore 
government accelerated the drive towards regionalism. Together with higher levels of 
funding, the UN and USAID also committed facilities and staff that developed the 
executive and management skills of local employees. To ensure a steady flow of 
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sponsorships, the Singapore government maintained a track record of effective regional 
projects that it helmed. 
Singapore’s economic strategy of initiating regional projects complemented US 
Congress’s preference for funding regional projects rather than country-specific 
proposals. US Ambassador to Singapore from 1969 to 1971, Charles Cross, proposed 
that the US government should utilise “American economic presence in Singapore” to 
help Singapore play a role in regional development.31 He felt that Singapore should be a 
“thinking center” and the US embassy should strive to “fit Singapore into existing USG 
plans and programs in the area so that Singapore’s contributions can be 
complementary” to overall US approach towards Southeast Asia. 32  Inheriting 
Galbraith’s enthusiasm in promoting Singapore, Ambassador Cross attempted to elevate 
Singapore’s importance within Washington’s containment strategy in Southeast Asia. 
Cross commented that Singapore’s development as a prosperous new nation with a 
growing regional role could be cited as a product of the success and patience of 
American strategy in the region. Furthermore, the Singapore example also reflected the 
importance of effective local governance. 
The United States embassy in Singapore concluded that regional projects 
mooted by the Singapore government seemed “destined to develop with reasonable 
assurance of success”.33 Singapore-initiated regional projects that USAID supported 
were the Regional English Language Centre (RELC), Southeast Asian Fisheries 
Development Centre, and regional transportation and communications surveys. The 
RELC, which opened in February 1968, was involved in organising seminars, 
facilitating research projects, and attracting professional visitors into Singapore. The 
Centre, a joint venture between USAID and the Singapore government, began with a 
five-year budget of US$4 million, of which USAID sponsored half of the funds 
needed. 34  The Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Centre that was based in 
Singapore received a US$60,000 sponsorship. Other regional projects such as regional 
surveys for transportation and communications, which included aeronautical 
telecommunications, flight inspection, air sea rescue, and marine navigational aids in 
the Strait of Malacca, received US$202,000 from USAID.35 The survey of marine 
navigational aids along the Strait of Malacca also attracted Japanese interest and 
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received an additional sponsorship of US$250,000 from the Japanese government, and 
the participation of a Japanese team of surveyors.36 The coordination of regional 
projects not only gave the Singapore government the aid it needed from the US, but also 
attracted other sources of support, most evident in the Strait of Malacca project. 
Although substantial, the economic aid received through Singapore’s regional projects 
could not match the US-Singapore trade that expanded exponentially from 1966 
onwards. 
There was, however, one exception to US refusal to finance Singapore-based 
projects. In August 1966, a recommendation was made for a US$15 million loan to the 
Port of Singapore Authority to finance the building of four deep water berths, a new 
port engineer’s plant yard and workshop, replacement and provision of additional 
floating craft and cargo handling equipment, and provision of data processing 
equipment.37 The loan enabled Singapore to develop its port — one of its most vital 
economic assets — and came with generous financing terms of 6% interest per annum, 
repayable over 25 years.38 American assistance to the PSA complemented plans to 
increase US-Singapore trade, and served the interests of both the United States and 
Singapore. 
It was perhaps Singapore’s good fortune that the United States’ military 
involvement in Vietnam was escalating after March 1965. The US government needed a 
suitable procurement office for war supplies and Singapore fitted the bill. As an 
independent state after 9 August 1965, Singapore had not signed a separate agreement 
with the US government for economic assistance and USAID-approved procurement 
programs.39  In January 1966, the State Department and the consulate general in 
Singapore made “vigorous” recommendations “to improve the export opportunities for 
Singapore by any legitimate means available”.40 The State Department listed attributes 
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that supported Singapore’s suitability as the main procurement centre for the US 
military based in Vietnam. In an action memorandum calling for more US economic 
assistance to Singapore, Rutherford Poats from the USAID argued that because of 
Singapore’s location, it was in an “advantageous position to supply rapidly to 
Vietnam”.41 Also, Singapore could often supply at a cheaper price because of efficiency 
in manufacturing and handling shipments.42 Furthermore, Singapore was becoming an 
“increasingly substantial supplier under U.S. Government-financed procurement for 
Vietnam”.43 Hence, on 15 March 1966, days after Bundy’s meeting with Lee Kuan 
Yew, the United States government designated Singapore “as a ‘developing country’ 
and [therefore] given priority status in the United States Procurement Program”.44 
Vietnam War-related trade with Singapore expanded rapidly after the US government 
included Singapore into the Vietnam procurement program. Singapore Finance Minister 
Goh Keng Swee reported in his budgetary statement in 1967 that Singapore took export 
orders amounting to S$300 million from South Vietnam in 1966.45 Goh also reported 
revenue from the business brought by American troops on combat leave in Singapore.46 
Shortly after the Lee-Bundy meeting, American servicemen from Vietnam 
arrived on the island for combat leave. Lee described it as “a quiet way of showing 
support for America’s effort in Vietnam”.47 Lee Kuan Yew recalled that about 20,000 
US military personnel arrived in Singapore in a year, making up 7% of the total number 
of tourists of that time.48 The Rest and Recuperation Program, which began in 1966, 
was an impetus for Singapore’s tourism and hospitality boom during the late 1960s.49 
Tourist traffic in Singapore grew from 30.7% in 1966 to 59.2%, 22.5% and 62.7% in 
1967, 1968 and 1969 respectively.50 In 1967, 39 US Navy ships and more than 11,000 
American sailors and officers took their shore leave in Singapore.51 The number of US 
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military personnel on R&R increased the following year, and in 1969, the US embassy 
in Singapore reported that an average of 1,600 US servicemen arrived in Singapore each 
month and about US$300 was spent by each person visiting Singapore on R&R 
totalling in excess of US$500,000 per month.52 According to a letter by Ambassador 
Cross written in 1970, Singapore had become a destination for “the enormous number 
of high brass military visitors who seem[ed] to have discovered Singapore as the most 
likeable R&R center in the area”.53 Singapore was such a popular site for the US Rest 
and Recuperation Program that, in early 1971, the US embassy in Singapore sought 
permission from the Singapore government to allow American servicemen stationed in 
Thailand to use Singapore as “a site for environmental and morale leave”.54 The 
Singapore government’s approval was granted shortly.55 The tourism and hospitality 
boom in Singapore not only contributed to Singapore’s GDP and foreign exchange 
earnings, but the growing industry also absorbed many of the workers previously 
employed on the British military base.56 
Perhaps the most critical contribution the United States government made to the 
Singapore economy was the utilisation of Singapore’s naval dockyards that were 
vacated by the British. After the British withdrawal was announced in January 1968, the 
growing presence of the US Seventh Fleet signalled that the US had an interest in 
Singapore’s security and boosted US investors’ confidence in Singapore.57 In 1966, 
British military spending amounted to S$550 million, or 16.3% of Singapore’s Gross 
Domestic Product. After the announcement of Britain’s military withdrawal, Britain’s 
military expenditure in Singapore shrank to 8.6% of Singapore’s GDP in 1969.58 In 
addition, Britain’s military withdrawal directly led to the unemployment of 40,000 
civilian workers. 
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During this period, the profitability of the ship repair business for Singapore 
gradually became apparent. The American embassy reported that US Army and Navy 
repair contracts brought in revenue of close to US$3.25 million for Singapore in 1969, 
and signed contracts worth up to US$7.4 million in 1970.59 The average number of 
ships stopping for repairs between 1968 and 1970 was 52 visits per year.60 By the first 
half of 1971, the number of ships arriving in Singapore for repairs already exceeded the 
total number of ship visits in the previous year. The more days US military vessels 
berthed in Singapore for repairs, the more revenue was generated. In 1971, the US 
vessels stayed a total of 29 days longer in Singapore compared with 1970, and brought 
in more tourist revenue from the thousands of US Navy servicemen who waited for the 
repairs to be completed.61 The number of ship visits had to be reduced in November 
1971 when the British Navy deployed three large ships to carry out withdrawal 
operations.62 That year, the number of ship visits reached 90 and dropped slightly to 86 
visits in 1972.63 In the first quarter of 1973, the US Seventh Fleet made 35 visits to the 
Singapore naval dockyard and signed contracts indicated that US ship visits would 
exceed 100 that year.64 Beginning from 1969, Singapore supplied US$200 million of 
petroleum products annually to American military vessels repaired in Singapore, or 
stopping for refuelling.65 
By the end of 1969, Singapore’s fear of the economic impact of the British 
withdrawal had been substantially overcome by the commercialisation of former British 
bases to repair US vessels and the trade brought about by the involvement of American 
troops in the Vietnam War. The Vietnam War ensured Singapore’s economic viability. 
Increases in repair contracts for US ships and aircraft in Singapore created 
corresponding reductions in repair contracts at Sasebo, Japan, and Guam because 
Singapore was able to offer repair contracts that were cheaper and met repair schedules 
more efficiently than the other Western Pacific repair facilities used by the US.66 
According to the Country Director for Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore Affairs at the 
US State Department, Theodore Heavner, in 1971-72 the “level of aircraft and ship 
repairs in Singapore [was] the result in part of a White House directive to increase 
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[America’s] use of Singapore facilities”.67 The directive to increase the number of USN 
ship visits to Singapore was aimed to minimise the chance of Soviet Union warships 
utilising vacant berths in the Singapore dockyard.68 Lee Kuan Yew’s appeal to US 
Ambassador Charles Cross in February 1971 to increase US repair contracts, as well as 
Cross’s persistence in getting a decision “at the highest level to make such increases”, 
contributed to the rise in number of ship repair contracts in Singapore.69  
Both Washington and the Singapore government welcomed the increase of 
repair contracts for US military vessels and aircraft in Singapore. According to 
Ambassador Cross, increased visits by US military craft was an indication of “a 
continuing American interest in the area, thus serving as a deterrent to China”.70 In 
1971, Ambassador Cross argued that the US could benefit from maintaining a military 
presence in Singapore while withdrawing troops from Vietnam: “[W]e can underline the 
fact that we are not retreating from Southeast Asia by the use of Singapore facilities for 
the repair and maintenance of US naval vessels and aircraft and by low key but frequent 
ship visits.”71 The psychological boost provided by visits of American military vessels 
and personnel was significant to Singapore, and only overshadowed by the substantial 
economic benefits that the repair contracts brought. Although the US government had 
been careful not to give any commitment to protect Singapore against external attacks, 
an American military presence facilitated the development of Singapore’s defence and 
confidence in a post-British withdrawal security environment. 72  According to 
Ambassador Cross’ successor, Edwin Cronk, Sembawang naval dockyard in Singapore 
was “becoming a favorite port of call for the Seventh Fleet” and the Singapore 
government seemed “delighted” with these ship visits.73 Ambassador Cronk added that: 
They [the GOS] like the fact that the Seventh Fleet is maintaining a visible 
presence in the area — and hope it will continue in the post-Viet-Nam period — 
and, of course, they like the tourist and other income derived. I’ve [Cronk] told 
people in the Foreign Ministry and Defense to let me know if they want to slow 
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this down for any reason, but their attitude seems to be the more the better. So, 
at the moment at least, the welcome mat is out.74 
Like the naval dockyards vacated by the British when they withdrew from 
Singapore, the air bases handed over to the Singapore government also provided 
substantial revenue for Singapore. The revenue generated by the budding aviation 
industry in Singapore and the rehiring of workers laid off by the British reduced the 
negative economic impact of the British withdrawal. US aviation companies, Lockheed 
Air Services and Grumman Corporation, established aircraft repair operations in 
Singapore with support from both the US government and the Singapore government. 
In 1971, Lockheed was awarded aircraft repair and maintenance contracts for US Navy 
C-121s and C-130s, US Air Force C-121s, and T-28 aircraft. These aircraft repair 
contracts amounted to US$2 million in 1972.75 The aviation maintenance facilities were 
also used for regional operations. Lockheed and Grumman used Singapore’s repair 
facilities for repairing helicopters deployed in Vietnam. Lockheed’s C-130 repair 
contracts from Vietnam and Indonesia were also carried out in Singapore.76 According 
to the State Department, keeping Lockheed operational in Singapore served “the 
purpose of retaining U.S. access and denying or minimizing access by the Soviet 
Union” to Singapore’s air bases.77 Hence, to ensure the viability of Lockheed Air 
Services in Singapore, a White House directive was passed in 1971 to increase the 
usage of Singapore’s “strategic facilities by U.S. military aircraft and naval vessels”.78  
After a promising start, however, inability to attain sufficient contracts from the 
US Department of Defense gave Lockheed a difficult year in 1973. Lockheed and the 
DOD disagreed on the volume of contracts needed for Lockheed to be profitable in 
Singapore. According to the US State Department, DOD would not give Lockheed “as 
much work as they say they need” because the Department did not feel that Lockheed 
had reached the point where it had to “pull-out” of Singapore because of the lack of 
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contracts.79 Country Director Theodore Heavner further remarked that if Lockheed were 
to pull out of Singapore in the short-term, it would hurt US standing with the Singapore 
government, “but not to an unacceptable extent”.80 DOD was right to conclude that 
Lockheed’s operations in Singapore were not likely to fold. The direct procurement 
program initiated by the White House directive exempted Lockheed from a competitive 
bidding process and guaranteed DOD contracts for Lockheed’s facilities in Singapore of 
up to 300,000 man-hours. By 1974, the direct procurement program had created over 
US$7 million of business for Lockheed in Singapore.81  
American involvement in Singapore’s economic development was only one side 
of the story. The Singapore government’s implementation of the country’s 
industrialisation plan starting from 1961 established conditions that made Singapore an 
attractive investment destination for American companies. The linchpin of Singapore’s 
industrialisation plan was Jurong Industrial Estate.82 Located in the southwestern part of 
Singapore’s main island, Jurong was considered “absolutely crucial” for Singapore’s 
economic development.83 “In fact,” as geographer Chiang Tao-Chang argues, “the 
question whether Singapore would survive as a viable and prosperous island Republic 
would be largely determined by the success or failure of the industrialization of 
Jurong.”84 Chiang asserts that Jurong Industrial Estate was part of a plan for the 
Singapore economy to focus less on entrepôt  trade and more on industries. Economists 
Lim Chong Yah and Ow Chwee Huay attributed the sharp decrease of Singapore’s 
entrepôt trade to the cessation of trade with Indonesia during Confrontation, where 
Singapore-Indonesia trade fell by 24.1% in 1964.85 In addition, the shift towards 
industrialisation was an attempt to address three economic conditions in the subregion: 
Singapore’s high unemployment rate; the opening of competing ports in Malaysia and 
Indonesia to avoid dependence on Singapore; and the rapid industrialisation of 
Singapore’s neighbours.86  
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Like Chiang, the World Bank and other economists who conducted economic 
surveys in Singapore during the 1950s and 60s assessed that Malaya and Singapore 
should merge to form a federation with “an industrial orientation as its modernisation 
thrust”.87 In 1961, after a United Nations Survey Mission led by Dutch economist 
Albert Winsemius visited Singapore, the Singapore government established the 
Economic Development Board and adopted the Winsemius mission’s proposals to 
implement a “radical program of industrial development”.88 The Singapore government 
took up the recommendations of the Winsemius mission and even hired Winsemius to 
be Singapore’s economic advisor from 1961 to 1984. His assistant, I-Fang Tang, was 
also employed by the Singapore government and eventually became Chairman of the 
Economic Development Board of Singapore. The Singapore government expected 
Jurong’s success to be guaranteed with Singapore’s merger with Malaysia in September 
1963, since the Singapore-Malaysian common market comprised over 11 million people 
with living standards second in Asia only to Japan’s.89 The common market with 
Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak would be a great attraction for foreign investors.90 In 1963, 
because of its relative wealth, Singapore possessed almost as large a market as the rest 
of Malaysia; Malaysia’s domestic market thus had the potential to expand faster than 
Singapore’s.91 Indeed, the incentive for establishing a tariff-free common market with 
Malaysia was not just the size of the market there, but also its potential for growth. 
Nevertheless, optimism about common market with Malaysia fizzled after separation 
and Jurong risked being redundant after investments had been made to develop 
infrastructure and amenities.92 It was therefore crucial that the Singapore government 
attract enough foreign investments into Jurong to justify the resources poured into the 
Industrial Estate. 
During Lee Kuan Yew’s first official visit to the United States, he vigorously 
promoted Singapore to US investors. By then, Singapore was already part of the 
USAID investment guarantee program, which insured US investors against losses 
resulting from political instability in Singapore. Lee and Finance Minister Goh, in a bid 
to attract more US investors, promised that American investors would be given 
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preferential treatment in Singapore.93 To the president of General Instrument, Goh said, 
“Tell us what you want; we’ll see that you get it.”94 When the Business Committee of 
the American Association, comprising the heads of leading American businesses in 
Singapore, was eager to donate money to build an American school, the Singapore 
government offered tax exemptions for the donations.95  Lee’s pitch to American 
businessmen in October 1967 and the investment guarantee program for Singapore 
created great momentum for US private investments into Singapore.96  
During the first ten years of independence from Malaysia, American investors in 
Singapore generated revenue for the Southeast Asian country and reduced Singapore’s 
unemployment. In 1967, Mobil Oil established an oil refinery in Singapore, investing 
about US$35 million.97 By the end of 1967, Esso, another American oil company, built 
another refinery off the coast of Jurong that cost Esso US$70 million and brought in 
orders worth US$100 million. 98  Managers from Mobil Oil who oversaw the 
implementation of the building projects in Singapore were enthusiastic in telling their 
visitors how Singapore workers completed the construction of their facilities “months 
ahead of the deadline and at less than original cost estimates”.99 By 1969, Mobil was 
hiring 153 employees, and was processing 20,800 barrels of crude oil a day.100 Apart 
from setting up refineries in Singapore, US oil companies initiating exploration 
operations in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam began to establish their offices 
in Singapore and “housed” the families of their employees in Singapore.101 In June 
1970, out of 186 oil exploration companies in Southeast Asia, 142 were based in 
Singapore.102 American construction and electronics manufacturing companies also 
started operations in Singapore. In 1967, American firm, Caterpillar, set up a warehouse 
in Singapore for distributing spare parts to Asia and Africa with an investment of about 
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US$1.4 million.103 Manufacturers of electronic products such as General Instrument and 
Westinghouse began operations in Singapore in 1968, providing jobs for thousands of 
locals.104 In 1968, the International Executive Service Corps ran its largest training 
operation in Singapore, managing 86 projects that equipped Singaporean executives 
with “knowledge of American methods and know-how”.105 In 1969, the manufacturing 
sector in Singapore employed more than 96,000 workers, an increase from 34,000 in 
1960.106 The US State Department reported that employment in US plants in Singapore 
had grown from 1,500 in 1968 to about 10,000 in 1972.107 Apart from increasing an 
average of 6,715 jobs per year from 1960 to 1969, the Singapore government also 
introduced compulsory national service for male citizens above 18 years old and work 
permits for West Malaysian workers in order to alleviate the high unemployment 
problem.108 From 12-15% unemployment in 1967,109 Singapore’s unemployment rate 
dropped to 4% in 1972.110 
United States investments in Singapore from 1965 to the early 1970s were 
instrumental to Singapore’s economic growth. In the first five years after Singapore’s 
separation from Malaysia, Singapore’s gross domestic product increased by 80%. Even 
when the British withdrawal from naval and air bases in Singapore was carried out 
between 1969 and 1972, Singapore’s economy was growing at a rate of 14% 
annually.111 In 1968, American foreign direct investments (FDI) was US$15 million out 
of the total FDI inflow of US$23 million into Singapore. The inflow of American FDI 
into Singapore continued to rise every year until it reached a peak of US$92 million in 
1973 when an oil crisis hit the world economy.112 By 1972, the United States had 
become the largest foreign investor in Singapore, pouring in US$500 million in private 
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investments; US companies invested only half of that amount in Malaysia.113 In 1972, 
Singapore had accumulated reserves of up to US$2 billion, indicating the depth of its 
financial stability, and trade between Singapore and the United States amounted to 
US$650 million. 114  Singapore became an export-oriented industrialised country, 
absorbing 48.6% of the total FDI that flowed into Asia in 1975.115 Whereas some 
economists credit the Singapore government with the economic success in Singapore, 
the economic assistance that the United States government provided should not be 
easily passed over. 116  Influx of American businesses accelerated Singapore’s 
industrialisation, reduced the severity of unemployment, and established Singapore as a 
centre for US businesses in the region. 
Although Lim Chong Yah and Ow Chwee Huay downplay the significance of 
the Vietnam War on Singapore’s economic development from 1965 to 1970,117 they 
acknowledge that trade with South Vietnam did increase during the war, such that South 
Vietnam became one of the largest markets for Singapore exports.118 Writing in 1971, 
their analysis was limited to statistics available in the period up to 1970.  Furthermore, 
in the midst of speculations on the pace of US military withdrawal from Vietnam at the 
time of writing, they might have felt the need to divorce Singapore’s economic growth 
from the Vietnam War, in case a quick withdrawal of American troops created a loss of 
confidence in the Singapore economy. Lim and Ow note, however, that 
[b]ecause of the war, Singapore’s sale of petroleum products to South Vietnam 
rose tremendously, thus arresting the decline of Singapore’s entrepôt trade 
during this period. In addition, the intensified war brought in more revenue for 
Singapore’s workshops for the repair of equipment and industry for the repair of 
ships.119 
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They posit that Singapore’s economic growth in its first five years was largely a result 
of strong efforts to promote foreign investment in industries and introduction of laws to 
attract investors into Singapore. In 1967, the Economic Expansion Incentives Act, 
which replaced the Pioneer Industries Ordnance of 1959, reduced company tax from 
40% to 4% for export-oriented industries for a 15-year period. Discipline in the 
Singapore labour force was enhanced through the Employment Bill and the Industrial 
Relations Ordnance, both introduced in 1968.120 Although countries like Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Indonesia and Malaysia provided somewhat similar benefits to attract foreign 
investments, economists stress the efficiency and integrity of the Singapore 
government, the availability of public utilities and a well-disciplined work force that 
drew investors to Singapore.121 According to them, the “imprint of the Government was 
everywhere”. Yet even Lim and Ow concede that “[a] baker, however good, cannot 
make bread without flour, water, yeast, oven, etc”.122 They attribute Singapore’s good 
economic performance in the late 1960s to booms in three key industries: hospitality, 
ship repair and ship building, and oil prospecting in Southeast Asia.123 W.G. Huff 
emphasises the growth of the electronics manufacturing sector as a driving force for 
Singapore’s economic development in the 1970s.124 American investments and market 
for Singapore’s exports played a key role in the rapid growth in these industries that 
kept Singapore’s economy viable in the midst of Indonesia’s Confrontation, separation 
from Malaysia and Britain’s military withdrawal. According to Huff, Singapore’s 
economic growth from 1966 to 1973 depended on “a combination of external free trade 
and strong internal economic control”.125 A complete picture of Singapore economic 
development must therefore take into account the efforts by the Singapore government 
as well as external factors, such as the US strategy of economic diplomacy that aimed to 
bolster Singapore’s political stability and economic viability. 
The United States-Singapore bilateral relationship developed rapidly on multiple 
levels from 1966 to 1975. The volume of trade between the two countries, and the 
influx of US investments into Singapore dispelled the anxieties of the Singapore 
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government after the British announced plans for military withdrawal east of Suez. By 
1975, the distance between the non-aligned Singapore and the anti-communist 
superpower was a matter of perception. The Singapore government had defined its 
policy towards the US as purely commercial, yet enmeshed in so many levels that 
damage to American interests in the region would be more or less certain if Singapore 
faced political, economic or social crises. But American contribution to the economic 
developments in Singapore was not altruistic. Decisions made by the US government 
towards helping Singapore were motivated by America’s interests in Southeast Asia, 
and deemed appropriate within US containment strategy. That being the case, the US 
government readily refused the Singapore government’s requests when the 
consequences of assisting Singapore would damage American relations with 
Singapore’s larger neighbours. The following section examines the tensions between 
Singapore and Washington from 1965 to 1975. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Part 3  
Strategic Distancing 
Balancing Non-Alignment and Containment 
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Chapter 6 
Catching the Cold 
Obstacles in US-Singapore Relations 
 
After a difficult start, Singapore and the United States had built up a remarkably 
close relationship, albeit one that was given the public appearance of distance. 
Singapore offered strategic and public support for US military operations in Vietnam 
beginning from the late 1960s. In return, the United States provided economic and 
military assistance that guaranteed Singapore’s security. As the US government began 
to show signs of military withdrawal from Vietnam in 1968, its strategic interest in 
Singapore diminished; so, too, did the Singapore government’s confidence in the 
reliability of the US. Although relations remained strong, Singapore reverted to its 
earlier strategy of hinting at a possible shift away from western alliance, playing the 
Soviet Union as an alternative to keep the People’s Republic of China in check. The 
Nixon administration, though keen to maintain close relations with the Singapore 
government, recognised that Singapore was less significant to US political interests in 
the region than Malaysia and Indonesia. Tensions between the US and Singapore grew 
as the Singapore government established formal diplomatic engagement with the Soviet 
Union. 
During the early Cold War period, from late 1940s to the 1950s, conflict and 
competition between the USSR and the US escalated apace and spread to parts of Asia. 
Large portions of the region were recovering from the trauma of the Second World War 
and undergoing decolonisation. In Asia, the Taiwan Strait, the Korean peninsula and 
Southeast Asia became, in various degrees, military and political battlegrounds for the 
Soviet-American Cold War. In 1962, deterred by the spectre of nuclear war after the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union entered an interregnum of 
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détente.1 The US government signed a Limited Test Ban Treaty with the USSR in 
1963.2 Although the LTBT was a step towards reducing the intensity of nuclear arms 
race between the two superpowers, it did little to reduce the “spirit of competition” and 
“mutual suspicion” between the United States and the Soviet Union.3 Three years after 
the treaty was signed, the US State Department observed that “it is more plausible to 
believe that the Soviets regarded the test ban as a tactical episode which did not carry 
with it a significant change in their stance toward the US”.4 In fact, part of Moscow’s 
motivation for signing the LTBT was the escalating competition between the USSR and 
the PRC to be the “true champion of liberation movements everywhere”.5 In a policy 
planning report written in 1966, the US State Department noted that Moscow “defied 
bitter Chinese opposition” towards the LTBT, and used it mainly as “an opportunity to 
isolate Peking in the Communist movement and Afro-Asian countries because of [the 
PRC’s] blatant opposition to this popular agreement”.6 Because Russian motivation 
behind the signing of the treaty might be driven more by a Sino-Soviet split than a 
détente between Washington and Moscow, the State Department advised that the US 
government should recognise the “transient and fragile character of the détente of 
1963”.7 The LTBT did not alter the dynamics of the superpower rivalry until the Sino-
Soviet split became apparent in the late 1960s.8 
Vietnam, and broadly speaking Southeast Asia, became geopolitically important 
to the Soviet Union after the rupture of the Sino-Soviet alliance.9 Increased Soviet 
interest in Vietnam not only concerned the PRC, but also drew much attention from the 
US government. According to the State Department, Soviet involvement in Vietnam 
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was symptomatic of Moscow’s competition with Beijing for leadership and influence 
among communist regimes in Asia. The division of labour observable during the early 
Cold War period had given way to a struggle for “leadership of world Communism”.10 
The State Department foresaw that, in time, Soviet hostilities towards the US would be 
redirected increasingly to Beijing, which was also competing for greater clout in 
Vietnam and the Third World.11 The competition for influence in developing countries 
in Southeast Asia, such as Singapore, intensified as the Soviet Union vied for strategic 
leverage in the region. 
During the 1950s, a period which saw the Soviet Union uninterested in the 
communist insurrection in Burma and also failing to establish superiority over the 
western powers during the Korean War,12 Soviet engagement with non-communist 
Asian states was superficial. Leszek Buszynski argues that the newly independent 
countries in Southeast Asia were suspicious of the Soviet Union, which was perceived 
to have intentions of spreading communism in the region by force.13 Furthermore, 
communist parties in Southeast Asia were receiving political guidance and military 
assistance mainly from the PRC, which had the support of Moscow during this period.14 
Hence, Soviet engagements with non-communist governments in Southeast Asia were 
limited to economic links and diplomatic recognition with some countries in the region. 
Buszynski noted, however, that the Soviet leader from 1953 to 1964, Nikita 
Khrushchev, began to recognise that relations with newly independent countries in Asia 
could benefit the Soviet Union.15 Hence, as a result of ‘de-Stalinization’ of Soviet 
policies under Khrushchev, Soviet policy in Southeast Asia shifted from supporting 
armed insurrections to putting greater emphasis on political and economic relations with 
newly independent Asian states. In fact, at the dawn of the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet 
Union avoided association with the communist parties in the region because of the 
Chinese identification with communist insurgencies in the region.16 By cultivating state-
to-state relations through economic diplomacy in Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union 
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abandoned its coercive image while exploiting the grievances that decolonised states 
had against the West, which was perceived to be perpetuating an unjust international 
order.17 The most apparent sign of the Sino-Soviet split, according to Paul Kelemen, 
was observable in North Vietnamese relations with the Soviet Union and the PRC. The 
1964 ninth plenum of the Vietnamese Workers’ Party Central Committee introduced a 
shift in strategy to engage in “a general offensive war” in South Vietnam, a departure 
from the previous approach endorsed by Beijing to focus on “guerrilla 
warfare…conducted as part of a social revolution”.18 Hanoi’s decision required Soviet 
assistance, since China could not supply the sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons needed 
to counter American bombers.19 Moscow’s response to Hanoi’s request was positive 
and immediate. By the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union became embroiled in Southeast 
Asian affairs through military support in Vietnam. 
Ideologically, Moscow’s approach in Southeast Asia aligned with its aim of 
disseminating socialism in the Third World. Buszynski observes that the Soviet Union 
“made a distinction between political independence, which the newly-decolonised 
countries have achieved, and genuine economic independence, which the Third World 
is yet to attain, without which a state could not be truly independent”.20 He also notes a 
marked difference in the definition of non-alignment between the Soviet Union and the 
majority of the members within the movement.21 Quoting Soviet author B.G. Gafurov, 
who wrote in May 1977, Buszynski asserts that Soviet interpretation of non-alignment 
did not imply “equidistance between socialism and capitalism”, but was an “active 
policy of confronting ‘imperialism’ or the West”.22 
Ultimately, the Soviet goal was to draw the newly decolonised countries out of a 
capitalist system by helping these countries to become less dependent on their former 
colonisers.23 Because reduced reliance on the western powers by newly independent 
states contributed to the Soviet objective, Moscow embraced neutralism more readily 
than the United States.24 The United States only began to adopt a more accommodating 
view of neutralism during the Kennedy administration.25 Buszynski argues that the 
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Soviet Union was able to utilise its relative success in diplomacy with non-aligned 
countries “to orchestrate Third World opinion in a way that would place limits upon 
United States activity”.26 The Soviet Union presented itself as an ally to the non-aligned 
nations against the United States, which it claimed to be a “predatory” superpower.27 
Clive Christie asserts that even “semi-socialist” governments gained Moscow’s “full 
support” because these regimes “weakened capitalism and thereby strengthened the 
world position of socialism”.28 
Predictions of an intensifying rivalry between the Soviet Union and the People’s 
Republic of China came true in the late 1960s. The veneer of Sino-Soviet solidarity was 
removed in March 1969 with two border clashes at the Damansky/Zhenbao Island.29 
Following the open clash between the Soviet Union and the PRC, Soviet-American 
détente became formalised as policy in 1971 when both superpowers recognised the 
“establishment of nuclear equality”.30 Détente limited the “dangers of escalation” in the 
US-Soviet conflict and was intended by Moscow to “throw the responsibility of 
restraint upon the American side”.31 In addition, the Soviet Union capitalised on détente 
to trumpet that “socialism was indeed expanding and capitalism contracting”.32 While 
recognition of Soviet achievements might be more apparent in communist states, it was 
hard to make the same claim in non-communist Southeast Asian countries since most of 
them functioned in a capitalist system. 
Although the Singapore government proclaimed Singapore’s non-alignment 
when it became independent in 1965, the non-communist People’s Action Party 
government was leaning closer to the United States. Lee Kuan Yew left Washington in 
October 1967 with the assurance that President Lyndon Johnson’s administration was 
committed to preventing the spread of communism south of Vietnam. Lee’s visit to the 
US came a few months after the British government announced plans to withdraw 
troops from Singapore. One of his chief objectives was to ascertain whether the United 
States government would play a role in Singapore’s security after the British 
withdrawal. In his memoir, Lee quotes Johnson’s reassuring speech during his visit to 
the White House: 
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Yes, America has the resolution and the restraint to see this struggle through in 
Vietnam.… I cannot put it more clearly or with more confidence. You have a 
phrase in your part of the world that puts our determination well. You call it 
‘riding the tiger.’ You rode the tiger. We shall.33 
While conversing with Lee, US Vice President Hubert Humphrey estimated that “70 to 
80 percent of the senate supported the president’s Vietnam policy”.34 Humphrey urged 
“people like [Lee], who were nonaligned and known to be politically independent, [to] 
speak up and stop the erosion of public opinion in the United States”.35 According to 
Lee, Humphrey urged the Singapore prime minister to “help keep the carpet under 
Johnson’s feet” or “he [Johnson] would be beaten in America, not Vietnam”.36 Lee left 
the United States in October 1967, heartened by the resolve exhibited by the Johnson 
administration to hold the line in Vietnam. 
Nevertheless, events that ensued after Lee’s US visit dampened the Singapore 
government’s confidence in the British and the American governments to resist the 
expansion of communist influence in Southeast Asia. In November 1967, the British 
currency was devalued, followed by an announcement made in January 1968 of an 
accelerated British withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore.37 In the same month, the 
American war effort in Vietnam came under severe domestic opposition after a fierce 
battle in Vietnam known as the Tet Offensive. President Johnson announced in March 
1968 that he would not represent his party to contest the US Presidential Election that 
year and expressed willingness to enter into peace talks with Hanoi.38 After Johnson’s 
announcement, Southeast Asian leaders recognised that the American government was 
looking for an exit strategy in Vietnam.39 The Singapore government could no longer 
depend on the Anglo-American powers to resist the military expansion of communism 
in Southeast Asia and moved quickly to find an alternative power that could contain the 
PRC in the region. On 1 June 1968, two months after President Johnson’s 
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announcement, the Foreign Ministry of Singapore established diplomatic relations with 
the Soviet Union.40 
For the Singapore government, establishing diplomatic relations with both the 
United States and the Soviet Union was an attempt to balance both powers. Bilveer 
Singh explains that a small state, such as Singapore, possessed little or no freedom of 
action within a marked sphere of influence of a great power, such as the US and the 
USSR.41 Hence, a balance of power in Southeast Asia gave Singapore greater freedom 
of action compared to a bipolar system. Singh argues that, for Singapore, “being small 
and in no way able to prevent the entry of great powers into the region, the next best 
policy has been to invite the presence of all great powers”.42 Singapore Foreign Minister 
S. Rajaratnam, in a 1976 speech, defended Singapore’s endorsement of a Soviet 
presence in the region: 
Insofar as the Soviet Union is concerned, there is no doubt about the role she 
intends to play in the region. Her policy in regard to Southeast Asia is activist, 
consistent and credible.… [W]e will continue to maintain good relations with 
the Soviet Union but at the same time resist on our own, or through the 
collective strength that ASEAN provides, any Soviet influence or pressure 
which we believe would be detrimental to our national interests or to our non-
communist way of life. Of course our capacity to resist big power pressure 
would be greater if there were a multiplicity of powers present in the region. 
When there are many suns the gravitational pull of each is not only weakened 
but also, by a judicious use of the pulls and counterpulls of gravitational forces, 
the minor planets acquire a greater freedom of navigation.43 
Rajaratnam’s speech attempted to justify the Singapore government’s adoption of a 
balance of power strategy towards the US and the Soviet Union. Since the likelihood of 
the Soviet Union imposing a “communist way of life” on Singapore was remote, the 
Singapore government accepted its involvement in the region.44 
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Singh posits three advantages for Singapore to open doors to all major powers. 
First, no one power would be “too powerful to be in a position to put pressure on the 
leadership”.45 While there might be credence to this argument, it was apparent that the 
Singapore government’s attempt to portray an evenhanded approach was evidence that 
Singapore was under pressure to consider the views of both the US and the USSR. 
Next, Singh asserts that there was a “direct economic spinoff” as a result of investments 
from the great powers into the Singapore economy.46 The volume of trade between 
Singapore and the USSR, nonetheless, suggested that the US was more significant to 
the Singapore economy than the Soviet Union by a large margin. In 1970, Singapore’s 
total trade with the US recorded $1.34 billion while trade with the USSR reached $174 
million. In 1975, US-Singapore trade shot to $4.8 billion whereas Soviet-Singapore 
trade shrank to $144 million. 47  Trade with the Soviet Union was clearly not a 
motivation for Singapore to put its relations with a major trade partner at risk. Finally 
and most significantly, Singh contends that Singapore benefitted from the efforts by the 
major powers to keep the “vital sea lanes of communications” open.48 In November 
1971, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore issued a statement  claiming “exclusive 
responsibility” over the safety of navigating in the Strait of Malacca.49 One section of 
the declaration included by Indonesia and Malaysia asserted that the Straits of Malacca 
and Singapore were not international straits, implying that the Malaysian and 
Indonesian governments could challenge the right of free passage along the two 
straits.50 Singapore did not possess the leverage to prevent Malaysia and Indonesia from 
‘nationalising’ the Strait of Malacca.51 Since both major power blocs had stakes in the 
free passage along the Malacca Strait, Singapore could depend on their stronger 
bargaining positions to maintain the status quo in the sea lanes that crossed Singapore.52 
Plans to nationalise the Strait of Malacca were stalled when Malaysia and Indonesia 
disagreed over Southeast Asia’s neutralisation.53 Eventually, the issue of free passage 
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through the Malacca Strait was resolved at the Law of the Sea Conference in 1977.54 
Hence, the Singapore government preferred the presence of major powers in the region 
because such a dynamic created a stable balance of influence in Southeast Asia.55 
Closer Singapore-USSR relations drove the US government to re-assess the 
strategic importance of Singapore in the 1970s. Before 1966, the United States had little 
stake in Singapore’s security. But by 1966, Singapore had become an increasingly 
crucial part of American containment strategy in Asia, chiefly due to American military 
entanglement in Vietnam. In 1966, the Defense Department linked Singapore’s strategic 
importance with US military operations in the Indian Ocean.56 When the British 
government announced its policy of withdrawal from the Malaysia-Singapore subregion 
in 1967, the US government began to view Singapore’s importance as part of the 
American containment strategy against the PRC. A 1972 study conducted by an 
Interagency Study Group (ISG), formed by various branches within the US State 
Department and Defense Department, remarked that Singapore was important to 
American interests because of the “large and growing U.S. investment” in Singapore.57 
The ISG laid out US strategic objectives in Singapore and proposed ways of meeting 
those objectives in the midst of emerging circumstances such as  
the British decision to withdraw a significant portion of its military forces from 
Singapore, previous Anglo-Australian difficulties with the Singapore 
Government in nailing down arrangements for their residual forces, the 
progressive expansion of Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean, and recent Soviet 
attempts to increase their influence in Singapore.58 
As reported in the 1972 Singapore Study by the ISG, the US Commander-in-
Chief of the Pacific (CINCPAC) considered the possible loss of America’s access to 
Singapore naval dockyards to be “nearly as critical as losing [US] base rights in the 
Philippines or Japan”.59 The ISG calculated that a countervailing US Navy presence in 
the Indian Ocean could be supported from Singapore with “much less cost in terms of 
ship time and forces required” in comparison to other bases available to the United 
States.60 If a USN presence in the east of the Indian Ocean were called for, Singapore 
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would be “commanding an importance far greater than its small size and relatively 
small population”.61 But CINCPAC’s position was not shared by all members of the 
ISG. Although some “high level planners” considered Singapore to be more significant 
than US bases in Japan and the Philippines, there were members in the ISG who 
demurred.62 Hence, the decision on whether the United States should increase its 
military presence in Singapore was shelved.  
The ISG asserted that Singapore was situated in a strategic position in “the 
southern Asia and Pacific region from which the U.S. or USSR can project military, 
political, economic and psychological interests”.63 The ISG elaborated that 
[a]lthough the U.S. has no vital interests in Singapore, the free world and the 
U.S. do have an important concern that Singapore shall remain free of undue 
Soviet or PRC influence.… The consensus of this Interagency Study supports 
that summary. It is important that the U.S. maneuver in all areas (military, 
economic, political, and psychological) to maintain an advantageous position in 
Singapore relative to the Soviets, but this should not be done at the expense of 
other PACOM countries [countries under the protection of the US Pacific 
Command].64 
Yet it was not “feasible or necessary…for the U.S. to occupy this [Singapore] base 
formally and conspicuously”.65 The ISG recommended that the US “must simply ensure 
that the facilities are operative and in friendly hands, and continuously receptive to the 
accommodation of U.S. vessels and aircraft.”66 In sum, Singapore was not sufficiently 
critical to free world interest to warrant a formal military deployment by the Americans. 
Singapore’s significance lay in the possibility that America’s enemies would have 
access to a potent asset against the free world if Singapore allowed the Soviet Union or 
the PRC access to its naval dockyards. 
The Singapore Study also evaluated the Singapore government’s attitudes 
towards the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The ISG assessed that Lee Kuan 
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Yew was “especially sensitive to China’s intentions toward Singapore” and would 
continue with his “flirtation with the Soviet Union” in light of the reduction of forces by 
the US in Vietnam.67 The study also highlighted that Lee had said publicly that the 
Soviet Union would be “one of the countervailing forces to China” in Southeast Asia, 
and he considered a Soviet naval presence “inevitable”.68 In fact, at the height of Lee 
Kuan Yew’s anti-American press campaign in late 1965, he threatened to offer the 
Soviet Union a military base in Singapore if the Malaysian government invited 
American troops to replace the British.69 At the same time, the ISG observed “definite 
indications that the USSR would like to use Singapore for ship repairs”.70 The study 
noted that 
Singapore’s location is roughly halfway between the USSR’s European and 
Asiatic ports along the optimum sea route. With a rapidly expanding merchant 
fleet and the possibility of a reopened Suez Canal, increased Soviet interest, 
activity and influence in Singapore is predictable.71 
Although the United States had a head-start against the Soviet Union in the utilisation of 
Singapore’s naval dockyards, it was “likely to have no more than a partial impact on 
Soviet influence with the GOS”.72 Since the US government feared the possibility of 
Singapore allowing access of its naval dockyards to the Soviet Pacific Fleet, a proactive 
strategy was to ensure that the Singapore naval facilities were “adequately utilized by 
the UK, Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S.”, so that “GOS [would] probably deny 
USSR access to those facilities”.73  
The Singapore Study, however, did not consider a high level of utilisation of the 
Singapore ship repair facilities to be sustainable after a reduction of US forces was 
announced by President Nixon in 1969.74 The Interagency Study Group forecast that US 
withdrawal from Vietnam would reduce the number of ship repair contracts in 
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Singapore. Yet the study raised concerns that reduced levels of US use of Singapore’s 
northern shipyard in Sembawang would have the following “disadvantages”: 
- Loss of political clout with GOS 
- Might cause GOS to offer Sembawang facilities to Soviets.… 
- Might cause GOS to restrict U.S. access to airfields for other than emergency 
needs.75 
Hence, despite the gradual reduction of American forces in Southeast Asia, the ISG 
recommended an increase in the level of ship and aircraft contracts in Singapore for 
1972 and 1973.76 By creating anxieties within Washington through closer links with the 
Soviet Union, the Singapore government guaranteed a high and sustained level of 
revenue for its ship repair business. 
The ISG predicted that a government in Singapore that was hostile to “Free 
World interests” would create “losses to U.S. investors [that] would be approximately 
several hundred million dollars”.77 Moreover, if the Singapore government made its 
strategic naval facilities “fully available to the Soviets”, it would give the USSR “a 
significantly improved strategic and psychological position in both the Pacific and 
Indian oceans”.78 Singapore, aligned with the Soviet Union and “hostile to the free 
world, …would certainly have a serious threat to free world commerce and [America’s] 
ability to defend or exert influence in the southern Asia area”.79 The ISG concluded 
that: “For the above reasons, the U.S. has a clear stake in maintaining friendly and 
cooperative relations with Singapore.” 80  But the policy of friendliness towards 
Singapore became increasingly unsustainable in Washington when the Singapore 
government appeared erratic in its attitude towards the US — most notably during Lee 
Kuan Yew’s anti-American press campaign in late 1965 and Singapore’s increased 
engagement with the Soviet Union after 1968.  
American government officials and diplomats wanted to assess the attitudes of 
the Singapore government regarding closer ties with the Soviet Union. In a conversation 
between Lee Kuan Yew and William Bruns of the American embassy in Singapore, the 
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American diplomat asked Lee about the Soviet-Singapore relationship. After Johnson, 
Lee was certain that whoever the next American president would be, the US would 
withdraw from Vietnam “as soon as possible”.81 Lee told Bruns that he was concerned 
that the next US president would “withdraw from Vietnam too soon”.82 It seemed clear 
that the Singapore government sought better ties with the Soviet Union in order to 
counter PRC influence and to keep Washington interested in Southeast Asia. It was a 
consolation to the American government that there seemed to be no hint of admiration 
by the Singapore government for the USSR or communist ideology. A State 
Department official, Robert Barnett, observed in another memorandum that Lee Kuan 
Yew did not hold the Russians in high regard, especially with respect to the Soviet 
Union’s engagement in Southeast Asia. 83 Barnett reported that Lee criticised the 
“Russians’ inability to grasp the psychology of the peoples of Southeast Asia” and felt 
that they “lacked style or even any well-defined purpose” in their activities in 
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. 84  Based on preliminary analysis by the US 
government in the late 1960s, Singapore’s intention to close ranks with the USSR was 
aimed at keeping the US engaged in the region.85 Although State Department officials 
understood Lee’s views of the Soviet Union to be largely negative in 1969, Lee began 
to speak favourably of the Russians after his visit to Moscow in September 1970.86  
Formal Singapore-Soviet Union ties could be traced to the signing of their first 
trade agreement in April 1966.87 Thereafter, both countries engaged in significant joint 
projects in shipping and aviation. In February 1967, a joint commercial shipping line — 
the Singapore-Soviet Shipping Agency (SinSov) — was established, running the route 
between Vladivostok and the Indian Ocean via Singapore.88 With SinSov, Singapore 
became the first country in the region to form a joint venture with the Soviets at that 
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time.89 More than five hundred Soviet ships called at Singapore ports in 1967,90 
followed by 520 in 1970, and the number steadily increased each year.91 In March 1975, 
a second joint Soviet-Singapore maritime company, Marissco, was formed.92 Increased 
Soviet maritime trade in Asia was driven by a sharp growth in Soviet-Asian trade, 
which doubled from 600 million roubles in 1970 to 1.2 billion roubles in 1975, and 
exceeded 2 billion roubles in 1978.93 The USSR bought 97% of its rubber from 
Southeast Asia and was destination to 12% of Malaysia’s exports.94 Singapore also 
became a ship repair centre for Soviet Union,95 which by 1976 possessed the world’s 
sixth-largest merchant fleet and ninth-largest tanker fleet.96  
When Soviet trading ships stopped at Singapore’s commercial ports, the western 
powers did not raise alarms. But when the Singapore government allowed Soviet use of 
Singapore’s ship repair facilities, the ANZUK nations quickly objected. The Singapore 
government, however, ignored their protests. On 7 July 1971, a Soviet merchant ship 
arrived in Singapore for repairs. One week later, a Soviet destroyer stopped at 
Singapore for repairs.97 In fact, the appearance of the Soviet warship in Singapore was 
foreshadowed by Lee Kuan Yew in March 1971, when he highlighted the usefulness of 
a Soviet fleet as a “counterweight” against both China and Japan, and accepted that the 
Soviets could make use of former British bases in Singapore for ship repairs during 
peacetime.98 The US and ANZUK nations exerted diplomatic pressure on the Singapore 
government to minimise Soviet ship repairs at the island but had limited leverage on the 
issue. The western powers were mainly worried about Soviet ships visiting Sembawang 
shipyard located in the northern region of Singapore, where USN and ANZUK Navy 
vessels were berthed for repairs. The presence of Soviet warships in the same facility 
exposed the US Navy’s classified technology and military intelligence to the Soviet 
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Union.99 Hence, the US government was determined to stop Soviet ships from entering 
the Sembawang facility. But the United Kingdom found it “difficult to take too hard a 
line” because the British government had allowed the Soviet Navy to use ports in the 
UK as well.100 The Singapore government became “somewhat irritated” by ANZUK 
efforts to dictate the use of the naval facilities, which the British had recently decided to 
abandon and the Australians were reluctant to take over.101 The lack of cooperation 
from the Singapore government led to a shift in US policy towards Singapore. 
In August 1971, there were signs that Washington was moving Singapore to a 
less central position in US Southeast Asian strategy. The shift was an outcome of the 
disagreement between the Singapore and the United States governments over the 
purpose of the naval dockyards in the northern part of Singapore. Washington requested 
the Singapore government to keep Singapore’s northern naval dockyards exclusively for 
ANZUK and US Navy use, but this was rejected by the Singapore government. As 
discussion between members of the Five Power Defence Arrangements neared its 
conclusion in mid-1971, the ANZUK informed the US State Department that two of the 
seven Stores Basins in Singapore’s Sembawang naval base would be converted to 
service commercial ships by the Singapore government.102 The US Navy had been using 
the Sembawang facilities for the repair of USN ships since 1966 when the facilities 
were under ANZUK control and hoped to maintain the status quo after the Singapore 
government took over. Hence, in July 1971, American ambassador to Singapore, 
Charles Cross, met Lee Kuan Yew to request for Sembawang to be preserved as a non-
commercial naval facility in exchange for more US Navy repair contracts in 
Singapore.103 Ambassador Cross argued that the US Navy did not wish to see parts of 
the Sembawang base turned into commercial berths because sensitive equipment 
onboard the USN ships would be less secure. Cross also expressed concern that USN 
ships would be turned away if lucrative contracts from merchant ships competed with 
contracts from USN vessels.104 Lee assured Cross that there would be “plenty of room” 
for US ships because Britain and Australia were reducing ship visits to the Stores 
Basins after 1971.105 Lee also disagreed with Cross’s assertion that USN ships would be 
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less secure if part of Sembawang was commercialised, telling Cross that the US Navy 
could “simply [lock] up its secret equipment” as Lee had seen being done in Malta.106 
The issue of Soviet ships using Singapore’s naval facilities became the most 
sensitive subject in US-Singapore diplomacy throughout 1972. 107  On one hand, 
Washington feared that the Singapore government was “considering increased Soviet 
use of Singapore naval facilities”.108 On the other hand, the US government could not 
impose its thinking on the Singapore government, which guarded Singapore’s non-
aligned image. Washington had to rely on the ANZUK to influence the views of the 
Singapore government regarding the matter of Soviet ships using the Singapore 
dockyards. But even the ANZUK powers had differing positions on the increase of 
Soviet ships in Singapore. Like the Americans, the Australians were “standing firm 
against any increase” of Soviet ships in the Singapore dockyards.109 The British were 
uncertain if the Singapore government could be persuaded and predicted that the US 
and the ANZUK might “in the end have to settle for keeping the Soviets out of the 
ANZUK naval base area of Sembawang”.110 London proposed that the Singapore 
government could be advised to take an “even-handed” approach and “bar both US and 
Soviet naval vessels” from using Singapore’s naval facilities.111 London’s suggestion 
“incensed” the Australians, not only because it failed to share their view that the 
increased Soviet presence in Singapore was a security threat to its allies, but also that it 
revealed the remoteness of London’s thinking vis-a-vis Canberra. 112  The British 
government promptly “dropped” the suggestion.113 
Eventually, after consultation with the US government, the ANZUK powers 
formally submitted their protest to the Singapore government. The ANZUK opposed 
any type of communist vessel berthing at any time in or near Sembawang, where USN 
and ANZUK Navy ships were located.114 They also opposed “communist intelligence-
gathering vessels” visiting any part of Singapore. Finally, they objected to “communist 
warship repairs anywhere in Singapore”, including “any communist warship calls 
except for brief, formal visits”.115 After the ANZUK “reiterated to the GOS, both orally 
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and in written form, their four major points”, the issue of Soviet vessels using 
Singapore’s naval facilities seemed to have “quieted down”.116 To ensure that the 
Singapore government was able to respond to the ANZUK protest, Washington planned 
to provide intelligence on the movement of Soviet ships in or near Singapore waters so 
that the Singapore government could turn away intelligence-gathering Soviet ships in 
advance.117 The US State Department noted that “the Singaporeans seemingly accepted 
the points made by the ANZUK powers and probably the matter is now best left 
unmentioned by US officials”.118  
To keep the Singapore government more accountable, Washington would pass 
the information to the Singapore government through the ANZUK, who would monitor 
the actions of the Singapore government. The US State Department opined that sharing 
key intelligence with Singapore would bind the Singapore government to being “more 
cooperative in general on this issue”.119 Country Director for Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore at the US State Department, Theodore Heavner, wanted to ensure that the 
ANZUK would not pass on the information to the Malaysian government, a member of 
the Five Power Defence Arrangements. Heavner posited that “since the GOM has not 
asked for it, the potential for a security leak would be increased, and we see no direct 
benefit to the USG”.120 Furthermore, the State Department was concerned that the 
Malaysian government had recently “made a deal to let the USSR build a 400 million 
Singapore dollar dam in Pahang which will result in Soviets running all over the 
place”.121 In fact, among the five founding countries of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), Malaysia was the top trading partner with the Soviet Union 
from 1970 to 1975.122 Soviet-Singapore trade was 8.4 million roubles in 1970, while 
Soviet-Malaysian trade hit 112.6 million roubles that year.123 It was nonetheless crucial 
for the ANZUK powers to treat Malaysia and Singapore with parity. The passing of 
intelligence to Singapore without dispatching a copy to Kuala Lumpur could potentially 
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damage the cohesion of the FPDA if the Malaysian government were to find out.124 
After months of negotiation between Washington, London, Canberra and Wellington, it 
was finally decided that US intelligence on Soviet movement near Singapore would be 
quietly passed to the Singapore government through the ANZUK. If the Malaysian 
government came to know about it, “the ANZUK response would be to the effect that 
[they] had regarded the matter as a Singapore problem and were therefore trying to deal 
with it in Singapore”.125  
Closer ties with the Soviet Union did not reduce Lee Kuan Yew’s frequent visits 
to the United States. During his visits, American officials plumbed Lee’s views on the 
Russians. In September 1970, Lee visited Moscow for eight days. He praised Soviet 
leaders for “displaying a profound understanding of the problems which Southeast 
Asian countries were facing”.126 Lee’s Moscow visit was closely followed by a visit to 
the United States in October 1970. During Lee’s visit to Boston, Lucian W. Pye from 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology hosted Lee at the university. Over dinner 
conversations, Lee told his American hosts that “things have improved in the Soviet 
Union…, [but] gone down in this country”.127 President Nixon’s National Security 
Advisor, Henry Kissinger, “like everyone else in Washington”, also pressed Lee to 
discuss “the Soviet ship business”.128 Lee’s visit to the US signified that he would 
maintain personal relations with American officials and academics despite disagreement 
between the two governments over the Soviet ship issue. 
The issue of Soviet ships using Singapore’s ship repair facilities was temporarily 
resolved in early 1973. Lee Kuan Yew declared in an interview that “there was no 
reason for the Russians to develop a habit of using Singapore ship repair facilities since 
such facilities would not be available to them ‘when they were really required’” by the 
ANZUK and the US ships.129 Lee stated that “the ANZUK presence…preempt[ed] the 
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use of the naval base against any possible Russian commercial uses”.130 Happily, the 
State Department concluded: 
[Lee] made it clear that we are welcome and the Russians are not. As a result of 
this apparent shift in the [Singapore] Government’s public posture, we have felt 
confident that the GOS would tolerate, and, in fact, welcome a greater use of 
Singapore by the US Navy.131 
The US State Department’s optimism was short-lived. Disagreement over the 
issue of Soviet ships in Singapore was revived after the Australian government 
announced its withdrawal from Singapore in December 1973. Washington observed 
“some erosion in the GOS position” on restricting Soviet ships visiting Singapore’s 
naval dockyards.132 State Department official, Theodore Heavner, reported in April 
1974 that six Soviet merchant ships were docked at the Stores Basin in Sembawang, “at 
least three of which arrived without advance GOS notification to ANZUK”.133 The 
Singapore government attributed the lack of notification to a “bureaucratic mix up and 
promised to give notice in future”.134 The Singapore government used the occasion to 
assert that restrictions on Soviet vessels using Sembawang shipyard only applied to 
warships. Singapore’s interpretation was contrary to the ANZUK/US demand, which 
wanted the ban to apply to all Soviet vessels. Yet with the FPDA weakened by the 
Australian decision and the complete British withdrawal that followed, the ANZUK 
powers had surrendered their leverage over the matter.135 It was then up to the United 
States government to increase USN usage of Sembawang to compensate for the 
declining ANZUK use with the announced withdrawals by the Edward Heath 
government in the UK and the Gough Whitlam government in Australia. The US 
government needed to secure access to Singapore’s northern dockyards, or at least keep 
the Soviet Pacific Fleet away from the area, but the ANZUK could no longer be 
depended on to influence the Singapore government. 
Yet the US government’s attempt to establish a permanent naval presence in 
Singapore did not amount to much. In the July 1971 meeting between Ambassador 
Cross and Lee Kuan Yew, the American ambassador asked about the possibility of 
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“maintaining some regular US Naval presence in Singapore over the long haul”.136 
Lee’s response, according to Cross, was “unclear”.137 Cross was testing the prime 
minister’s initial reaction towards a proposal to “homeport” some USN ships after the 
US withdrew from Vietnam.138 Lee rejected the “homeporting” arrangement because he 
was worried about “incidents” involving US servicemen on shore leave.139 He told 
Cross that “any kind of ‘punch up’ would create grave political difficulties” for the 
Singapore government and could “cost him an election”.140 Ambassador Cross took 
offence in Lee’s assertion that the British and Australians “had smooth ways of keeping 
their forces out of trouble with the [local] population” but the Americans were incapable 
of doing the same.141 Lee’s view on the sensitivity of American military presence could 
be attributed to attempts by the Barisan Sosialis to protest against the American R&R 
program in July 1966, and turn Vietnam into a domestic political issue against the 
PAP.142 In facts, laws were passed by the PAP government in August 1966 to restrict 
press publications on the R&R program and US ship visits.143 When opinions between 
the two men became too “obscure”, the meeting ended with both parties agreeing that 
US naval presence in Singapore would only be considered if it benefited both 
governments.144 Throughout the meeting with Cross, Lee insisted that homeporting US 
Navy ships in Singapore and keeping Sembawang exclusive for USN ships would not 
benefit Singapore.   
Lee was unwilling to allow the United States to establish a military base on the 
island because of Singapore’s experience with the British bases that were leaving in 
December 1971. Lee’s speech was quoted in the ISG study in August 1972: 
We do not want a U.S. base in Singapore. I have just gotten through all the 
problems of unemployment and dislocation of employees as a result of the 
British forces being drastically rundown.… We do not want to have our people 
working as servants, cooks, grocers and dry cleaners for American service 
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families stationed in Singapore. But we shall be happy to do a technical job for 
them.145 
Although Lee rejected the proposal for a permanent US military presence, he assured 
the American ambassador in July 1971 that Singapore would not turn away American 
ships that needed to use Singapore’s repair facilities.146  
The US State Department was looking for a stronger commitment from the 
Singapore government on American access to the Singapore naval dockyards after the 
British withdrawal. Since the US government could not establish an American naval 
base in Singapore, Washington had to consider the contingency that the USN might not 
be able to use the Singapore dockyards in the future. As a result, State Department 
planners reduced Singapore’s role within US strategy in Southeast Asia. In 1971, 
Theodore Heavner stated that assessment of Singapore’s significance should focus on 
“the strategic importance of the [Malacca] Straits or ‘the water passageways between 
the Indian and Pacific oceans’”.147 The United States government no longer regarded 
Singapore as a key element in its strategy for Southeast Asian security as it did in the 
late 1960s, but as one of several bases that could be used to secure a vital strategic area 
— the Strait of Malacca.148 Heavner also stressed the necessity of ensuring “the 
declining military significance of Singapore over the long haul”.149 According to 
Heavner’s analysis, Singapore would only be “vital” in the case of naval conflict 
between the US and the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean — a scenario considered to 
be “a remote contingency” in 1971. 150  Furthermore, easing tensions between 
Washington and Moscow in the early 1970s meant that Washington now aimed to 
“minimize” rather than “deny” Soviet influence. 151  Heavner further argued that 
technological development in weaponry and aircraft carriers meant that Singapore’s 
geographical location had lost its “strategic value” in a “nuclear and missile age”.152 But 
as long as the US remained engaged in armed conflict in Vietnam, Heavner posited that 
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the U.S. is interested in assuring continued pro-Western influence in Singapore 
and denying increases in Soviet influence. In terms of military facilities in 
Singapore, U.S. strategic interests are served to the extent that the GOS grants 
preferential access to the U.S. and other free world forces vis-a-vis the 
Soviets.153 
According to the US State Department, Singapore was not unimportant, but should 
gradually become less important strategically. 
Theodore Heavner also pointed out in 1971 that Singapore did not possess 
“much political clout in the region”.154 All three of Singapore’s closest neighbours 
Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, were more important to the US in political and 
economic terms than was Singapore. 155  Hence, to reflect the State Department’s 
position on Singapore accurately, Heavner suggested that it was vital to consider the 
“political ‘isolation’ of Singapore” in the region, since Singapore’s relations with 
regional countries were such that its political influence was “in many ways actually 
negative”.156 The US State Department concluded that the United States’ relations with 
Malaysia and Indonesia outweighed Singapore in importance when measured by the 
higher degree of influence possessed by Malaysia and Indonesia in the Strait of 
Malacca. A Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation (PARA) Study conducted by the 
US State and Defense Departments in 1973 concluded that 
Malaysia’s aspirations for sovereignty over and control of traffic in its claimed 
portion of the Malacca Straits poses the most immediate and serious threat to 
U.S. interests vis-a-vis Malaysia. A determined Malaysian prosecution of its 
position could cause a serious deterioration in our good relations with that 
country and jeopardize other U.S. interests in Malaysia. Indonesia’s position on 
the issue will directly influence Malaysia, and other regional and developing 
nations’ positions will also affect the GOM’s negotiating stance.157 
Within the context of American interests along the Malacca Strait, Singapore mattered 
far less than Malaysia and Indonesia. 
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On another level, personal relationships between US officials and the Singapore 
leadership began to lose the mutual admiration evident in State Department documents 
in the late 1960s. A background document drafted by the State Department in 1972 
hinted at signs of tension between the Singapore and US government officials. The 
paper noted “a brief deterioration in 1971 when Lee again accused the U.S. of engaging 
in clandestine political action in Singapore”.158 In 1972, the US State Department 
drafted a briefing paper for American officials visiting Singapore that revealed a change 
of perception in Washington towards Singapore; words of praise and admiration for 
Singapore’s leaders noticeable in the late 1960s were replaced by perfunctory, and 
somewhat cynical, notes on the Singapore government. Describing the Singapore 
leadership, the State Department remarked that 
[t]hey see themselves as the most successful, sophisticated, and cosmopolitan 
leaders in Southeast Asia, and they are accustomed to having high-level 
American and European statesmen listen courteously to them as “spokesmen for 
Asia”.159 
The State Department also outlined Singapore’s non-aligned foreign policy and its 
influence on Singapore’s perception of the United States: 
[T]he Singapore leadership…seeks to “balance off” the great powers in order to 
maintain maximum independence for Singapore. They appear to be convinced 
that all the great powers, including the U.S., are unreliable in their relations with 
small countries and will quite readily sacrifice the interests of small partners.160 
Washington’s change of perception towards Singaporean leaders reflected substantive 
changes in US policy towards Singapore. The US government had become less 
sympathetic to Singapore’s non-aligned policy. 
The US State Department found itself in a weak negotiating position not only 
over the Soviet ship repairs, but also when the Singapore government requested to buy 
sophisticated military equipment from the US. The State Department attempted to 
prevent Singapore’s poisoned shrimp defence strategy from triggering a regional arms 
race. Nevertheless, US government officials hesitated to refuse the Singapore defence 
ministry’s requests because “should Western sources deny purchase of a specific 
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weapons systems or material which Singapore deems vital to its military posture, the 
possibility that it will turn to a communist source cannot be ruled out”.161 When the 
Singapore government showed persistent interest in the F-4 supersonic aircraft and 
modern artillery equipment, such as the M-109, US embassy officials often resorted to 
delaying tactics instead of rejecting Singapore’s requests.162  
For the sake of both governments’ interests, however, political and strategic 
misalignments between Washington and the Singapore government between 1970 and 
1973 did not plunge US-Singapore relations into crisis. In fact, a de-emphasis on 
Singapore’s military role in the eastern Indian Ocean region did not exclude Singapore 
entirely from US strategic planning. US Defense Department policy in Southeast Asia 
now positioned Singapore as a provider of key “logistic support facilities for naval units 
conducting operations and port visits”.163 The approach of the US Defense and State 
Departments was to attenuate Singapore’s military importance and accentuate its 
logistical and economic significance. Heavner argued that the US government should 
“continue our present policy of encouraging American investment and generally 
supporting economic development in Singapore”.164 During the early 1970s, Singapore 
did not seem to have experienced the much-forecast economic, political and strategic 
crises created by the British military withdrawal. The American embassy in Singapore 
commented in March 1972 that: “The GOS considers that it has no unemployment 
problem now.”165 In 1972, Singapore had accumulated reserves of up to US$2 billion, 
indicating the depth of its financial stability, and trade between Singapore and the 
United States amounted to US$650 million.166 Soviet-Singapore trade, on the other 
hand, was fluctuating at approximately US$40-60 million per year between 1965 and 
1973.167 
The US government’s approach towards Singapore in response to the Singapore 
government’s strengthening ties with the Soviet Union was encapsulated in the 
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Interagency Study Group’s 1972 Singapore Study. The ISG recommended that the 
United States should maintain a policy of “current low key supportive role”, with 
“certain modifications”.168 The US government would increase ship visits to Singapore 
to about 100 a year, maintain a volume of ship and watercraft repair contracts that 
would utilise Singapore’s Sembawang naval base, maintain aircraft repair contracts in 
Singapore at a minimum level of US$2 million for 1973, and continue to promote 
American investments into Singapore.169 The Singapore Study further recommended 
that the US government should continue to give low-key support to the Five Power 
Defence Arrangements in order to preserve the US Navy’s continued use of the 
Singapore naval base. Most important, it recommended that the US government expand 
the scope of military equipment that could be supplied to Singapore by modifying the 
National Disclosure Policy to give Singapore greater access to confidential information 
and munitions. By allowing Singapore more choices for purchasing US military 
equipment, the ISG argued that it would remove the constant irritant of Singapore 
having to wait for State Department and Congress clearance before purchasing 
equipment classified as ‘Confidential’. Politically, giving Singapore more access to 
confidential US material and information would encourage Singapore to be more 
dependent on US military equipment and technical assistance, and demonstrated US 
support and trust towards the Singapore government.170 A likely result of including 
Singapore into the National Disclosure Policy, however, would be a possible request by 
the Malaysian government to enjoy a similar status with Singapore — a consequence 
the ISG deemed as tolerable since both countries were governed by anti-communist 
governments. A major concern was the risk that Malaysia and Singapore would start a 
regional arms race, but that too, the ISG was confident the US government could 
handle.171  
From 1968 to 1972, the United States-Singapore relationship became strained as 
result of the Singapore leadership’s loss of confidence in the US government’s 
commitment to Southeast Asian security. To ensure that the US continue to maintain its 
strategic interest in Singapore, the Singapore government indicated its willingness to 
shift away from western influence by increasing Soviet-Singapore engagement. Closer 
diplomatic and commercial links with the Soviet Union led to a deterioration in US-
Singapore relations, especially when the US State Department and embassy in 
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Singapore viewed Soviet ships in Singapore as a security threat. Still, in the interest of 
both Washington and Singapore, the US-Singapore nexus was kept sufficiently close 
through economic cooperation. By keeping diplomatic channels open, both 
governments were able to maintain a reasonably close relationship despite occasional 
disagreements arising from Singapore’s non-alignment and signs of Washington’s 
abandonment of Southeast Asia. The last chapter examines the consolidation of United 
States-Singapore relations in the closing years of the Vietnam War until 1975. 
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Chapter 7 
From Nixon to Ford 
Cementing US-Singapore Relations 
 
During the Nixon administration, the Singapore government and the United 
States government enjoyed strong diplomatic relations, marred only by Singapore’s 
increased engagement with the Soviet Union.1 The benefits of maintaining close US-
Singapore ties, albeit at arm’s length, outweighed the reasons for Singapore to shift 
towards the USSR. Singapore-US relations were more important than Singapore-Soviet 
ties because US economic and military support for Singapore was more significant than 
the USSR. Hence, from 1969 to 1975, despite its non-aligned foreign policy, the 
Singapore government remained closer to Washington than to Moscow. After the 
Vietnam War ended with a ceasefire in 1973, the Singapore government tilted even 
more to the US to ensure that the superpower did not pull out completely from 
Southeast Asia. The Five Power Defence Arrangements suffered a major blow after 
Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam announced in 1973 that Australia was going 
to pull back its forces from Malaysia and Singapore by 1975. With the diminution of 
Commonwealth defence commitment in Malaysia and Singapore, the period between 
1969 and 1975 became crucial years for the development of an enduring Singapore-
American relationship. 
The Singapore government depended on America to play the role of “the anti-
communist anchorman” in Southeast Asia, a phrase used by Singapore Prime Minister 
Lee Kuan Yew to describe the United States in his memoir.2 The US government played 
the anti-communist role by paying close attention to communist activities beyond its 
borders, including the Malaysia-Singapore subregion. Although the Malayan 
Communist Party was defeated by 1960, the US State Department remained vigilant in 
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monitoring MCP influence in Malaysia and Singapore in the 1960s. In March 1968, 
State Department reports revealed that the MCP had  
successfully infiltrated elements of the Labor Party of Malaysia (LPM) and the 
Partai Rakyat (PR or People[’s] Party).… In addition, there is a group of armed 
insurgents, popularly referred to as the Communist Terrorist Organization 
(CTO), on the Thai side of the Thai-Malaysian border whose stated purpose is 
the “liberation of Malaya including Singapore”.… Although there is no reliable 
evidence that the CTO is either directed or supported from Peking, the group 
slavishly follows the Peking line and could probably be counted upon by Peking 
as an implementing vehicle, should Peking decide to engage in a Malaysian 
adventure. The CTO is currently rather ineffective. However, should serious 
sustained communal friction occur in Malaysia, the CTO could be expected to 
become much more active and possibly much more effective.3 
In addition to communist threats in West Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur had to manage the 
growing instability in East Malaysia. The Sarawak Communist Organization was 
reported to have infiltrated the Sarawak United Peoples Party and was perceived to be 
able to take over SUPP with “little effort”.4 If the SCO were to come to power in 
Sarawak, the US State Department predicted that it would “attempt to bring about 
Sarawak’s secession from Malaysia and establish an independent communist state”.5 
The existence of an armed insurgent group across the Indo-Malaysian border further 
threatened the political stability and security of East Malaysia.6 
The US government estimated that the risk of a communist threat in Singapore 
was lower than in Malaysia because leftist groups had been repressed effectively by the 
Singapore government. The US State Department posited that the Barisan Sosialis, an 
opposition political party in Singapore reputed to be sympathetic to the PRC, could not 
“pose any real threat to Singapore”.7 If there were “serious and sustained economic 
dislocation or communal friction in Singapore”, however, the People’s Action Party 
government in Singapore would be under threat.8 Furthermore, if “Peking were to 
decide to engage in an adventure in Singapore, overt or covert, the BSP [Barisan 
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Sosialis] would be the likely vehicle”.9  Hence, the US government’s strategy of 
containment in Singapore was to reduce the risk of economic crisis in Singapore 
through proactive economic cooperation, a strategy that the Singapore government 
acquiesced in. But beyond US economic assistance, the Singapore government also 
desired American military protection in the region. 
The Singapore government held the view that the American determination to 
fight communism in Vietnam was critical to the security of Singapore. Any indication 
that the US was giving up its anti-communist war campaign in Vietnam would 
jeopardise the security of Singapore, which was already imperilled by the planned 
British military withdrawal from 1968 to 1971. Lee feared that 
[i]f America disengaged, the tide would go against all non-communist countries. 
Thailand would change sides and Malaysia would be put through the mincing 
machine of guerrilla insurgency. After that, with fraternal communist parties in 
control, the communists would cut our throats in Singapore. The Chinese army 
would not have to march into Southeast Asia.10 
By “holding the line” in Vietnam, the Americans forestalled a military and political 
takeover of Southeast Asian states by the communists, and also “bought time” for the 
rest of Southeast Asia to strengthen their resilience against communist-inspired 
subversion or insurgencies.11 At the same time, the US government recognised that 
American military engagement played a critical role in the region. A National Policy 
Paper prepared by the US State Department in 1968 concluded that “the U.S. military 
presence in eastern Asia and the Pacific…have tended to shield the [Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore] subregion from direct and severe forms of external 
Communist pressure”, thereby giving them “valuable time to develop their own 
societies and plan for their own defense”.12 After the Johnson administration left office, 
Lee visited President Richard Nixon in 1969 to learn of the new administration’s policy 
in Vietnam, and more important, to present a strong case for the US troops to remain in 
Vietnam. 
                                                
9 Ibid. 
10 Lee, From Third World to First, p. 457. Lee’s comments were written after the end of the Vietnam War 
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the US government disengaged from Southeast Asia. 
11 Rogers, “President’s Meeting with Lee”, 2 May 1969; Ang, Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War, p. 
29. 
12 US Department of State, “NPP: Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore”, 6 February 1968. 
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Lee made his fourth visit to the United States in May 1969. In making his first 
official call on President Nixon, Lee wanted to know whether the US had “the stamina 
to see Viet-Nam through, and the subtlety and the will to play the important but, over 
time, diminishing role” in the Southeast Asia.13 The US State Secretary William P. 
Rogers commented that Lee might also discuss the future of Southeast Asia and assess 
American policy in the region.14 The US embassy in Singapore advised the new 
administration to a build close and personal relationship with Lee, cautioning that 
Lee would take offense easily if he felt we [the US government] were merely 
“tolerating” him rather than welcoming his periodic stopovers.… Because Lee 
can be prickly and difficult, however, it is vital that Washington be prepared to 
handle him and fully understand his purposes and attitudes.15 
When Lee Kuan Yew met Richard Nixon, he gave President Nixon the similar 
admonition he offered to Johnson, that “no Southeast Asian leader…wanted to see the 
United States ‘pull out’ of Viet-Nam”.16 Country Director for Malaysia and Singapore, 
Maurice D. Bean, who was the control officer for Lee’s May 1969 visit, accompanied 
Lee for most of his meetings in Washington and observed distinct differences in the 
way Lee behaved since his first state visit to Washington in October 1967. Lee was 
“relaxed, warm and friendly in every situation” and avoided comparing Americans with 
their “British cousins”.17 When asked if the United States should resume contacts with 
the PRC, Lee recommended that Washington should do so.18 He felt that the PRC 
government would not respond positively to US rapprochement, but thought the US 
should still attempt to establish a relationship with the PRC because “a very large 
community of Chinese” outside mainland China “would welcome a resumption of 
China’s links with the U.S.”19  
Bean also noted that Lee was less critical of the Malay leadership in Malaysia 
than before. Communal violence broke out between Malays and Chinese in Kuala 
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Lumpur on 13 May 1969, bringing the country “to the brink of collapse”.20 When asked 
to comment on the communal riots, which occurred while Lee was still in Washington, 
Lee said that “the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand (in that order) were in 
the best position to offer (and have accepted) useful advice to the GOM [Government of 
Malaysia]” and “neither Singapore nor the United States could play such a role”.21 
Having previously expressed the view that the US had encouraged the Malaysian 
government to be dependent on American protection, perhaps Lee might be urging Bean 
not to appear overly responsive to requests for assistance with communal conflicts in 
Malaysia.22 
In addition to the impact on Malaysia’s internal instability, the 13 May 1969 riot 
also affected regional security. Ambassador Cross observed that progress in the 
development of the Five Power Defence Arrangements suffered a setback when the 
Australian government, a key contributor to the FPDA, had shown “a marked 
reluctance” to play a significant part in the defence arrangement since the May 13 
incident.23 The US government saw Australia as the most likely power to shoulder the 
defence burden of the Malaysia-Singapore subregion after Britain’s military 
withdrawal. Although the United States had assured Australia that the US would honour 
its ANZUS treaty obligations and support the Australians and New Zealanders in the 
subregion if requested, Washington had also stressed to Canberra that ANZUS 
obligations would not extend to Australian involvement in maintaining Malaysia and 
Singapore’s internal security. With the Australian government nervous about getting 
dragged into the internal security of Malaysia, both the Singapore and Malaysian 
governments were anxious that the ANZUK powers might delay the establishment of 
the FPDA. The situation would be graver if the new American president pulled out US 
forces hastily from Vietnam. 
Lee’s arguments for American involvement in Vietnam had been consistent 
since 1965. During media interviews, Lee gave his view that the US had been 
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overcommitted in Vietnam.24 Having already committed ground forces and incurred 
“40,000 dead, 200,000 wounded and maimed” and billions of dollars in aid, however, 
Lee urged the US administration not to “throw it away”.25 Lee argued that there was 
more to lose for the US if it pulled out from Vietnam too soon. “So I think,” Lee 
argued, “making the stand in Vietnam was not particularly wise, but a stand having 
been taken, I think it will be even more unwise to throw it away.”26 After returning from 
the US in May 1969, in a conversation with William Bruns, Charge d’Affaires ad 
interim at the US embassy in Singapore, Lee was asked to give an assessment of Asian 
leaders concerning the situation in Southeast Asia after the Vietnam War.27 Lee stressed 
that the US must not leave South Vietnam before October 1972. He predicted that the 
US Congressional election in 1970 would increase the “pressures on President [Nixon] 
to withdraw from Vietnam too soon”, and holding on until just before the November 
1972 US Presidential elections would be a sound strategy for Nixon to win re-election.28 
If American logistical and military support continued after the US withdrawal and 
elections were held successfully in South Vietnam that year, Lee judged that the 
situation would “probably be all right for Southeast Asia”.29 Yet Lee was less optimistic 
about the situation if the South Vietnamese government fell, predicting that the Thais 
would “cave in” and the Malaysians would not be able to contain the communists.30 In a 
memorandum of conversation recorded by William Bruns one month later, he 
highlighted that Lee warned US Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral 
McCain, that US credibility was at stake if it pulled out of Vietnam “as early as 1970 or 
1971”.31 Lee’s counsel to the US government did not seem to alter the intentions of the 
Nixon administration to exit Vietnam. 
In July 1969, President Nixon outlined the foreign policy approach of his 
administration in a press conference held in the American military bases at Guam.32 
President Nixon’s foreign policy pronouncement was commonly referred to as the 
Nixon, or Guam, Doctrine. President Nixon also announced a withdrawal of 25,000 
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troops from South Vietnam. The Nixon Doctrine struck Lee Kuan Yew as a preamble 
for a quick and complete US withdrawal from Vietnam.33 Weeks later, President Nixon 
announced that he would double the number of troops to be withdrawn. In late 1969, 
Ambassador Francis Galbraith reported that Lee’s “outlook was as gloomy as 
[Galbraith] had ever seen it”, and Lee “had large doubts about [US] policy in Viet-
Nam”.34 Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman was equally concerned about 
“the will and capability of the United States to safeguard the security of the Southeast 
Asian region”, especially when the Malaysian government regarded US involvement in 
the Vietnam War as an aid to Malaysia.35 At the Commonwealth Conference, soon after 
the US withdrawal was announced, Lee observed that the news was a “crushing blow” 
to the Australians and New Zealanders.36 Lee heard an Australian government official at 
the Conference expressing “grave doubts about the dependability of the US”.37 For the 
Singapore government, the planned US withdrawal coupled with the British withdrawal 
warranted a significant re-assessment of Singapore’s strategy to rely on powerful 
western countries for its defence.  
The Singapore government consequently developed plans to mitigate the 
negative impact of the US military withdrawal from Vietnam. A series of studies 
conducted by the American embassy in Singapore in late 1969 reported that 
a) the GOS is deeply disturbed that the US disengagement in Vietnam and the 
UK withdrawal from this [Malaysia-Singapore] area are happening at more or 
less the same time; 
b) because of this growing insecurity, the Singaporeans are more determined 
than ever to implement Lee Kuan Yew’s “poison shrimp” defense concept, even 
if it means going it alone; and 
c) little has been accomplished within the Five Power [Defence] framework to 
ease the worries of the Singaporeans.38 
It was no wonder then that the Singapore government deepened its relations with the 
Soviet Union, in order to find an alternative power to balance communist Chinese 
influence in Singapore and the wider region.39 
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Citing Soviet sources, Leszek Buszynski suggested that the Soviet Union was 
highly suspicious of the Nixon Doctrine, attributing the doctrine to Sino-American 
collaboration against the Soviet Union. Buszynski quotes Russian commentator E.M. 
Zhukov, who wrote that 
[t]he main task of the [Nixon] doctrine was, accordingly, resolution of the China 
problem in US foreign policy and in this respect the adjustment demanded the 
withdrawal of forces in areas close to China and their retention in regions 
removed from the mainland. The doctrine, therefore, was acknowledgement that 
the US and China shared interests in Asia against the Soviet Union and 
consequently was preparation for Nixon’s eventual visit to China.40 
Zhukov argued that the Nixon doctrine paved the way for a US-China “grand design” 
against the USSR.41 Not only was the Soviet superpower suspicious of the Nixon 
Doctrine, but Singapore being a small state was also uncertain of the implications of 
such a policy. 
The American Vice-President, Spiro Agnew, called on Lee Kuan Yew during 
his January 1970 Asian tour to find out the reaction of the Singapore leader towards the 
Nixon Doctrine. According to a memorandum of conversation between Lee and Agnew, 
Lee’s interpretation of the “Guam pronouncements” was that 
it was now quite clear that both the present and succeeding U.S. Governments 
will no longer acknowledge it as U.S. responsibility to prop up governments in 
the region, nor to spare U.S. manpower for the cause of others.42   
For Southeast Asian countries not formally allied with the United States, Lee told 
Agnew that it was “crucial that the Thais, who had enjoyed U.S. support and protection 
for the last 20 years, did not lose the will to resist” communist attack from Vietnam, 
should Saigon fall to Hanoi after the Americans withdrew from South Vietnam.43 
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Expressing some confidence in the Nixon administration, Lee told Vice-
President Agnew that Southeast Asian leaders had taken “a great deal of heart from the 
courage, resolution and political sagacity” in the way Nixon had taken over the conduct 
of the Vietnam War from Johnson.44 Lee felt that most Southeast Asian governments 
would rate Nixon’s policy as “most likely to get through both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate”.45 Emphasising the need to preserve “a climate of 
confidence” that the US could maintain a sense of security in Southeast Asia under 
changing circumstances,46 Lee warned that “one should never name dates and targets” 
for military withdrawals.47 He argued that “nothing would be more calculated to 
diminish the chances of a permanent non-Communist South Vietnam than by naming a 
date for total US withdrawal”.48 The US should, according to Lee, “leave the impression 
on the North Vietnamese, the Vietcong and the South Vietnamese that US non-
combatant forces will be there indefinitely”.49 Agnew disagreed that the US government 
should create an impression that Americans would remain in Vietnam indefinitely, and 
reminded Lee of “the US domestic scene and the sad fact that there were Americans 
who were prepared to side with the enemy”.50 As much as Agnew was testing Lee’s 
response towards the new administration’s policies towards Southeast Asia, Lee was 
also testing the intentions of the Nixon government for Vietnam. With the Nixon 
administration determined to withdraw from South Vietnam, both men came out of the 
meeting less assured that their plans would align.  
After the Lee-Agnew meeting, the US embassy in Singapore observed that Lee 
became more concerned over the “style and pace” of US withdrawal from Vietnam.51 
US Ambassador Cross observed that 
Lee’s focus seems to be not so much on how much or what US actually does in 
this area, but rather on our style of carrying it out, particularly by showing 
consistency and coolness.… Our task, as Lee sees it, is to provide the confidence 
which is absolutely essential if governments in this area are to deal effectively 
with communist insurgencies.52  
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Lee was optimistic that the South Vietnamese would have the confidence and will to 
“carry on alone” if some US presence remained until November 1972. 53  Lee’s 
comments hinted that the Singapore government seemed to be preparing for an 
American withdrawal just before the November 1972 presidential elections. 
In August 1971, Singapore’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, S. Rajaratnam, gave a 
speech that indicated some erosion of confidence in America’s commitment in 
Southeast Asia. Rajaratnam announced that the Singapore government was ready to 
adjust its policies to fit “new realities”:54 
[T]his Government [of Singapore] believes that the people should be informed at 
the earliest possible moment when facts have become fiction. Not only tell them 
the facts but reshape policies in the light of new realities.… I would like to tell 
you of one big fact which is today fiction. It is no longer a fact that the 
Americans are going to save South East Asia — and that includes Singapore — 
from Communism and from Peking. We in the Government never believed this 
but for 20 years a great many people accepted this as a fact and built policies 
and attitudes on the basis of this fact.55 
In his speech, Rajaratnam ostensibly denied that the Singapore government ever 
held the belief that the United States was going to save Singapore from communism. 
Yet, his speech also implied that the Singapore government wanted to inform the people 
that the ability of the US to hold back the spread of communism was now in question. 
Surely, the Singapore government had to grapple with this “one big fact which is today 
fiction”.56 In fact, Rajaratnam continued his speech by addressing the anxieties of 
Singaporeans who might feel that the Americans had betrayed Asians.57 
So if today the Americans are pulling out militarily from Vietnam and Taiwan 
they are doing so not because they want to betray friends but because the rules 
of the Power Game leave them no choice.…And I [Rajaratnam] for one will not 
judge the big powers harshly. If small nations think national interests come first 
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who are we to deny this privilege to big powers? Instead of wailing that we have 
been betrayed by our big friends, far better if small nations were to spend this 
time thinking out ways and means of not putting themselves in situations where 
they can be let down or if let down to emerge with the least possible damage.58 
Lee and Rajaratnam expressed the Singapore government’s position towards major 
powers. Depending on big powers for survival could not sufficiently ensure Singapore’s 
security and, hence, the Singapore government should think of ways and means to avoid 
being let down by big powers again. By the early 1970s, the Singapore leaders were 
beginning to articulate a balance of power strategy to safeguard its autonomy.59 
A few months after Spiro Agnew’s visit in January 1970, however, Ambassador 
Charles Cross noted that Lee had “come around to think” that the US would not be 
“totally inept” in their handling of Vietnam.60 Cross reported that Lee appeared to be 
“an admirer of Nixon’s political style” and exchange of letters between Lee and Nixon 
showed “the former’s being extremely warm”. 61  Nevertheless, Cross noted that 
sentiments within the Singapore government were highly subject to changes in regional 
circumstances. The US ambassador, therefore, recommended that the American 
diplomatic mission “should be constantly taking temperature of Singapore opinion”.62 
Cross also concluded that: “[N]obody has reversed anything”.63 In fact, not only did the 
Nixon Doctrine effect minimal changes in the approach of the Singapore government, 
but even the US embassy did not alter its approach towards Singapore. The US State 
Department and US embassy’s policy of keeping a low profile and promoting American 
investments in Singapore remained fully relevant under the Nixon Doctrine.64 In a 
discussion with the American Charge d’Affaires ad interim, John J. O’Neill, Jr., 
Rajaratnam opined that “the strength of the United States was its economic magnitude 
which far outstripped anything that either the PRC or USSR [could] offer”.65 He also 
applauded US economic contributions to regional projects that promoted cooperation 
among Southeast Asian countries. A 1973 Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation 
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(PARA) study conducted by the US government summed up American perception of 
Singapore this way: 
Singapore is a good Nixon Doctrine country: self-reliant, developing with great 
success and rapidity, and cooperating in regional economic and security 
arrangements, Singapore requires little US attention and no US assistance, yet 
contributes significantly to US interests and objectives in the area.66 
Washington would “seek no closer political and defense relationship with Singapore 
and take an essentially ‘hands off’ attitude toward it while maintaining correct and 
friendly relations”.67 
Washington-Beijing rapprochement began with President Nixon’s visit to the 
PRC in 1972. After President Nixon’s summit in Beijing in 1972, the US State 
Department reported about the reactions of the Singapore leadership: 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew doubts that the PRC will stop its past program of 
support for local insurgencies, and he also doubts that China is seriously 
concerned with a revival of Japanese militarism. Fundamentally, China only 
fear[s] the USSR, and its foreign policy is designed primarily to counter the 
Russians. It is for this reason, Lee believes, that the PRC welcomed President 
Nixon’s initiative for a summit in Peking. The summit, according to Lee, 
“bought time” for Southeast Asia in [which] to develop and strengthen its 
defense against China — ultimately the menace to all other powers in Asia.68 
According to an Interagency Study Group report in August 1972, Lee still saw 
the People’s Republic of China “as the principal threat to Singapore’s long-term 
viability, …and has consistently avoided close contact with [the] PRC”.69 The report 
added that 
[d]iplomatic relations [between Singapore and the PRC] are avoided and trade 
relations are closely controlled. No PRC officials are allowed to reside in 
Singapore.… [Lee] resents Malaysian overtures toward the PRC because they 
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may generate pressures in Singapore, particularly among the “Chinese Chinese” 
[Chinese-Singaporeans from China].70 
Lee was carrying out a “nation-building program” that would involve “bring[ing] the 
development of a Singapore national consciousness to the point that it would be safe to 
end the present insulation from contact with Communist China”.71 Lee said in August 
1971 that he needed ten more years to reach his goals but Malaysia’s improving 
relations with the PRC could force the Singapore government to end the insulation of 
Singapore’s people from PRC influence.72 
But the US embassy in Singapore detected contradictions in the Singapore 
government’s policy towards the PRC. Commenting on earlier drafts of the ISG report, 
John J. O’Neill, Jr. pointed out that Singapore was already responding to improving 
Malaysia-PRC relations despite expressing grave concerns to US embassy officials. In 
March 1972, O’Neill highlighted that Singapore had sent a table tennis team and some 
reporters to the PRC.73 The Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce also sent a trade 
mission, which was followed by a special mission dealing with shipping.74 To some 
degree, the balance of power approach taken by the Singapore government could 
reconcile Lee’s anti-Beijing speeches with the actions of the Singapore government 
towards more Sino-Singapore cooperation. In effect, Sino-American détente contributed 
to improving America’s image among the Chinese population in Singapore. 
The US Department of State observed positive changes in news reports on 
American policy in Singapore after President Nixon’s visit to Beijing in February 1972. 
In a country report on Singapore drafted in 1973, State Department officials noted that 
[t]he treatment accorded United States policy in Asia by the Singapore press, 
both in general newsplay and editorials, has undergone demonstrable change 
over the past year. This has been particularly true of the Chinese language press 
which, as Prime Minister has clearly pointed out, is the most influential in 
Singapore.75 
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Commenting specifically on the changes in the two Chinese newspapers in Singapore, 
Nanyang Siang Pau and Sin Chew Jit Poh, the report highlighted that 
Sin Chew also began to use in its columns almost everything offered by USIS, 
especially economic material.… Since the President’s China trip, …Nanyang 
has also showed considerable sympathy for US foreign policy, including at 
times support for the US efforts in Viet-Nam.76 
Although the report carried positive trends in Singapore’s press reporting of the United 
States foreign affairs, the study also noted that “news coverage of US home affairs 
emphasize the negative and [Americans] are generally pictured as an example of a once 
great society rapidly coming apart at the seams”.77  
The United States signed a ceasefire agreement with the North Vietnamese 
government in Hanoi in January 1973. The Singapore government initially responded 
with cautious optimism. In a pragmatic tone and withholding judgment on the moral 
issues revolving around the war in Vietnam, Rajaratnam foreshadowed Singapore’s 
endorsement of the impending ceasefire in late 1972: “Whatever our views on the rights 
and wrongs of the Viet-Nam war, it gave non-Communist countries in the region time 
to prepare to meet the new stresses and strains that the ending of this terrible war must 
bring.”78 His speech indicated that Singapore was ready to handle the dynamics of a 
post-Vietnam War Southeast Asia. After the ceasefire agreement was signed, 
Rajaratnam commented that: “[I]t is a necessary and important step towards restoring 
peace in the region…. But it is only one step, although a major one.”79 
After the ceasefire agreement was signed between Washington and Hanoi in 
January 1973, Lee visited Thailand. When asked in Bangkok about his criterion for 
choosing a strategic partner for Singapore’s security, Lee answered: “I think it should 
be a partner who will not let you down.”80 Since Lee had actively urged Washington to 
remain in South Vietnam until November 1972,81 he should find consolation that the 
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Nixon administration held on in South Vietnam until early 1973. In 1972, the US State 
Department reported Lee’s changing stance towards an American withdrawal from 
Vietnam: 
Lee would have preferred that we [the US] keep large ground forces in Indo-
China until the Communists were defeated, but he has adjusted to the reduction 
in our forces by arguing that Vietnamization is all right even if South Viet-Nam 
should eventually fall, so long as that fall is seen to be a result of the 
inadequacies of the GVN [Government of Vietnam] leadership who were given 
what they needed to survive if they had used it properly. It would have a 
disastrous effect on other governments, on the other hand, if it seemed to them 
that South Viet-Nam was lost because the United States pulled out prematurely 
and abandoned its responsibilities as a result of its own internal problems.82 
It was clearly in the Singapore government’s interest that the US withdrawal from 
Vietnam did not diminish US prestige and America’s ability to stabilise the region. 
Lee Kuan Yew was proactive in shaping the Southeast Asian security 
environment after the American withdrawal from Vietnam. Lee had earlier indicated his 
view that a strong American presence in Thailand was critical to Southeast Asia’s 
security if the US were to pull out of Vietnam.83 Shortly after the ceasefire agreement, 
Lee described the American withdrawal as “inevitable” and emphasised that the United 
States needed to assure Thailand that the Nixon Doctrine would be implemented in 
Thailand — that the Nixon administration would “supply them with economic and 
military assistance to help them defend their independence”.84 “If Thailand is able to 
maintain her independence on the basis of the Nixon Doctrine,” Lee claimed, “then the 
survival of the other countries in Southeast Asia will not be in jeopardy.”85 
Despite making positive statements about the future of peace in Vietnam after 
US withdrawal, the Singapore government remained sceptical of Saigon’s ability to 
resist Hanoi’s “indoctrination efforts and subversive activities”.86 Rajaratnam’s view, as 
reported by State Department officials, was that the ceasefire meant that the US, China 
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and Russia had decided “not to continue to confront one another in Indo-China”.87 In 
fact, the removal of the superpowers from the struggle without changing the underlying 
hostility of the contesting parties in the Vietnam conflict would intensify North 
Vietnam’s subversive activities in South Vietnam, engagement in political assassination 
and other “standard Communist tactics”. 88  Rajaratnam seemed to question South 
Vietnam’s capability to counter these “Communist tactics”.89 In December 1973, the 
Governor of California, Ronald Reagan, visited Singapore and met Rajaratnam. During 
the meeting, Rajaratnam told Reagan that the Thieu government in South Vietnam 
would be able to put up a “fairly strong” fight if “the North launched an all-out 
attack”.90 But if the North followed “a policy of promoting the gradual disintegration of 
South Vietnam through political means”, the Singapore foreign minister would be 
“pessimistic about the outcome”.91 
The Singapore government had understood the implication of US détente with 
the PRC and the USSR, as well as the American military withdrawal from Vietnam. 
According to Ang’s analysis, the Lee government anticipated that small states, such as 
Singapore, no longer needed to avoid being drawn into the major power blocs. Instead, 
small states should ensure that their interests were taken into consideration when the 
major powers reached their compromises.92 Since the United States presented no threat 
to Singapore, the Singapore government moved overtly to establish closer ties with 
Washington. The US State Department reported a change in attitude of the Singapore 
government towards American military presence in Singapore as early as 1973. 
Theodore Heavner wrote that 
[w]hile nothing dramatic has surfaced, the former GOS policy, i.e. holding us at 
arm’s length and even flirting with the possibility of increased Soviet presence, 
now seems to be undergoing gradual change. In short, I think I discern a tilt 
toward the US — a tilt which raises questions about our own posture.93 
Heavner observed that the Singapore government had, over the recent months, made 
several requests through Ambassador Edwin Cronk to increase the number of US 
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military personnel assigned to Singapore to perform missions directly involved with the 
Singaporean Armed Forces.94 The Singapore government asked for military training 
teams from the US to assist the Singapore defence ministry in logistics, flight training 
and classified projects, such as aerial photo interpretation.95 The US embassy in 
Singapore also asked for more US military personnel to staff the Lockheed facility and 
the US Navy office in Singapore due to increased workload.96 The clearest signal that 
the Singapore government preferred US military presence to a Soviet military 
dominance in the region was Lee’s request on 11 May 1973 for a joint naval task force 
comprising the US, Western Europe, Japan, Australia and New Zealand “to counter 
Soviet influence in the region”.97  
Only two years earlier, in 1971, the US government’s proposal to homeport 
USN ships had been rejected by Lee.98 The Singapore government’s volte face for more 
direct military cooperation with the US was described by Heavner to be Singapore’s 
departure from its “traditionally more or less even handed approach to the major 
powers”.99 Lee had been stressing the importance of a continued US military presence 
in Southeast Asia, and began cultivating a closer relationship with Taiwan at a time 
when other Southeast Asian countries were considering closer relations with the 
PRC.100 Washington welcomed Singapore’s apparent shedding of non-alignment but the 
Singapore government’s overtures towards Washington had come too late. Lee’s refusal 
to allow the US Navy a permanent presence in Singapore in 1971 was a missed 
opportunity that looked gone for good. 
Heavner emphatically pointed out that America’s basic policy was and should 
continue to be “to seek continued military access to Singapore’s facilities with the least 
possible US involvement”.101 To safeguard against unwitting shifts away from the 
policy, Heavner reiterated the following guidelines when responding to future requests 
from the Singapore government: 
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(a) Is it really important to continued US military access or to US/GOS relations 
that we meet the request? If not, we should try to avoid it. 
(b) Could one of the ANZUK powers meet the request? If the answer is yes, we 
should try to put the burden on them. 
(c) What would the reaction be in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur if we were known 
to be involved in the project? Our relations with both are more important than 
our relations with the GOS.102 
It was striking that Heavner’s recommendations reflected the unchanging position that 
the State Department held since the late 1960s — that Singapore was to remain a 
Commonwealth responsibility. Consistent with the Nixon administration’s position on 
Singapore since 1969, State Department officials viewed American relations with 
Indonesia and Malaysia as more important than US-Singapore relations.103 The US 
government’s diplomacy towards Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia was reflected 
through its military assistance to the three Southeast Asian governments. 
The United States was a major supplier of military equipment, not only to 
Singapore, but also to other countries in Southeast Asia. The US contributed to the 
stability of the region by ensuring that the supply of US military equipment did not 
trigger an arms race in the region. In 1971, the Singapore government expressed interest 
in purchasing supersonic jets, the F-4 aircraft, from McDonnell Douglas Corporation.104 
Heavner was concerned that Singapore’s acquisition of F-4 jets would jeopardise future 
plans for Five-Power Integrated Air Defence System, since the rest of the FPDA powers 
did not possess F-4s.105 Furthermore, Heavner feared that selling F-4s to Singapore 
would create interest in other Southeast Asian countries to acquire these sophisticated 
aircraft and set off a “mini arms race”.106 The State Department warned that 
[i]f Singapore were to buy the F-4, it would be the first country in Southeast 
Asia to have anything approaching such an advanced weapons system. Such a 
quantum jump in weaponry would undoubtedly send shock waves throughout 
the region, and the probable result would be increased regional tensions, a 
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Southeast Asian arms race, and quite possibly a deterioration in our relations 
with a number of important countries.107 
The State Department assessed that Singapore’s acquisition of the F-4 aircraft would 
“put heavy pressure” on Malaysia and Indonesia to acquire similar aircraft.108 Indonesia 
and the Philippines might request similar aircraft from the US government under the 
Military Assistance Program. The US government could not afford to supply these 
expensive aircraft under the MAP and would put its relations with the two countries 
under strain if it went on to supply the jets to Singapore.109 The situation would be 
much worse for Malaysia as the US had recently sold the less advanced F-5 aircraft to 
the Malaysian government. Writing to the Director of the Office of Munitions Control, 
John Sipes, Heavner warned that “the Malaysians would feel they had been misled by 
the U.S. and their heavy investment in part nullified. Their envy and resentment of 
Singapore would increase, and to some extent slop over on the U.S.”110 Moreover, the 
US government had recently refused the sale of the F-4 aircraft to Taiwan. Selling the 
aircraft to Singapore would “probably outrage the ROC [Republic of China]”.111 John 
Sipes was willing to adhere to the State Department’s recommendation to reject the F-4 
sale to Singapore since McDonnell-Douglas was working at capacity and had more 
orders than it could handle for the next few years.112 
The US embassy in Singapore was relieved to find out in December 1972 that 
Singapore was shelving its plans to purchase the F-4s.113 The Singapore government 
postponed its plan to purchase the F-4s because it had recently purchased forty A4B 
aircraft and was in the process of training pilots and maintenance technicians to support 
the new equipment.114 Heavner remarked that 
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[t]he GOS is fully occupied now in trying to digest the A4B purchase. They are 
very short of both pilots and maintenance technicians for that program.… At 
present the Singaporeans are overwhelmed by technical problems associated 
with the A4B purchase, and it will probably be some time before they will feel 
capable of taking on F-4s. In fact, the difficulties experienced with the A4 may 
lead them to postpone indefinitely the acquisition of such a sophisticated aircraft 
as the F-4.115 
The Australian and New Zealand Air Force were equipped with the A4B aircraft, as 
well. Hence, the Singapore government’s decision also contributed to the effectiveness 
of the Five Power Integrated Air Defence System. 
After the United States withdrew from South Vietnam in 1973, a Surplus 
Property Disposal facility was set up in Singapore. In December 1973, the Department 
of Defense proposed expanding the facility in Singapore from three personnel to thirty-
three, by transferring US personnel from the Vietnam office to Singapore.116 US 
Ambassador to Singapore, Edwin Cronk, objected to the proposed increase on political 
grounds,117 seemingly worried that a temporary increase in American military presence 
in Singapore would harm political relations between Singapore and the US in the long 
run.118 The State Department concurred with the embassy’s assessment and informed 
the Defense Supply Agency of the political implication of the DOD’s proposal. “We 
were concerned that once the precedent of moving out of Vietnam and into Singapore 
had been established,” Theodore Heavner told DSA, “others would try to follow suit as 
the deadline for cutting back in Vietnam draws near.”119 Even though an influx of US 
military personnel might make the Singapore government “relatively happy” at first, the 
eventual departure of the Surplus Property Disposal unit from Singapore “might be 
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interpreted as a further sign of US disengagement from the area”.120 Consequently, DSA 
agreed to reduce the number of personnel to be transferred from Vietnam to Singapore.  
Washington was similarly cautious about granting Singapore its request for 
military training teams (MTT) through the Defense Attaché Office at the American 
embassy in Singapore. Consideration was given to how the rendering of assistance to 
Singapore would affect US relations with Malaysia and Indonesia. In 1974, the State 
Department spotted a statement in one of the proposals submitted through USDAO 
stating that one of the missions of the MTT was to “design and play a logistical 
exercise, as part of the training program, which assumes small unit deployment across 
water of approximately 3,000 men”.121 Heavner highlighted to Ambassador Cronk that:  
It seems to me we would want to avoid anything that might look like we are 
helping the GOS prepare for the invasion of one of its neighbors. We have told 
ISA [International Security Agency] that we have no objection to the MTT 
designing an appropriate exercise as part of their instruction, but they should 
steer away from the “across water” aspect.122  
Heavner also advised Cronk that the MTT should keep a low profile by ensuring that 
the members “wear civilian clothes and the whole project be treated as classified”.123  
Apart from seeking closer defence links with the US, the Singapore government 
also developed stronger relations with countries in the region, especially states that are 
aligned with the US. The Singapore government began to form close, but discreet, 
defence links with Taiwan in the early 1970s. On the way to visiting Tokyo in June 
1973, Lee Kuan Yew disembarked at Taipei and did not board the connecting flight to 
Tokyo with the rest of the Singaporean delegates. In a conversation with Taiwan’s trade 
commissioner to Singapore, Peter Chang, the deputy Chief of Mission at the US 
embassy in Singapore, John J. O’Neill, Jr., learnt that 
Prime Minister Lee’s visit…would have gone unnoticed were it not for the fact 
that some alert reporter in Tokyo noticed the passenger manifest did not include 
Prime Minister Lee after the plane left Taipei.124 
                                                
120 Ibid. 
121  Theodore J.C. Heavner, “Official-Informal Letter to Honorable Edwin M. Cronk, American 
Ambassador, American Embassy, Singapore”, 11 April 1974, in DEF 6 Armed Forces 1974, Box 12, 
Subject Files of the Office of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore Affairs, 1965-74, RG 59, NACP. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
 200 
Even the Singapore Foreign Ministry was not aware of Lee’s visit to Taipei 
beforehand.125 According to Chang, Taiwan was providing Singapore with pilots for 
Singapore’s A4S program and both countries were cooperating in military training.126 In 
fact, a group of Singapore military personnel had been training in Taiwan and had 
recently returned to Singapore.127 The trade commissioner spoke about the continuity of 
the program and mentioned that high-ranking visitors from Singapore had also visited 
Taiwan over the last year. Chang also noted that the Singapore government had been 
pleased and impressed with the ROC government’s ability to “keep such visits from 
getting into the press”.128 
While relations between the US and Singapore became warmer after US military 
operations in Vietnam wound down, the reliability of the Five Power Defence 
Arrangements became increasingly doubtful in late 1973. The nature of Australia’s 
military involvement in the FPDA was altered in December 1973 under the Labor 
government led by the Prime Minister Gough Whitlam. As opposition leader, Whitlam 
had signalled that Australia should withdraw ground troops from Singapore.129 On 8 
December 1973, Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, Lance 
Barnard announced plans for the withdrawal of Australian ground combat troops 
stationed in Singapore.130 Barnard also announced that Australia would retain 600 
Australian personnel by 28 February 1974 and complete a full withdrawal by April 
1975.131 The fledging FPDA, established in November 1970 as a result of the planned 
British military withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia, was unravelled by the 
Australian decision. Australian withdrawal of ground combat troops led the British to 
consider once again a complete retreat from the subregion, after the Edward Heath 
government partially reversed their predecessor’s decision to withdraw UK troops fully 
from Malaysia and Singapore. When pressed in October 1974, Sir Michael Wilford, 
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Deputy Undersecretary at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, stopped short 
at promising to involve the US in “full consultations” after the British defence review 
had been completed.132 
When the United States Department of Defense conducted a study of the British 
force deployments in Singapore, it highlighted the impact an Australian and a resulting 
British withdrawal from Singapore would have on US strategic interests in the region. 
Having utilitised the Singapore naval dockyards since 1968, the DOD did not foresee 
that American access to Singapore’s ship repair facilities would be “greatly 
impaired”.133 The Country Director of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, Edward 
Ingraham, was concerned, however, that 
a. lack of a secure anchorage would increase the vulnerability of U.S. vessels to 
foreign intelligence collection; and  
b. perhaps more important, present GOS restrictions on Soviet access to the base 
area and Sembawang shipyard would probably be lifted.134 
In voicing concerns about increased vulnerability of USN vessels to foreign 
intelligence collection, Ingraham was echoing his predecessor, Theodore Heavner. 
Heavner reported in April 1974 that there appeared to be “some erosion on the GOS 
position” on restricting access of Soviet vessels to the Stores Basins located in 
Sembawang, the northern part of Singapore.135 The Singapore government had allowed 
six Soviet merchant vessels to use the Stores Basins at Sembawang, and insisted that its 
agreement with the ANZUK powers was only to restrict Soviet warships from using the 
Sembawang facilities. Objections from the ANZUK/US powers did not change 
Singapore’s position. In the April 1974 report, Heavner highlighted that the US DOD 
officers were worried that personnel onboard the Soviet bloc vessels could photograph 
and collect intelligence on US warships.136 The Soviet ship issue loomed larger for 
Washington when the British government announced in 1975 that it was planning to 
withdraw “virtually all” of its 2,200 military personnel from Singapore by March 
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1976. 137  Secretary of State Henry Kissinger proposed a National Security Study 
Memorandum to assess the impact of the British withdrawal and the increase of Soviet 
ship visits to Singapore, which was “apparently moving quickly in the wake of the 
British announcement”.138 Furthermore, by 1975, the resilience of the South Vietnamese 
government in the face of the communist North was in doubt. 
In April 1975, North Vietnamese troops took over Saigon, reunifying Vietnam 
under a communist regime. Buszynski argues that the USSR considered Vietnamese 
reunification under a communist regime represented the most favourable outcome for 
Soviet policy in Southeast Asia.139 “In blood, in treasure, in the sullying of America’s 
image in the world,” writes Cohen, “the war in Vietnam was enormously costly to the 
United States and a great boon to the Soviet Union.”140 The Soviet Union had 
outmanoeuvred the PRC diplomatically in Vietnam, enhancing Soviet influence in 
Southeast Asia after supporting the North Vietnamese regime with military equipment 
during the Vietnam War.141 Significantly, Moscow also wrote off Vietnam’s debts 
incurred before August 1975 and promised continued economic aid for Hanoi’s five-
year plan.142 Vietnam became a close ally with the USSR and allowed Soviet ships and 
planes to operate from Cam Ranh Bay and Danang.143 Soviet military installations in 
Vietnam “put Soviet bombers within two hours of the Straits of Malacca” and enabled 
Soviet ships and planes to “easily monitor movements at the American naval bases” in 
the region.144 The Soviet Pacific fleet was able to exert pressure in Southeast Asia as a 
result of its presence in Vietnam.145 Feeling the threat of a growing Soviet military 
influence in the region, the Singapore government no longer seemed to cease its 
flirtation with the Soviet Union and appeared to be less encumbered by its non-aligned 
image. 
                                                
137 Henry A. Kissinger, “Proposed NSSM on U.S. Military Access to Singapore”, March 1975, in 
Singapore - NSSM 218, Box 10, National Security Adviser. NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff 
Files, GRFL. 
138 Ibid. NSSM 218 was promptly approved by President Gerald Ford. Nevertheless, details of the NSSM 
218 remain classified under “National Security Restrictions”. 
139 Buszynski, Soviet Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia, p. 31. 
140 Cohen, America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945-91, p. 185. 
141 Kelemen, “Soviet Strategy in Southeast Asia”: pp. 340-42. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid. Alagappa notes that Cam Ranh Bay and Danang were the largest forward deployment base 
outside the Soviet Union in 1979. See Alagappa, “The Major Powers and Southeast Asia”: p. 557. 
144 Kelemen, “Soviet Strategy in Southeast Asia”: p. 342. 
145 Ibid. Kelemen illustrates this point with two examples. One in March 1979, where the Soviet Pacific 
Fleet sent a 15-ship contingent to intercept Chinese battlefield communications. Another in November 
1980, where the Soviet Pacific Fleet sent four warships and an aircraft carrier into the Gulf of Thailand to 
protest a “UN vote in favour of the ASEAN resolution on Kampuchea”. 
 203 
Lee Kuan Yew visited Washington in May 1975, this time to “get a first-hand 
appreciation” of US foreign policy after South Vietnam had been taken over by 
Hanoi.146 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger briefed President Gerald Ford that Lee was 
“wary of the PRC presence” and planned to be “among the last of Southeast Asian 
nations to recognize Peking”.147 Kissinger also commented that Lee recently declared 
that “the contest for influence” in Southeast Asia would now be mainly between the 
PRC and the Soviet Union.148 Finally, the briefing memo noted that Lee had worked 
with the US government in recent years when he 
- Facilitated U.S. naval and air access to Singapore, and cooperated with us [the 
US] to minimize that of the Soviets. 
- Urged the Thai not to press for a hasty withdrawal of remaining U.S. forces.149 
Overall, the Secretary of State was preparing President Ford to welcome a friend and 
supporter of the United States in a region where American military influence was 
diminishing. President Ford should respond positively to Lee as much as possible, and 
sympathetically when the US government found the request hard to meet.150 
In another briefing memorandum to President Ford prior to Lee’s May 1975 
visit, US State Department official, Robert Ingersoll, highlighted that 
Lee has consistently followed a policy of holding all the major powers at arms’ 
[sic] length, largely over concern that small but strategically-located Singapore 
might become the target of big power rivalry. In practice, however, Lee clearly 
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does not regard the U.S. as posing a threat and has welcomed our [US] presence 
in Southeast Asia as a counter to China and the USSR. US-Singapore relations 
remain cordial and free from any serious points of contention.151 
Ingersoll further pointed out that US-Singapore economic cooperation, “common values 
and a similar world outlook” constituted a firm basis for amicable relationship.152 With 
regards to developments in Indochina, Ingersoll noted that Moscow’s relationship with 
Hanoi would provide the Soviets with “a larger foothold in Southeast Asia”.153 It was in 
American interest to encourage some growth in PRC influence in Southeast Asia, since 
a stronger China might prove a useful check on the Soviet and North Vietnamese.154  
Nevertheless, the Singapore government’s position on the PRC had not changed 
significantly since Singapore’s independence. In 1975, the US State Department still 
noted that 
[a]s regards China, Singapore considers itself especially vulnerable to 
subversion because of Singapore’s large Chinese population and their emotional 
ties with the mainland, and has therefore been apprehensive of closer contacts 
with the PRC.155 
Ingersoll recommended that President Ford make clear to Lee that the US government 
would continue its policy of “normalization” of Sino-American relations, 156  but 
acknowledged that the question of PRC-Southeast Asian diplomatic relations was “one 
for individual Southeast Asian governments to decide on its merits”.157  
On 8 May 1975, President Ford, Secretary Kissinger and Prime Minister Lee 
met in the Oval Office. The memorandum of conversation recorded during the one-hour 
meeting revealed a discussion resembling a monologue, with Ford and Kissinger asking 
for Lee’s views on Asian affairs and Lee doing most of the talking.158 Asking Lee to 
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comment on the fall of Saigon, Ford said, “I would appreciate your unvarnished views 
of the situation and what to do. Don’t worry about being frank.”159 In reply, Lee 
expounded on his views regarding the Thai, Indonesian and Philippine governments. He 
advised President Ford to keep Indonesia stable by restricting excessive military aid to 
Indonesia, for fear that President Suharto might be overthrown “from within”.160 He 
also urged the US government not to interfere with Thai overtures towards the PRC 
because, according to Lee, China was Thailand’s “insurance agent” against Vietnamese 
attack.161 Lee ended his lengthy reply with this: 
If I may emphasize one point. There is a tendency in the U.S. Congress not to 
want to export jobs. But we [Southeast Asian countries] have to have the jobs if 
we are to stop Communism.… If we stop this process, it will do more harm than 
you can every [sic] repair with aid. Don’t cut off imports from Southeast 
Asia.162 
The meeting with President Ford reflected the degree of respect that the American 
leadership had for Lee. Lee’s statements reflected his proclivity towards portraying 
other Southeast Asian leaders negatively and persuading the US government to maintain 
American economic involvement in the region. 
When Lee returned from Washington, he sent a “chatty and candid letter” to 
express admiration for President Ford’s leadership.163 In his letter to Ford, Lee wrote: 
America is still the anchorman of the free world in this three-cornered tug-of-
war between the two communist centres of power and the free world. Hence, 
every major crisis, sooner or later, lands on the tray of the President of the 
United States.164 
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Lee assured the president that “most ordinary people in Southeast Asia, and certainly all 
the leaders in office, hold America in high esteem”.165 He concluded with a statement 
that was as strong an encouragement as it was a warning: “Regardless of what some 
may have to say publicly, all would be dismayed if an American President were to 
meekly do what the liberals in the media advocate.”166 
A telegram from the American embassy in Singapore to Washington in 
December 1975 revealed that Lee Kuan Yew was firmly committed to a close 
relationship between Singapore and the US. Ambassador John Holdridge reported in the 
telegram that  
[t]he very candor of our conversation suggests to me that we [the US 
government] retain a very high degree of rapport in our relationship with him 
[Lee]. I consider it implicit in our conversation that Lee realizes he has no one 
else to rely upon except the U.S. and will continue trying to work with us.167 
Holdridge concluded that the Singapore government could not depend on any other 
power but the United States to protect Singapore’s interests.  
American-Singapore military cooperation deepened after the fall of Saigon. In 
1975, Singapore’s Defence Ministry requested secondment of US Air Force officers.168 
The US State Department advised the American embassy in Singapore to reject the 
proposal for secondment because “this request would have USG virtually running the 
RSAF [Republic of Singapore Air Force], in both command and staff capacities”.169 
The Singapore government had asked for USAF personnel to hold nine RSAF positions 
which included the Director of the Air Staff, the Head of the Air Operations 
Department, the Head of Flying Operations Branch, and other staff and training 
officers.170 The State Department assessed that secondment of USAF officers to the 
RSAF would introduce “a possibly discordant note into ASEAN” and the roles 
performed by these USAF officers would not be relevant to countering the communist 
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threat in the region.171 Hence, the move would not serve US interests. The US embassy 
was instructed to offer other options to the RSAF, such as contracting a US firm to 
provide managerial skills, hiring qualified retired reserve US military officers, or 
requesting for US Mobile Training Teams.172 The Singapore government’s request was 
indicative of its degree of openness towards American personnel in its defence force. 
The end of American military involvement in Vietnam also marked the end of 
Lockheed Aircraft Service in Singapore. From 1969 to 1974, LASS developed and 
trained 900 local staff in Singapore. By September 1975, LASS had reduced its work 
force to approximately 300, and to less than 150 by the end of the year.173 Lockheed 
was due to complete its last US contract by November 1975, and since the Singapore 
government had notified LASS that it was establishing a Singaporean organisation to 
take over the work for the RSAF, it was likely that Lockheed would terminate its 
operations in Singapore after its contract expired in April 1976. The State Department 
reported that Lockheed had met its obligations to Singapore by providing significant 
income from US military programs and a US military presence through a commercial 
venture.174 LASS was also instrumental in converting Singapore from an “all European 
equipped Air Force to a U.S. hardware oriented military service”, making Singapore the 
only significant logistics and repair base with capabilities available to the US “from 
Guam in the East and across the Indian Ocean to the West”.175 The half a million dollars 
per year required to sustain Lockheed’s operations in Singapore was nonetheless 
considered to be too high when weighed against US political and strategic interests in 
1975.176 
After 1975, the US Department of Defense and the Singapore Armed Forces 
continued to carry out military exercises. In May 1976, a US-Singapore military 
exercise was planned.177 On 29 June 1976, five thousand personnel from the USN 
Commander Task Group and 204 personnel from the SAF took part in Exercise 
MERLION II. MERLION II was designed to be an anti-ship and anti-air training 
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exercise involving four USN ships and four to six ships of the Republic of Singapore 
Navy. Through the exercise, the RSAF would demonstrate its capability to identify an 
aggressive surface force and ability to coordinate its defence with the RSN against an 
aggressor.178 The political intention of conducting the military exercise was to “signal” 
to the North Koreans, the PRC and the USSR that the US and Singapore defence forces 
were able conduct a combined exercise and perform mutual support operations in the 
region. 179  After MERLION II, a similar exercise nicknamed MERLION III was 
conducted on 25 January 1977, with intentions of leading foreign nations conducting 
ocean surveillance on Singapore to perceive this exercise as “a demonstration of US 
capability to conduct war-at-sea operations opposed by ships and land-based 
aircraft”.180 Through these joint military exercises, it was apparent that US-Singapore 
defence cooperation had developed an alliance, albeit without signing a formal treaty. 
In February 1976, the heads of government of ASEAN countries met in Bali, 
Indonesia, for the first time.181 Singapore became party to the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation and the Declaration of the ASEAN Concord, signed during the Bali 
Summit. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation provided a “machinery for regional 
dispute settlements and made provision for accession to it by non-members”, which 
included communist Vietnam.182 Michael Leifer interprets the treaty as a display of 
solidarity among the five ASEAN nations and notes that the machinery for dispute 
settlement has not been invoked since its inception.183 Ly Tuong Van makes the claim 
that the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation was “the first binding treaty signed by the 
leaders of ASEAN that sought to promote regional peace, amity and effective 
cooperation”.184 Indeed the ASEAN governments were showing a united front against a 
Vietnamese threat through the signing of the treaty in 1976.185 But beneath the display 
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of unity among the non-communist governments in Southeast Asia lay the fear that 
American disengagement from the region was imminent. For the Singapore 
government, especially, the loss of US presence in the region was considered to be 
highly detrimental to Singapore’s security and economy. 
In fact, so keen was Lee in trying to keep the Americans engaged in Southeast 
Asia that he tried to facilitate US-ASEAN dialogue. On the eve of Lee’s visit to Manila 
in January 1977, he called Ambassador Holdridge at night after reading reports of the 
Philippines president, Ferdinand Marcos, making strident remarks over the US 
government’s statement on Philippine human rights and threatening to stop the 
arrangement of the US-ASEAN economic dialogue.186 The Philippines was designated 
by ASEAN to arrange the economic dialogue between ASEAN and the US government. 
During the meeting, Lee expressed “dismay” that President Marcos was stalling the 
progress of the US-ASEAN dialogue.187 If President Marcos refused to proceed with 
organising the US-ASEAN economic dialogue, Lee felt that the progress could drag on 
for months.188 Holdridge reported that  
[Lee] knew what Marcos’ attitude would be — to hold out until he received $2 
billion, or $3 billion, or whatever, from the U.S. The PM was certain that 
Marcos would not move until he got what he wanted.189 
Lee told the US ambassador that he “felt a statement of disinterest on Marcos’ part 
would…clear the way” for other ASEAN countries to start the talks.190 Lee would meet 
Holdridge again after returning from Manila to discuss the results of his talk with 
President Marcos. Holdridge concluded his telegram, commenting that Lee’s dismay 
over the likelihood of the Philippines dropping out of the US-ASEAN dialogue was 
indicative of “the great importance” he attached to these talks.191 After a decade of 
trying to keep the United States at arm’s length, the Singapore government recognised 
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that Singapore’s security and economic development hinged on continued US interest in 
the region. 
Singapore and the United States enjoyed stable and cordial relations during 
President Gerald Ford’s administration. In a letter to Ford after his loss at the November 
1976 Presidential Election, Lee Kuan Yew expressed his admiration for the former 
president. “Your integrity,” Lee wrote, “had helped to restore confidence in the 
Presidency after the terrible trauma of Watergate.”192 Ford replied to Lee in January 
1977, reciprocating the prime minister with kind words of his own: 
The steadfast support and friendship of Singapore during the past two and one 
half years enabled us to continue to play a constructive role in Southeast Asia 
and contribute to continued stability and peace. I trust that the friendship 
between our two peoples which has developed during my term in office will be 
continued and expanded in the future.193 
The end of the Ford administration marked the close of a decade of US-Singapore 
relations through the tenure of three American presidents who oversaw the war in 
Vietnam.  
Lyndon Johnson’s presidency led to an escalation of US engagement in the 
Vietnam War. Richard Nixon’s presidency created a thaw in US relations with the 
USSR and the PRC, paving the way for American withdrawal from Vietnam. Gerald 
Ford’s presidency marked the beginning of US military disengagement from American 
allies in Southeast Asia. Indeed, the Vietnam War was an epicentre for US-Singapore 
relations. By 1976, the Singapore government had weathered significant challenges 
such as the separation from the Federation of Malaysia and the removal of the 
Commonwealth security umbrella. At the same time, the PAP government also had to 
resolve Singapore’s economic problems that arose from a failed merger with Malaysia 
and high unemployment caused by Britain’s military withdrawal. Much of the reason 
for Singapore’s largely successful development was the support from three consecutive 
American presidencies to a country that was too small to be significant, but that still 
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held strategic weight. US-Singapore’s intimacy at a distance was an indispensable 
relationship that secured the Singapore government domestically, regionally and 
internationally. 
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Conclusion 
 
Singapore gained independence in 1965, the same year that the United States 
deployed American troops to fight in the Vietnam War. As the Cold War raged in 
Southeast Asia during the 1960s and 1970s, newly decolonised Singapore found itself 
thrust into a bipolar global conflict. Singapore’s non-communist government, led by 
Cambridge-trained lawyer Lee Kuan Yew, had clear preference for the West. Yet the 
need to gain popular support from Singapore’s Chinese majority, who were sympathetic 
to the leftist opposition party, compelled the Lee government to project Singapore as a 
non-aligned country. Singapore had been under the security umbrella of the 
Commonwealth Strategic Reserve and was host to key British Royal Navy and Air 
Force bases in the region, making its claims of neutralism highly questionable. The 
United States adopted a containment strategy, which comprised political, military, 
economic and cultural instruments of statecraft, aimed at limiting the influence of 
communism in Asia. During the 1950s, major non-aligned countries such as India and 
Indonesia tilted more to the Sino-Soviet bloc than the United States, creating a 
perception that neutralism was not only anti-colonial but also anti-American. US 
containment strategy was, therefore, ostensibly incompatible with Singapore’s public 
image of non-alignment.  
In a span of ten years, diplomatic relations between the United States and 
Singapore oscillated time and again between periods of strong public discontent and 
deep sense of solidarity. The Singapore government attempted to keep a distance from 
the US when Singapore sought the recognition of non-aligned countries in the United 
Nations. After gaining international acceptance for its independence, however, the 
Singapore government began to increase economic cooperation with the United States. 
Singapore became a major fuelling station for US military vessels and a procurement 
centre for American military operations during the Vietnam War. American soldiers on 
combat leave in Singapore led to the growth of the island’s tourism and hospitality 
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industries. But beyond commercial benefits to Singapore, the US military presence 
provided a psychological boost for Singapore’s security and economic stability. 
America’s objective in Singapore was to maintain Singapore’s non-communist status by 
tacitly endorsing Lee’s pro-West government and supporting Singapore’s economic 
growth. 
In 1967, Singapore tilted to the US even more when Britain announced plans to 
withdraw its troops from Singapore and Malaysia. Fearing the security and economic 
crises that could result from Britain’s withdrawal, the Singapore government invited the 
US to take over the British bases. While there was a need for the US Navy to maintain 
access to Singapore’s naval dockyards, the Johnson administration was unwilling to 
station American military forces in Singapore. Instead, the US Department of Defense 
assisted with the commercialisation of the British naval and air bases in Singapore and 
provided a stream of ship repair and maintenance contracts to keep the dockyards 
lucrative. The US government also supplied Singapore with military equipment to 
enhance its ability to build a credible defence force. 
Although US-Singapore relations were close during this period, the Singapore 
government’s overtures towards the Soviet Union from 1968 to 1972 created tensions 
between the two countries. The Singapore government lost confidence in the US 
government’s commitment towards Southeast Asian security after President Lyndon 
Johnson announced that he would not run for a second presidential term, just as the 
Vietnam War had become increasingly unpopular in America. Johnson’s successor, 
Richard Nixon, promised “peace with honour” during his presidential campaign, 
indicating that US military withdrawal from Vietnam was imminent. The Singapore 
government feared that America’s withdrawal from Vietnam might lead to greater 
influence from the People’s Republic of China in Singapore and the region. Therefore, 
the Lee government increased diplomatic and economic engagement with the Soviet 
Union in the hope of inducing Washington to remain committed in Southeast Asia. In 
1971, the US ambassador in Singapore, Charles Cross, voiced concerns that Soviet 
ships berthed at Singapore’s naval dockyards for repairs could compromise the security 
of USN vessels in the same facility. The US government, as well as Australia, New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom, formally protested against Soviet use of Singapore’s 
naval dockyards. Lee eventually succumbed to the demands of the ANZUK/US nations 
after initial resistance to give in. By 1973, the Soviet ship issue was resolved. 
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After American troops withdrew from Vietnam in 1973, Vietnam was unified 
under the communist government two years later. After the fall of Saigon in 1975, the 
USSR was able to project its military presence in Southeast Asia through its alliance 
with Vietnam. Soviet strategic presence in the region became an impetus for closer US-
Singapore relations. The Singapore government abandoned its public image of non-
alignment and began participating in joint military exercises with the United States. 
This study on Singapore’s close relationship with the United States from 1965 to 
1975 sheds light on how global containment of communism intersected with 
Singapore’s diplomacy after its decolonisation. It demonstrates how Singapore leaders 
navigated the bipolar dynamic of the Cold War in order to safeguard Singapore’s 
independence and ensure the island’s security and economic viability. While projecting 
a non-aligned foreign policy stance, the Singapore government invited US military 
presence on the island, took advantage of trade generated from the Vietnam War and 
encouraged the American government to prolong its military campaign in Vietnam. 
When the US government showed intentions to reduce America’s commitment to 
Southeast Asia, the Singapore government played the Soviet card by increasing 
diplomatic and economic engagements with the Soviet Union.  
By urging Washington to keep communism in check through military 
intervention in Vietnam, the complicity of the non-communist regimes of Singapore, 
Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines in the lives lost in the Vietnam War becomes a 
difficult issue to unravel. What the Singapore leadership did out of self-preservation not 
only prolonged the Vietnam War but also contributed to the resilience of Southeast 
Asia’s non-communist regimes against communist influence. This dissertation contends 
that, in a morbid way, the prosperity and stability of Singapore was built on intense war 
efforts by the United States during the Vietnam War. The Singapore government turned 
a blind eye to the American and Vietnamese lives that were lost in Vietnam every day 
so that Singaporean lives would be preserved, or even prosper. As bystanders of the 
conflict, non-communist regimes in Southeast Asia contemplated the effects of the 
spread of communism into their borders and chose to endorse, tacitly or publicly, the 
devastation of Vietnam brought about by war. In this sense, the Vietnam war was a 
proxy conflict not just involving the US, the USSR and the PRC, but also their 
supporters cheering them on at the sidelines. Indeed, regional efforts made to rebuild 
Vietnam after the war should not just be seen as serving the economic interests of rich 
Southeast Asian countries but also a necessary payback for a debt owed to a neighbour. 
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Many of Singapore’s founding political elites, such as Lee Kuan Yew, Goh 
Keng Swee, Lim Kim San, Rajaratnam and S.R. Nathan, have published their memoirs 
or biographies, offering a history of Singapore’s development as an independent state.1 
Their stories attempt to provide instructive insights for future generations, urging them 
to emulate the resolve and resourcefulness of the first generation of PAP leaders. Their 
rendition of Singapore’s nation-building history focuses on the contributions of the first 
generation of PAP leaders towards Singapore’s political, economic and social progress. 
Singapore might not have become a politically and economically viable state if not for 
the enterprising and industrious leaders. Yet this research argues that it was the meeting 
of these individuals with America’s opportune entanglement in Southeast Asia that 
created the conditions for Singapore’s survival. Without America’s disposition to assist 
Singapore, albeit for US self-interests, the PAP leadership might not have succeeded in 
building a nation-state within such a short span of time. This research, therefore, offers 
an important corrective to an inward-looking perspective of Singapore’s nation-building 
history that ignores a major ally that Singapore depended on for its security and 
prosperity. Although the Singapore government wanted to keep Washington at arm’s 
length during the Vietnam War, its actions displayed a keen desire to ensure that 
Singapore’s relations with the United States were also intimate. 
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